

VARIOS
-
INFORMES DE INTELIGENCIA -

Nº

| SECTOR | |
|--------------|------------|
| A | ARMARIO |
| B | ESTANTERIA |
| C | FICHERO |
| D | ESTANTE |
| E | CARPETA |
| F | BIBLIORATO |
| G | CAJAION |
| H | |
| I | ALFABETICO |
| J | EJEMPLAR |
| OBSERV. C1/5 | |

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- MEGATRENDS 2000
- MODELOS DE LAS F.F.A.A. EN ESPAÑA
- "THE U.S.A.F. : TODAY AND TOMORROW"
- EL FUTURO DE LA F.A. CANADIENSE

PARTE DE INFORMACION N° 067/90.

PARA CONOCIMIENTO DE: De Acuerdo al Distribuidor.

AREA DE ICIA. RELACIONADA: Componente Psicosocial.

ASUNTO: Comentarios sobre el libro "MEGATRENDS 2000".

I - INFORMACION

1. Las MEGATENDENCIAS, esos grandes cambios sociales, económicos, políticos y tecnológicos, son lentos y una vez que comienzan, proyectan su influencia por un lapso de 7 a 10 años o más, fijan el tenor de una década de cambios.

2. En 1982, en el libro "MEGATRENDS" (MEGATENDENCIAS), se describen las tendencias que regían en la década del 80:

- 1º) Sociedad industrial a sociedad de información.
- 2º) Tecnología forzada a Alta tecnología de gran calidad.
- 3º) Economía Nacional a Economía Mundial.
- 4º) Corto plazo a Largo plazo.
- 5º) Centralización a Descentralización.
- 6º) Ayuda Institucional a Independencia (Autoayuda).
- 7º) Democracia Representativa a Democracia Participativa.
- 8º) Organización Jerárquica a Organización Reticular.
- 9º) Norte a Sur.
- 10º) Opción Dicotómica (esto o eso) a Opciones Múltiples.

3. Estos cambios continúan, en gran medida vigentes, pero son sólo una parte del espectro al entrar en la década del 90, en la que entran en juego un nuevo conjunto de fuerzas.

En 1977, la deuda externa continuó creciendo, alcanzando los 23.000 millones de dólares, es decir 15% mayor que el año anterior. Se estima para 1978, que la deuda externa llegará a los 40.000 millones de dólares, es decir un aumento del 73%.

V.3.3. Deuda Externa.

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4. Inicialmente, parecerá arbitraria esta metodología de enfocar el mundo en una lista de megatendencias. Sin embargo, el propósito no es ser simplista y superficial, sino el de establecer bases fundamentales para construir un conocimiento mayor, proporcionar una estructura, un marco de referencia para facilitar la interpretación de los datos e información que se nos brinda a diario.

5. Los acontecimientos no se suceden en el vacío, sino en un contexto social, político, cultural y económico. Este libro describe ese contexto y lo resume en las megatendencias del fin del milenio:

- 1º) La repentina expansión económica global de los '90.
- 2º) Un renacimiento en las artes.
- 3º) El surgimiento de un socialismo con libertad de mercado.
- 4º) Estilos de vida internacionales y nacionalismo cultural.
- 5º) La privatización del Estado benefactor.
- 6º) El desarrollo de las márgenes del PACIFICO.
- 7º) La década de la Mujer en la Conducción.
- 8º) La era de la Biología.
- 9º) El despertar religioso del Nuevo Milenio.
- 10º) El triunfo del individuo.

6. No se pueden entender las megatendencias de los años noventa sin reconocer la importancia metafórica y espiritual del fin del milenio. Más aún, debemos reconocer su capacidad de evocar visiones poderosas y positivas, junto a las más terribles pesadillas.

7. Con asombrosa regularidad, surgirán los temas apocalípticos, las predicciones de cambios cataclísmicos, al acercarnos al año 2000 se ven sustentadas con encabezados periodísticos del tipo del "Efecto invernadero" y del "agujero de ozono". El año 2000 no es sólo una nueva centuria, es una experiencia religiosa.

comportamiento poco dinámico de la inversión pública y privada.

- Energía Eléctrica:

El crecimiento estimado en la generación de energía eléctrica fue de 8% en 1977, lo cual permitió responder a los requerimientos normales de la demanda, que se había visto afectada en los años anteriores.

- Petroquímica básica:

Esta industria registró un decaimiento de 3,5% en 1977. Afectada por la contracción de la demanda de estos productos, asociada al poco dinamismo de la actividad industrial y a la mayor atención concedida al sector petrolero de exportación.

- Minería:

Su producción se mantuvo igual que en 1976 debido a las condiciones desfavorables de la demanda exterior. La producción de metales preciosos presentó un panorama favorable. La extracción de oro aumentó un 38,1% y la de plata un 17%.

Una visión del nuevo Mundo.

8. La guerra fría terminó el último año de la década del 80 y la carrera armamentista se ha reducido, quizás detenido. Ha concluido el período nacionalista de post-guerra y la guerra fría ideológica, comenzando una nueva era de globalización.
9. El arte está floreciendo en todo el mundo. Hay un llamado internacional a la protección del medio ambiente.
10. Los países comunistas experimentan con la Democracia y la Economía de Mercado. Entre las naciones, el deseo de cooperación económica es mayor que el de aventuras militares con su implícito costo humano y económico.
11. ASIA ha redactado nuevas normas para el desarrollo económico y muchos de sus habitantes han alcanzado un nivel de vida similar al europeo. Existe una fuerte tendencia a incrementar el libre comercio.
12. Hasta en la más pobre nación del AFRICA están creciendo los modelos de privatización y auto-confianza. Hay un nuevo respeto por el Espíritu Humano.
13. El mundo está cada vez más interconectado, este Libro, más que el anterior "MEGATRENDS", describe las tendencias que influyen sobre los EEUU, las márgenes del PACIFICO y EUROPA, esto se debe a que las tecnologías de información, servicios y electrónica en común unifican estas regiones.
14. Diariamente, se presentan encabezados tratando temas como la droga, el crimen, la destrucción de la selva amazónica, el SIDA, la guerra química, la corrupción y déficit de dos o más dígitos, haciendo difícil pensar que algo bueno exista entre tanto mal. Los problemas del mundo reciben gran atención, este Libro, en cambio, aporta información y circunstancias para describir tendencias mundiales que conducen a oportunidades de progreso.
15. Describir las tendencias de toda una década requiere resumir una inmensa cantidad de información. Lo importante es resaltar algo de lo positivo, sin ignorar las dificultades para lograr buenos resultados.

V.2. Análisis de los sectores.

V.2.1. Sector Primario.

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La producción agrícola en 1977 creció cerca de un 4% en relación con 1976; aunque este es un desarrollo favorable la agricultura no muestra un verdadero alicio del estancamiento que la afecta desde años anteriores. Entre los factores que contribuyeron al crecimiento del sector vemos las mejores condiciones climáticas y el mayor almacenamiento de agua al inicio del año (riego). Además se observó un cambio en la composición de cultivos hacia aquellos que tienen un valor comercial, (algodón, hortalizas, soja y cártago). Podemos prever que durante 1978 será necesario importar alimentos básicos, como maíz y trigo, además se necesitará importar aceites, grasas, oleaginosas y sorgo.

La expansión económica global de los años 90.

16. No puede entenderse a la economía global como el crecimiento del intercambio entre el total de los 160 países; debe enfocarse como un mundo que pasa de un intercambio entre países a una economía única.

17. La historia económica de la civilización es la siguiente: en un principio villas económicas autosuficientes, le siguieron las ciudades-estado que intercomerciaban muy poco, y luego, por muchos años tuvimos un conjunto de naciones-estado macroeconómicas, en gran medida autosuficientes.

18. A través de los años se fueron distribuyendo las tareas económicas dentro de las naciones. En la actualidad nos encontramos en un proceso de distribuir las tareas económicas entre las naciones, con la interdependencia económica que ello implica.

19. Según GORBACHOV, la economía mundial se está convirtiendo en un organismo único y ningún Estado, cualquiera sea su sistema social o status económico, puede desarrollarse con normalidad fuera de él.

20. La nueva economía mundial se moldea por una confluencia de fuerzas. Estas fuerzas no son casuales, están todas relacionadas y se complementan unas a otras; algunas de las principales son:

- Los asuntos económicos adquieren mayor trascendencia que los asuntos políticos.
- El movimiento hacia un mercado libre mundial.
- El poderoso impulso de las telecomunicaciones.
- La relativa abundancia de los recursos naturales.
- Competencia por la reducción de cargas impositivas.
- Contención de las tasas de interés e inflación.
- El paso de sociedad productora a sociedad de consumo en las márgenes del PACÍFICO.

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Dentro del ámbito Latinoamericano, debe destacarse la creación del Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (S.E.L.A.). Este Organismo excluye a los Estados Unidos, y ha sido fruto de la iniciativa de los Presidentes de México y Venezuela; igualmente CONAVENIA auspició la creación de Viera Multinacional del Caribe (VAMUCAR), Compañía Caribaeña Central S.A. y Comité Coordinador Latinoamericano no de la Industria Azucarera.

- El avance de la democracia y la expansión de la libre empresa.
- La guerra pasó a ser un recurso obsoleto.
- La protección del medio ambiente.

El Renacimiento de las Artes.

21. En los últimos años, antes del cambio del milenio, habrá una transformación fundamental y revolucionaria en las costumbres de aprovechamiento del tiempo ocioso y las prioridades de gastos de la sociedad.

22. Durante la última década, las artes gradualmente reemplazarán a los deportes como principal actividad ociosa de la sociedad. Esta megatendencia ya es visible en la actual explosión de las artes visuales y actorales.

El surgimiento de un Socialismo con libertad de mercado.

23. Las consecuencias de esta transformación del Socialismo comenzarán a aclararse a partir de los años 90. La última década del siglo será escenario de un período extraordinario de experimentación para salvar al Socialismo.

24. Los dos principales actores de este drama son GORBACHOV y Margaret THATCHER. Esta última desmantelando al "Estado benefactor" y GORBACHOV desmantelando la economía dirigista del mayor Estado Socialista.

25. Las principales razones del fin del Socialismo clásico son:

- La economía global. En este tipo de economía ningún país, comunista o capitalista, puede sostener una economía cerrada y autosuficiente sin quedar relegado. Los países deben ser mucho más competitivos que en un ambiente protegido.
- Tecnología. Las telecomunicaciones hicieron posible una economía real; esa misma tecnología ahora acelera su desarrollo.

- La continuidad de su política exterior, relativa a los...
- La... de sus relaciones con países de todo el mundo, sin discriminación ideológica.
- Fuerte dependencia de los EE.UU.
- Política exterior que permite la irradiación de ideología...

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- El fracaso de la Centralización. Finalmente se ha reconocido el fracaso de las economías dirigistas. GORBACHOV reconoce que desde STALIN hasta la actualidad, han vivido un desastre económico.
- El alto costo de los sistemas socialistas de Estado benefactor. Los servicios sociales provistos por el gobierno central han llevado a la bancarrota a casi todos esos países.
- La transformación de las fuerzas laborales. En el mundo ha declinado la importancia de la clase trabajadora, base de los sindicatos y partidos socialistas.
- La nueva importancia del individuo. La misma naturaleza de la información económica cambia su enfoque desde el Estado al individuo. En resumen, al globalizar la economía los individuos adquieren más poder e importancia de la que tenían en la era industrial.

Estilo de vida internacional y nacionalismo cultural.

26. Gracias a la floreciente economía mundial, las telecomunicaciones globales y la expansión del turismo e intercambio entre los distintos países, ha aparecido en los principales centros urbanos de los países desarrollados signos de una cultura internacional en la juventud. Esto es más notable en las costumbres alimenticias, la música y la moda, donde reina un estilo de vida universal. El mundo es cada vez más cosmopolita.

27. Pero aún cuando nuestros estilos de vida son cada día más similares, hay signos inconfundibles de una poderosa contratendencia: una reacción contra la uniformidad, un deseo de afirmar que la cultura y lenguaje de uno son únicos, un repudio a la influencia foránea. El nacionalismo cultural se manifiesta en todos los rincones del mundo.

La Privatización del Estado Benefactor.

28. Al acercarnos al próximo siglo, los gobiernos en todo el mundo se encuentran abocados al proceso de reformulación del concepto de responsabilidad social en sus ciudadanos, especialmente en aquellos que realmente no pueden ayudarse a sí mismos.

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IV.8. CONCLUSIONES

La política exterior mexicana, sufrió en los últimos años, profundas modificaciones.

Fue durante la Presidencia de LOPEZ MATEOS que se inició una política independiente con el exterior, pero fue el triunfo del gobierno del Lic. DON VIALA que México pasó de un estado de dependencia legalista, pasiva y bilateral a otro de independencia opuesta, es decir, proactiva, activa y planificada.

DON VIALA buscó la relación personal con dirigentes de distintos países que representaran una importante suma de ideologías políticas, de categorías económicas y de sistemas de gobierno.

Su principal objetivo consistió en contrarrestar la influencia dependiente respecto a un solo país, EE.UU., con el fin de lograr este objetivo aumentó al máximo sus nexos con todo el mundo, abriendo nuevos mercados y trató de adquirir, al mismo tiempo tecnología avanzada.

El actual Presidente, LOPEZ FORTILLO manifestó que en política internacional continuaba con los lineamientos dados a la misma por su antecesor, con ese propósito ha propiciado la visita de numerosas personalidades extranjeras a México, llevando a cabo con igual fin viajes por los países del área, Asia, Europa y la URSS.

Con relación al liderazgo de los países llamados del "tercer mundo" LOPEZ FORTILLO llevó a cabo una política realista que su antecesor, dado que no abriga las pretensiones de líder de los mismos, sustentadas por ECHIBARRIA.

En el marco regional, buscó atenuar las fricciones producidas durante la administración anterior, en especial con EE.UU., al respecto trató de concertar acuerdos relacionados con el ingreso de trabajadores ilegales a los Estados Unidos, tomarse medidas tendientes a erradicar el contrabando de drogas y lograr un efectivo entendimiento en materia petrolera.

En el ámbito latinoamericano mantendrá el aislamiento impuesto por ECHIBARRIA al régimen de PINOCHET.

29. En el mundo hay un claro cambio de enfoques de Clase o Grupo (pobres, negros, madres solteras, etc) se pasa a destacar al individuo. Antes se pensaba: vamos a hacer esto, o deberíamos hacer aquello, "por ellos"; ahora se enfoca al individuo. Sin duda, lo más útil es un programa confeccionado para equiparar los potenciales individuales con las necesidades, que el Gobierno, concertando al sector privado, dé respuesta a cada individuo, no a clases, grupos o categorías.

30. Conducida por Margaret THATCHER, quien marcó el paso en este cambio de valores, la beneficencia estatal se está reconceptualizando en todo el mundo.

31. El cambio básico es de un Gobierno centralizador a uno que delega facultades en el sector privado:

- De complejos habitacionales públicos a propietarios.
- De un Servicio Nacional de Salud a opciones privadas.
- De regulación gubernamental a mecanismos de mercado.
- De hacer beneficencia a abrir fuentes de trabajo.
- De colectivismo a individualismo.
- De monopolio gubernamental a competencia interempresaria.
- De industrias estatales a compañías privatizadas.
- De industrias estatales a propiedad del empleado.
- De planes de Seguro Social gubernamentales a inversión y jubilaciones privadas.
- De barreras impositivas a reducción de impuestos.

El desarrollo de las márgenes del Pacífico.

32. Hace 500 años el comercio mundial comenzó a mudarse del Mediterráneo al Atlántico. Hoy se está mudando del Atlántico al Pacífico. Las ciudades de LOS ANGELES, SIDNEY y TOKYO están reemplazando a las atlánticas NUEVA YORK, PARIS y LONDRES.

33. La región Pacífica de ASIA es dos veces mayor que EUROPA y los EE.UU. ASIA posee la mitad de la población mundial y para el año 2000 se elevará a dos tercios. Ya sea desde el punto de vista geográfico, demográfico o económico, la margen del Pacífico representa una potencia mundial.

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IV.3. Países con los cuales mantiene relaciones diplomáticas,
nivel y número de representantes de los mismos.

A. PAÍSES DE INTERÉS:

José Antonio Lara Villanueva

Roberto de Rosenzweig Diaz

ALBANIA, REP. FEDERAL

ALBANIA

AFGANISTAN

ANGOLA, REP. POP. de

ARABIA SAUDITA

ARGENTINA

ARGENTINA

AUSTRALIA

AUSTRIA

BAHAMAS

BAHRAIN

BANGLADESH, REP. POP. de

BARBADOS

BARIN

BELGICA

BOLIVIA

BRAZIL

Juan Gallardo Moreno

BOSNIA

BULGARIA

Juan Manuel Buitrago Garcia

CABO VERDE

CAMBODIA

CANADA

Agustín Barrios Gomez

COLOMBIA

CORSA, REP. de

COSTA DE MARFIL

34. Las márgenes del Pacífico son una vasta región que va desde las costas occidentales de SUD AMERICA hacia el Norte y a través del Estrecho de Bering a la URSS, y luego hacia el Sur hasta AUSTRALIA, es decir, todos los países bañados por las aguas del Pacífico.

35. Los cinco puntos más importantes a tener en cuenta son:

- Los cambios en las márgenes del Pacífico son de origen económico y a un ritmo que no tiene precedentes.
- El cambio no es sólo económico, también es cultural. Los países de esta área hablan más de mil idiomas distintos y tienen la más amplia variedad de religiones y tradiciones culturales del mundo.
- A pesar de ser JAPON el actual líder económico de la región, el dominio será, eventualmente, del ASIA ORIENTAL (CHINA y los "Cuatro Tigres"- COREA DEL SUR, TAIWAN, HONG KONG y SINGAPUR -).
- El impulso económico de esta cuenca se refuerza con una dedicación a la educación. Ya en 1985, era mayor el porcentaje de jóvenes coreanos que concurrían a la Universidad que el de jóvenes británicos.
- En una economía global, el desarrollo del Pacífico no implica, necesariamente, una declinación de Occidente, a menos que este último ignore la importancia de esta tendencia y deje de capitalizarla.

La década de la mujer líder.

36. En las últimas dos décadas, la mujeres norteamericanas, han ocupado dos tercios del millon de empleos nuevos creados en la "Era de la Informática". Terminaron los días en que las mujeres eran una minoría en la fuerza laboral.

37. En la faz empresaria, muchas mujeres profesionales, han llevado el ínfimo porcentaje de 10% en 1970 a un nivel que va del 30 al 50% del mundo empresario.

38. Se ha cambiado un importante principio de organización:

- Centro de Estudios Argentinos "Rodolfo Ortega Peña". (26-IV-77).
- Casa del Montonero: (26-VII-77)
- Comité Juvenil de Solidaridad con el Pueblo Argentino. (10-VIII-77).

Al asumir el poder el actual Presidente mexicano, nuestro representante, en esos momentos, en MEXICO, Francisco ROLDAN SALAS, se entrevistó con el mismo y con el General ROLDAN SALAS, el cual que con el Secretario de Gobernación Lic. Jesus RUIZ HERRERA, a quienes explicó el motivo del distanciamiento argentino ante el gobierno de MEXICO.

ROLDAN SALAS manifestó que "la tolerancia con el comportamiento de los exiliados había terminado, estos seguirían gozando de los derechos de asilo, pero tendrían que aceptar las obligaciones que el mismo determinaba, según las convenciones de LA HABANA Y MONTEVIDEO".

De allí en más, cambia la postura del gobierno mexicano, llevándose a cabo hechos sucesivos negativos para los exiliados como ser: se ordenó el cierre de la Casa del Montonero (12-VIII-77); se mandó quitar la bandera argentina del frente de la Casa del Pueblo Argentino y la Secretaría de Gobernación llevó a cabo una severa restricción policial nada con el camino que deben seguir todos los exiliados, bajo pena de expulsión, de seguir violando el derecho de Asilo Internacional.

Bajo la Presidencia de LOPEZ PORTILLO la prensa mexicana, en general, mostró su agresividad hacia los acontecimientos ocurridos en ARGENTINA.

Sin embargo con anterioridad a la realización del Mundial 78 y durante su desarrollo, realizando los comentarios periodísticos adversos, realizando, al mismo tiempo a través de la radio y TV una campaña de desprestigio y agresividad más virulenta por parte de partidos argentinos en esa; volviéndose a una etapa más objetiva luego de la finalización del mencionado evento.

Después de una serie de visitas, las relaciones entre ambos países pueden considerarse satisfactorias. En algunos aspectos, se han producido avances positivos, en especial en el marco de la vinculación económica; las visitas del

de manejo, con la finalidad de controlar una Empresa, la lide-razgo, con el fin de sacar el mayor provecho de las personas y responder rápidamente a los cambios. Fuera del modelo de manejo militar, las mujeres y los hombres son igualmente capaces de inspirar un compromiso y sacar lo mejor de las personas.

39. Si el hombre era el prototipo del trabajador industrial; en la era de la informática, son las mujeres las que dominan el panorama, y es ahí donde se encuentra el futuro.

La Era de la Biología.

40. A medida que nos acercamos al próximo milenio, la biotecnología será tan importante como la computación. Todos los sentimos así. Sabemos que debemos conocer mas a cerca de ella y adonde nos conduce.

41. La biotecnología, se está transformando en una presencia importante en nuestras vidas, sin embargo, poco sabemos de este gran fenómeno científico y aún menos de sus implicancias éticas y sociales.

42. El primer impulso de la biotecnología, se aplicó sobre la salud, cuando los científicos alteraron los genes de ratones y cabras para producir proteínas y sustancias químicas útiles para los humanos.

43. Hoy, la manipulación genética de las cosechas y animales de granja se expande con velocidad. En las semillas se colocan fertilizantes y repelentes de insectos, lográndose variedades de papas, arroz y mandioca con mayor contenido proteico; tomates con resistencia a los virus y parásitos, etc.

El despertar religioso del Nuevo Milenio.

44. En los albores del tercer milenio, se cubre el mundo de inconfundibles signos de resurgimiento religioso que abarca todos los credos. Aquella juventud que en la década del 70 rechazaba toda religión organizada, hoy regresan a la iglesia llevando a sus hijos.

45. Los judíos Reconstructivistas que hace 40 años quitaban de sus libros de oraciones todo lo sobrenatural, hoy reincorporan las referencias a milagros, mitología y el Messiah.

La principal meta de MEXICO en sus relaciones con el marco mundial, consiste no sólo en estrechar los lazos de amistad con todas las naciones, al margen de las diferencias ideológicas, sino que aspira fortalecer sus vínculos culturales, buscando ayuda técnica y científica, logrando al mismo tiempo la apertura de nuevos mercados, mediante acuerdos económicos tratando con ello en forma principal, dejar de depender económicamente de un solo país, E.E.U.U. ya que más del 70% de las transacciones comerciales mexicanas se llevan a cabo con el mercado norteamericano.

A pesar de que los Gobiernos mexicanos han declarado reiteradamente que MEXICO basa su política exterior en principios inmutables, como ser la no intervención en los asuntos internos de los Estados y ser respetuoso de la autodeterminación de los pueblos, al término de la guerra civil española, Lázaro Cárdenas rompió relaciones con el Gobierno del Gral. FRANCO, reconociendo al mismo tiempo al Gobierno español republicano en el exilio, quien por algún tiempo tuvo su sede en MEXICO.

As bajo la Presidencia de LOPEZ MATEOS que se resumió y estimula el período activo de la política exterior mexicana de apertura indiscriminada en el marco mundial, al efecto y en las posturas de su mandato visitó POLO NIA, YUGOSLAVIA, la INDIA e INDONESIA; pero es bajo la carismática figura del ex-Presidente ECHVERRIA que la Revolución Mexicana se internacionaliza, adoptando posturas definitivas en todos los centros neurálgicos con-
flictivos del mundo.

Puede decirse que MEXICO, adquirió en el ámbito mundial bajo el sexenio de ECHVERRIA un predicamento no alcanzado por ningún Gobierno anterior. Nació por su iniciativa la Carta de Derechos y Deberes Económicos de los Estados, aprobada en la reunión de las Naciones Unidas en DICIEMBRE 74.

Al asumir ECHVERRIA el poder, MEXICO mantenía relaciones con 65 países, cifra que se elevó a 127, al dejar este la Presidencia, a pesar de que durante su Gobierno no rompió relaciones con CHILE al asumir PINOCHET al Gobierno.

46. Los mormones, en 1987, celebraron el mejor de sus 158 años de historia, marcando el record de 274.000 nuevos adherentes. En JAPON, los festivales shintoistas convocan cada vez más adeptos así como los ciclos de vida y rituales en las pagodas.

47. En la última década los movimientos carismáticos mundiales han triplicado su número de seguidores llegando a una cifra aproximada de 300 millones. Los jóvenes chinos y soviéticos se ven fascinados por la religión y disfrutan el concurrir a las iglesias, ante la consternación de sus mayores.

48. El islamismo fundamentalista, una poderosa fuerza política en IRAN, AFGANISTAN y en el mundo árabe, está resurgiendo entre la clase media occidentalizada de EGIPTO y TURQUIA.

49. Tanto la religión como la ciencia buscan la "verdad" pero, como la ciencia y la tecnología no pueden brindarnos el significado de la vida, lo buscamos en la espiritualidad.

El triunfo del Individuo

50. Al terminar el Siglo XX, todo se sintetiza en un gran tema, el triunfo del individuo. Amenazados por el totalitarismo a lo largo de gran parte del siglo, los individuos salen al encuentro del milenio con más fuerza que nunca.

51. Es un individuo el que crea una obra de arte, abraza una filosofía política, apuesta los ahorros de toda una vida en un negocio, inspira a un colega o a un familiar a tener éxito, emigra a otro país, tiene una trascendental experiencia espiritual. Es el individuo el que se cambia a sí mismo antes de intentar cambiar a la sociedad. Hoy los individuos influyen sobre los cambios con mayor efectividad que la mayoría de las instituciones.

52. Esta década se caracteriza por un nuevo respeto por el individuo como fundamento de la sociedad y unidad básica de los cambios. Los llamados "Movimientos de Masas" están permitidos. El movimiento para protección del medio ambiente, los movimientos feministas, los antinucleares, fueron creados de una conciencia a la vez, por un individuo que se convenció de la posibilidad de tener una nueva realidad.

53. Este no es el tipo de individualismo de "cada cual por su lado", gratificando sus deseos por encima de los derechos ajenos. Es una filosofía ética que eleva al individuo a

Relaciones con el COMECON.

En su visita a URSS, el 15 MAY 78, LOS 22 PORCINOS de la
frente a los representantes del mencionado organismo, la
organización política de MEXICO y dentro de ella, la de
su viaje consistente en la necesidad de diversificar las
relaciones económicas con el exterior, al margen de los
menes y de ideologías.

Con esta medida, MEXICO se constituyó en el primer país
de la órbita occidental que se une al Bloque Económico
de los países comunistas.

En su visita a URSS, el 22 NOV 1974, acordó que MEXICO participara
en el Consejo de Ayuda Mutua Económica, (COMECON) junto
con los Estados Socialistas de Europa
Oriental, ASIA y CUBA.

SECRET

un nivel universal; donde todos somos responsables por la protección del Medio Ambiente, de prevenir una guerra nuclear, eliminar la pobreza.

Conclusiones.

54. Estas son las diez tendencias más importantes de la década que nos lleva al año 2000. En el umbral del milenio, por mucho tiempo un símbolo de la EDAD DE ORO de la humanidad, tenemos a nuestra disposición las herramientas y la capacidad para que UTOPIA se haga realidad.

55. Hay que sobrellevar grandes obstáculos, como el desarrollo económico del Tercer Mundo, sanear el medio ambiente y encontrar las curas al cáncer y el SIDA. De todos modos, el sentido de las megatendencias actuales, en gran medida fortifican a la sociedad para que combata a sus peores males sociales, a lo largo de esta década definitoria.

56. La expansión económica del mundo desarrollado, será cimiento para una mayor evolución y afluencia global. La prosperidad no conduce a la codicia, como nos haría pensar el cinismo convencional. La teoría de la jerarquía de las necesidades, del psicólogo humanista Abraham MASLOW lo expresa bien y en forma simple: "al satisfacer las necesidades básicas, como refugio y seguridad, las necesidades mayores como propiedad, logros y perfeccionamiento, es decir, excelencia o superioridad, toman su lugar". Esto es válido tanto para las sociedades como para los individuos.

57. La satisfacción de las necesidades básicas ha estimulado la búsqueda de lo trascendental, ejemplificado por el renacimiento de las artes y resurgimiento de la espiritualidad.

58. A medida que más países logran la prosperidad, buscando nuevas áreas de inversión, los países menos desarrollados, donde la mano de obra es más barata se transforman en áreas de atracción para esas beneficiosas inversiones. Ejemplo de ello son las inversiones que los países desarrollados del PACIFICO (JAPON, COREA, TAIWAN y SINGAPUR) hacen en TAILANDIA, también en MALASIA y FILIPINAS. También los capitales que HONG KONG y TAIWAN están inyectando en CHINA.

• Acuerdo para la Supresión de Vistas. Firmado en México D.F. el 07 JUN. 1965.

Vistas:

• Acuerdo sobre comunicaciones radioeléctricas. Firmado en Italia, el 08 MAR. 1949.

Telecomunicaciones:

• Tratado para la extradición de criminales. Firmado en México D.F. el 22 MAY. 1999.

Extradición:

• Acuerdo de Intercambio Cultural entre México e Italia, firmado en México D.F., el 08 OCT. 1965.

Cultural:

• Acuerdo que crea una Comisión Mixta de Cooperación Tecnológica. Firmado en México D.F., el 20 JUL. 1965.

Cooperación Científica, Tecnológica e Técnica:

• Convenio de Cooperación entre México e Italia. Firmado en México D.F. el 15 MAR. 1965.

Cooperación:

• Convenio sobre Transportes Aéreos. Firmado en México, el 23 DIC. 1965.

Aviación Civil:

• Tratado General de Aviación Civil. Firmado en La Haya, Holanda, el 16 OCT. 1947.

Aviación:

ITALIA

SECRET

59. Los países de las Márgenes del Pacífico han reescrito la historia del desarrollo económico, saltando por encima del periodo industrial, entran en la economía de la información, donde los recursos más importantes no provienen de los suelos, sino de la gente.

60. A lo ancho del Tercer Mundo hay un creciente consenso que la pequeña empresa, y no el planeamiento central, constituye el camino a la verdadera prosperidad. Presenciar como la URSS y CHINA se vuelcan por los mecanismos de mercado, sólo acelerará el cambio del Tercer Mundo de un modelo de desarrollo económico Marxista, al modelo interempresarial sancionado, de hecho copiado, por las superpotencias comunistas. Esto vigorizará la búsqueda de la autosuficiencia económica.

61. La prosperidad y la democracia terminarán, finalmente, con los fatales conflictos regionales. El bienestar es un gran pacificador. Las 44 naciones más ricas del mundo han estado en paz por más de 45 años. Cuando los países desarrollados viven en paz con sus vecinos, una mayor porción de sus recursos puede invertirse en desarrollo económico.

62. El flagelo del SIDA y el sufrimiento que ha traído, representa y pone en evidencia el desconocimiento que tenemos de nuestro cuerpo y su inapreciable Sistema Inmunológico. Hoy, al aprender más acerca de la imagen y visualización positivas en la salud, estamos a un paso de poder ver en la misma naturaleza de la célula humana, el mismo código ADN.

63. Como dijera T.G. HARRIS, editor jefe de "AMERICAN HEALTH" "hemos comenzado a utilizar una vasta gama de modernas tecnologías de imágenes, tales como la resonancia nuclear, para penetrar en los tejidos vivientes. Hemos comenzado a aplicar la biofísica a las relaciones intracelulares como el ADN. Pronto estaremos en condiciones de combatir los virus y Bacterias aún antes de identificarlos".

64. El acercamiento de las superpotencias reduce las oportunidades de conflictos regionales que escalen a una guerra mundial. Más aún, el fin de Guerra Fría ha virado la atención del mundo hacia el medio ambiente. A pesar de que algunos podrían decir que es un poco demasiado tarde, nunca antes compitieron en-

SECRET

tratando de prestigiar cada vez más, tanto en el ámbito regional como en el latinoamericano y mundial la imagen de MEXICO.

Sin embargo, LOPEZ PORTILLO, al margen de las anteriores declaraciones ha desistido de poner a MEXICO a la cabeza del Movimiento por un nuevo orden económico internacional y se muestra mucho más sobrio, que su antecesor, al respecto.

Parecería que la diplomacia mexicana se halla en la actualidad de un nuevo realismo, el cual la ha llevado a atenuar la energía de sus ataques en materia de derechos humanos y las críticas contra los regímenes militares de la región.

A esto se añadiría cierta renuncia a las pretensiones de liderazgo tercermundista que MEXICO abrigó durante la gestión del Presidente ROOSEVELT.

Con relación a su vecino del norte LOPEZ PORTILLO trata de llevar a cabo una política de acercamiento, buscando al mismo tiempo no comprometer su postura nacionalista.

tre sí los estadistas para ser el líder mundial del medio ambiente. George BUSH quiere ser un Presidente Ambientalista. Mikhail GORBACHOV mencionó muchas veces el medio ambiente en su histórico discurso en las NACIONES UNIDAS. Margaret THATCHER, a veces suena como una ambientalista "verde".

65. En la era post-Guerra Fría, encontramos a los EEUU y la URSS colaborando en temas como la protección del medio ambiente y los esfuerzos no ideológicos, para terminar con la pobreza.

66. El significado de ese gran símbolo que representa el milenio, depende enteramente de cómo se lo interprete. Puede representar el fin de los tiempos o el principio de una nueva era. Creemos que ya se ha tomado una decisión. En las mentes y en los corazones de la humanidad hubo un compromiso para con la vida, con la utópica búsqueda de la paz y la prosperidad para todos, meta que hoy podemos visualizar claramente.


Vicecomodoro ALFONSO RUGGIERO
Jefe Departamento II

II - DISTRIBUIDOR

| | |
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| Comando de Instrucción..... | Ej.N° 01 |
| Comando de Material..... | Ej.N° 02 |
| Comando de Regiones Aéreas..... | Ej.N° 03 |
| Comando de Operaciones Aéreas..... | Ej.N° 04 |
| Jefatura III - Planificación..... | Ej.N° 05 |
| Escuela Superior de Guerra Aérea..... | Ej.N° 06 |
| Jefatura II - Inteligencia (Dpto.II División "F")..... | Ej.N° 07 |

Fue durante el gobierno de ECHVERRIA que MEXICO pasó de una política legalista, pasiva y bilateral, a otra diametralmente opuesta, es decir, práctica, activa y pluralista.

Pero fue el ex Presidente ECHVERRIA quien impulsó la política externa mexicana dándole su sello personal al mismo. Llevó a cabo una intensa campaña en pro de un nuevo orden internacional y el reconocimiento expreso de la identidad de los intereses básicos de MEXICO con los de los países en desarrollo a los que se acostumbró agrupar bajo la denominación genérica de "Tercer Mundo". Debe destacarse que a pesar de su actuación en favor de los mismos mediantes ataques verbales contra las potencias mundiales, MEXICO no ingresó al Movimiento de Países No Alineados.

Adolfo LOPEZ MATEOS reactiva y estimula el período activo de la política exterior de MEXICO, iniciando una apertura indiscriminada con el exterior, visitando POLONIA, YUGOSLAVIA, la INDIA e INDONESIA. Manteniendo a MEXICO como la única nación latinoamericana que sostiene relaciones con CUBA.

Al gobierno de AVILA CAMACHO toca ejecutar un acto de gran trascendencia en la política exterior del país, la declaración de guerra a los países del Eje: ALEMANIA, JAPON e ITALIA.

Con Lázaro CÁRDENAS comienza el período activo en la política exterior mexicana, quien rompe relaciones diplomáticas con ESPAÑA al asumir el poder el CRI, FRANCISCO Y reconoce al gobierno español en el exilio.

La tradición política exterior de MEXICO, se basa en principios inmutables y de validez permanente: igualdad soberana de los Estados, no intervención en los asuntos internos de otros países, autodeterminación de los pueblos, proscripción del uso de la fuerza y de las armas nucleares y solución pacífica de las controversias.

IV.2. Antecedentes y evolución histórica de las relaciones exteriores.

RESERVAR

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mán. Investigación de la SIDE

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Estado (SIDE),
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afirmar que esté
argentino el MTP"
iguando una even-
tero Luminoso en

el vocero presidencial José Ignacio López,
quien posteriormente se trasladó hasta la
residencia de Olivos para informar a Alfonsín,
aunque no trascendieron los detalles
de ambos encuentros.

La emisora tucumana LV-12 Radio
Independencia difundió una versión según
la cual, en la íntima cabecera...

PARTE DE INFORMACION N°

PARA CONOCIMIENTO DE: De acuerdo al Distribuidor.

AREA DE ICIA. RELACIONADA: Componente Militar. PAIS: ESPAÑA.

ASUNTO: Debate en ESPAÑA sobre el modelo de sus Fuerzas Armadas.

I - INFORMACION

1. La crisis del GOLFO PERSICO ha reabierto un debate que lleva varios años presente en la sociedad española: el modelo de ejército y, más concretamente la desaparición o no del servicio militar obligatorio.
2. Ante una previsible guerra en el GOLFO surge la cuestión de si los jóvenes reclutas deban asumir riesgos que en otros países están reservados a profesionales.
3. Al igual que en SUIZA, varios partidos políticos presentes en el Parlamento hablan de convocar un referéndum en el que se consulte a la nación si está dispuesta a que se cree un ejército profesional y que desaparezca el servicio militar obligatorio.
4. Mientras el Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), el Partido Popular (PP), Centro Democrático y Social (CDS) y Convergencia y Unión (CiU) sostienen que el debate debe resolverse en el Parlamento, otros como Izquierda Unida (IU) y el Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) se inclinan por convocar un referéndum en el que, con una pregunta clara, la sociedad decida sobre el futuro modelo del ejército.
5. Es precisamente este modelo lo que está en cuestión. La división que manifiestan los partidos políticos se reproduce también entre los propios militares y algunos de ellos reconocen en privado que, si el Parlamento no lo soluciona, se debería recurrir a un referéndum.
6. El Jefe del Estado Mayor de la Defensa (JEMAD), Almirante Gonzalo MARTIN GRANIZO, rechaza la idea de que ESPAÑA se dote de Fuerzas Armadas con estructuras similares a las de FRANCIA en la I Guerra Mundial.

Los funcionarios son nombrados y removidos por el Pte. de la Nación. Este Ministerio está presidido por un Procurador General, quien es el Consejero Jurídico del Gobierno.

El Pte. de la República puede pedir ante la Cámara de Diputados la destitución, por mala conducta, de cualquiera de los Ministros de la Suprema Corte y demás magistrados. En ese caso lo trata primero la Cámara de Diputados y luego la de Senadores y se expiden por mayoría absoluta de votos.

SECRETARÍA

7. Asimismo, el Director del Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de la Defensa, General Alonso BAQUER, explicó a los diputados de la Comisión de Defensa del Congreso que "el actual servicio militar tiene escasa duración para formar a los soldados, no existen expectativas para los reclutas y, además, militarmente son las unidades especializadas, las más competentes en caso de conflicto".
8. La mencionada Comisión recibirá del General Alberto PIRIS -experto en temas de defensa- un informe en el que se propone reducir el actual ejército de 285.000 hombres a tan sólo 84.000. El estudio adjudica 60.000 hombres al Ejército de Tierra y unos 25.000 para Marina y Aire. Propone una estructura muy técnica en la que la oficialidad y los mandos superiores serían mayoría con 45.000 militares de carrera y la tropa (soldados y suboficiales) estaría en torno a los 40.000 hombres.
9. Las razones de los que se oponen a cambiar de modelo de ejército, y también a celebrar un referéndum, se basan en dos argumentos: uno ideológico (pretender un ejército enraizado en la sociedad), y otro técnico (el costo de la profesionalización de las Fuerzas Armadas).
10. Entre los que apoyan el referéndum, como la Izquierda Unida, también están divididos y consideran que el mismo solucionaría las contradicciones del conjunto de la izquierda.
11. Los recientes estudios realizados por ERGOMAS (grupo europeo integrado por instituciones militares y expertos en ciencias políticas, centrados en la crisis de la profesionalización militar y en el papel de las fuerzas armadas en una sociedad sin guerra) demostró que el debate es en general en toda EUROPA.
12. Un experto en defensa del Instituto ORTEGA Y GASSET manifestó: "Hay una crisis general de la concepción de los ejércitos. Son instrumentos para impulsar las políticas de defensa que, ahora, ya no están claras. ¿Quién es, por ejemplo, el enemigo?. En ESPAÑA el problema es aún más grave porque no hay una política de defensa y, por tanto, tampoco puede haber una política militar ni una definición del soldado".
13. Expertos militares y civiles están informando a los parlamentarios quienes estudian la reforma de la ley del servicio militar. Si ésta se produce en el marco del Parlamento, o se lleva a

Poder Legislativo

El Poder Legislativo se deposita en un Congreso que mantiene la tradicional forma de división en dos Cámaras:

- Cámara de Diputados

La Cámara de Diputados está integrada por 300 diputados electos según el principio de votación mayoritaria relativa, mediante el sistema de distritos electorales uninominales y hasta 10 diputados que serán electos según el principio de representación proporcional, mediante el sistema de listas regionales, votada en circunscripciones plurinominales.

- Cámara de Senadores

Se compone de dos miembros por cada Estado y dos por el Distrito Federal, electos por votación mayoritaria relativa en sus respectivas entidades.

- El Congreso se reúne a partir del 1º de setiembre de cada año para celebrar sesiones ordinarias.

También se reúne en extraordinarias, convocadas por la Comisión Permanente.

En caso de vacantes de miembros del Congreso de la Unión, electos por votación mayoritaria relativa, la Cámara de que se trata convocará a elecciones extraordinarias.

- Comisión Permanente

Durante el receso funciona una Comisión Permanente compuesta por 29 miembros (15 diputados y 14 senadores), nombrados por sus respectivas Cámaras antes de clausurar sus sesiones.

referéndum tal y como piden ya algunas fuerzas políticas, estará condicionado por la presión que se produzca en la opinión pública. Y la presión, posiblemente, vendrá determinada por los acontecimientos en el GOLFO.

Vicecomodoro RAUL ALBERTO GAMBANDE
Jefe Departamento II

II - DISTRIBUIDOR

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| Comando de Operaciones Aéreas | Ej.N° 04 |
| Jefatura III - Planificación (Dpto.Políticas) | Ej.N° 05 |
| Secretaría General de la Fuerza Aérea | Ej.N° 06 |
| Jefatura II - Inteligencia (Dpto.II - Div."F") | Ej.N° 07 |

17

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RESERVADO

FUERZA AEREA ARGENTINA

COMANDO EN JEFE

Agregación Aeronáutica a la Embajada
Argentina en los Estados Unidos de
América

Folio _____

WASHINGTON, DC, 12 de Diciembre de 1990.

OBJETO: Elevar Informe Mensual.

| | |
|--------------|-------------|
| FUERZA AEREA | |
| No. | 1358433 |
| E | |
| S | DEC 13 1990 |

AL JEFE DEL ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL DE LA FUERZA AEREA.

1. Adjunto elevo al señor Jefe, informe correspondiente al mes de Noviembre de 1990.

2. El documento se estructura como sigue:

1°) RECURSOS:

- a) Humanos
- b) Materiales
- c) Económico-Financieros

2°) INTELIGENCIA:

3°) ACTIVIDADES:

3. Respecto a RECURSOS:

1°) Humanos: Pendientes de resolución

- Expediente Nro. 1358273 FA (Convenio prestación servicios médicos Personal Militar Fuerza Aérea en U.S.A.)
- Expediente Nro. 5285288 FA (Acuerdos traslado de cargas con Ejército)
- Fax Nro. 2442 del 13 de Setiembre de 1990 (Reintegro de gastos atención médica Vcom. PEREZ y Cap. BACCHIDDU)

2°) Materiales: (Anexo "ALFA")

- a) Planillas de compra: durante el mes de Noviembre/90, se recibieron 19 planillas de compra totalizando 411 ítems, por un valor de U\$S. 548.775,26 (Apéndice I)
- b) Ordenes de compra: se procesaron 3 órdenes de compra, totalizando 5 ítems, por un valor de U\$S. 16.602,60 (Apéndice II)
- c) Sistema FMS: La Oficina de Enlace procesó un total de 272 requerimientos por un valor de U\$S. 184.402,73 (Apéndice III)
- d) Estado de Gestión de los Casos Militares: (Apéndice IV)

3°) Económico-Financieros: (Anexo "BRAVO")

- a) Se recibieron transferencias de fondos por un valor de U\$S. 520.011,33

Documentos
agregados:

CONTI///

1/2 fl.

FUERZA AEREA ARGENTINA
COMANDO EN JEFE

Agregación Aeronáutica a la Embajada
Argentina en los Estados Unidos de
América

Folio _____

///NUACION.

b) Los fondos a disposición del E.M.G.F.A. son del orden de U\$S. 9.302.662,00, y los comprometidos a la fecha ascienden a la suma de U\$S. 17.630.335,00. Durante el mes de Noviembre/90, el capital operativo sufrió una caída del 9%.

4. Respecto a INTELIGENCIA: (Anexo "CHARLIE")

- 1º) Informe elaborado por la Agregación Aérea.
- 2º) Revista correspondiente al mes de Octubre/90 editada por la FUNDACION FORUM, con bibliografía considerada de interés (Apéndice I) Una vez analizada la información contenida en el citado apéndice por la Jefatura II, se solicita sea remitido a la Jefatura III - PLANIFICACION.
- 3º) Revista editada por DEFENSE & FOREIGN AFFAIRS, correspondiente al mes de Noviembre/90 (Apéndice II).
- 4º) Crisis MEDIO ORIENTE: Se cumplimenta Mje. Nro. TS 7584 GHO 212230-Ago-90 de ESMAFUAER.

5. ACTIVIDADES: (Anexo "ECO")

- 1º) Trámites especiales:
 - a) Concurrencia del señor Comodoro D. WALTER FELIX VIDELA a la XX Reunión organizada por el COMITE DE APOYO LOGISTICO MUTUO, realizada en la Base Aérea HILL - UTAH - EE.UU., entre los días 4 y 9 de Noviembre de 1990.
 - b) Atención delegación de la ESCUELA DE AVIACION MILITAR, encabezada por el señor Brigadier JUAN D. PAULIK, quienes en viaje final de instrucción visitaron distintas localidades de los EE.UU. entre los días 06 y 26 de Noviembre de 1990.
- 2º) CANADA: Se adjunta publicación editada por COMMUNIQUE (Centro Control de Armamento) con fecha 31-Oct-90 y relacionada con un análisis sobre la Crisis en el Golfo.

6. CONCLUSIONES:

- 1º) De no girarse divisas, y al ritmo actual de inversiones y gastos, ésta Agregación Aérea tiene para siete (7) meses de supervivencia.




Brigadier Mayor CARLOS ENRIQUE CORNEO
Agregado Aeronáutico

Documentos
agregados:

2/2

Nº DE
ORDEN: 369

27 DIC 1990

BUENOS AIRES,

POR RESOLUCION DEL SEÑOR JEFE DEL ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL:

AL SEÑOR:..... SUBJEMG

A efectos de:.....

- 1) Su conocimiento y Archivo.....
- 2) Su conocimiento y trámite a.....
- 3) Su conocimiento y coordinación con.....
- 4) Su consideración y trámite con opinión a.....
- 5) Difundir el contenido de la información.....
- 6) Su estudio y respuesta a.....
- 7) Producir memorándum y elevar.....
- 8) Acceder a lo solicitado.....
- 9) Designar representante del señor JEMG.....
- 10) Designar representante/delegación de la F.A.....
- 11) Los fines que estime corresponder.....
- 12) Atender la audiencia solicitada.....
- 13) Su cumplimiento.....
- 14) Verlo con el expediente adjunto.....
- 15) Su estudio y posterior informe al señor JEMG.....

D/L II

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Foundation Forum

"The United States Air Force: Today and Tomorrow"

**A National Symposium Sponsored by
the Air Force Association**



**October 25-26, 1990
Los Angeles, California**

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Dear Friends and Supporters of the Aerospace Education Foundation:

The Air Force Association recently sponsored a national symposium on the United States Air Force: Today and Tomorrow. We were very fortunate to have outstanding speakers who addressed a wide variety of issues facing our nation's Air Force.

Included in this summary of proceedings are remarks delivered by The Honorable Anne Foreman, Under Secretary of the Air Force. We were honored when Chief of Staff-Designate, General Merrill A. McPeak chose this association to deliver his first major address following his confirmation by the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. General H.T. Johnson, Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command and Military Airlift Command; General Robert D. Russ, Commander, Tactical Air Command; Lt Gen Jimmie V. Adams, Commander in Chief-Designate, Pacific Air Forces; and Lt Gen Donald O. Aldridge, Vice Commander In Chief, Strategic Air Command, also provided our symposium audience with invaluable insights. Please note a very informative question and answer session concerning Soviet trends conducted by a panel from the Rand Corporation.

The Aerospace Education Foundation is publishing these excerpts as part of our continuing mission of informing and educating the nation about important developments in aerospace. We believe the information in this document provides an excellent and timely perspective of the challenges facing the Air Force today and in the future.



*Oliver R. Crawford
President
Air Force Association*



*Gerald V. Hasler
President
Aerospace Education Foundation*

Foundation Forum

Symposium Speakers

Thursday, October 25, 1990

| | |
|--|--|
| Oliver R. Crawford, National President | Introduction |
| The Honorable Anne Foreman | "USAF: Today and Tomorrow" |
| General Robert D. Russ | "Tactical Air Forces: Today and Tomorrow" |
| Lt Gen Donald O. Aldridge | "Strategic Air Command: Realities of Tomorrow" |
| General H. T. Johnson | "Support America Can Always Count On" |

Friday, October 26, 1990

| | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| General Merrill A. McPeak | "The U.S. As An Aerospace Force" |
| Panel from the Rand Corporation | "An Assessment of Recent Trends in the USSR" |
| <i>MODERATOR: Mr. David Ochmanek</i> | |
| <i>Dr. John VanOudenaren</i> | |
| <i>Dr. Eugene B. Rumer</i> | |
| <i>Mr. Robert C. Nurick</i> | |
| Lt Gen Jimmie V. Adams | "Air Force Operations in Desert Shield" |

Symposium Moderators

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| Monroe W. Hatch, Jr. | Executive Director, AFA/AEF |
| Brian R. Green | Chief, Legislative Research & Analysis, AFA |

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Honorable Anne Foreman

Under Secretary of the Air Force

USAF: Today & Tomorrow

A very long time ago, when I was a graduate student here in Los Angeles, I was trained as an historian. I truly do believe past is prologue. In my view, it is impossible to adequately analyze current issues or future challenges without reference to the past for context and perspective.

I would like to begin with a review of the remarkable events that have taken place in our world since you met here last year. Then I will discuss the implications of those changes for the United States Air Force, for the industrial base and, of course, for our security.

When you met here last year, we were looking in awe at the number of countries previously lost behind the Iron Curtain that were making their first steps toward liberty. At the time, the L.A. Times wrote, "It took ten years in Poland, ten months in Hungary, ten weeks in East Germany, ten days in Czechoslovakia." That was October and we were still a month away from the fall of the Berlin Wall.

We were just beginning to recognize the magnitude of our victory in the Cold War; a victory in which many of you had a personal part. At the same time, however, we were also beginning to recognize the variety and the potential philosophy of the third world threat that remained.

A year later, our world includes a united Germany, allied with the West. Perhaps even more startlingly, we stand side-by-side with the Soviet Union, with much of the rest of the world, East and West, against a new tyranny and a new international felon, Iraq.

A recent article by Charles Krauthammer provided a very interesting commentary on our role in the Middle East and on our historically predictable reactions to the events of the past year. His thesis was "America: The Reluctant Superpower."

Of course, this isn't the first time that we have been described as being hesitant about taking the world stage. But his perspective, thought, was refreshing in that he considers our reluctance to be a positive attribute. I strongly agree. Our initial assent to international leadership was obviously during World War I. But as soon as the war was over, we reverted very quickly to our pre-war isolation.

After the second World War, once again, when the battle was won, we wanted to withdraw, but this time it was impossible. Now that we have dramatically won the Cold War, many would have us return to our insular past. But I would argue that it is not only essential that we remain a superpower, but it is also critical that we retain our reluctance to exercise that role.

Our natural reluctance to intervene militarily safeguards us from developing a proclivity to shoot first and negotiate later, which is good for this country and for the world. What would not be constructive and would be, in my view, historically and tragically irresponsible is if we turned away from the mission we have been given. Only the United States can exercise the benign world power necessary to thwart the aggression of totalitarianism and keep the world free for the best aspirations of man.

That is not chauvinism. It is not paternalism. It is the truth. Ours is a defensive posture that incorporates an ability to exercise global reach in response to external threats. Its development takes ingenuity, perseverance and strength. However difficult, we must

remain militarily ready, while devoting the same resourcefulness, the same dedication to a wide range of new and complex challenges.

Chief among those challenges is the collective ability to correctly identify the defense needs of the future. There are those who doubt our capability to do so. We see it in news articles. We see it in budget discussions. We see it in confirmation hearings.

What we don't see is diminishment of the threat to our security. Yet, as a nation, I sense that we do expect the answers to be easier than they are. I think that is in part because of our phenomenally successful past and also, perhaps, because of misconceptions that we still hold in regard to the basis for that success. We all recognize that fluctuations in the DoD budget, which is 20 percent of our manufacturing GNP, will seriously affect the health of our industrial base. But I have not found the converse to be true.

Indeed, there seems to be a limited understanding that a robust manufacturing base is essential for our national security. This lack of understanding makes remedial measures more difficult to implement.

Following World War I, this country demobilized and looked inward. We experienced the Great Depression and then in the late thirties, we began to build again. Our thoughts were of peace and if that peace could not be achieved for everyone, then at least we thought it would be possible for a prosperous United States.

Before we entered World War II, President Roosevelt called upon the nation to become the arsenal of democracy. One of his production goals was the manufacture of 500,000 aircraft a year. The Germans had only produced 38,000 aircraft for all of World War I. Here in the United States we had produced fewer than 30,000 aircraft since Kitty Hawk.

As impossible as it must have sounded at the time, the aircraft industry greatly exceeded that number. In the process, it developed several generations of aircraft with very few false starts. Part of the reason for that success was that we built on existing capabilities. As most of you would recognize more easily than I, one can assemble a series of drawings from our World War II planes and be able to visually take the evolutionary development forward, from the B-9 and B-10 to the B-17, to the B-29 and the B-36.

Our aircraft could go from the drawing board to the flight-line in a matter of days. The British asked us to take the P-51 Mustang from paper to prototype in 120 days and we beat the deadline. Each new aircraft was a refinement on what we had previously built. Each new design achieved a measure of improved performance.

Today it is not the same and it never will be again. We began conceptual work on the ATF in 1980. We don't expect IOC much before the turn of the century. We no longer merely refine. We redefine. On our ramps today, you see the B-52 next to the B-1, and we're flight-testing the B-2. Yet, it is nearly impossible to visually turn the B-52 into a B-1. The B-1 is more like a fighter. It would take another leap in technology to go from a B-1 to a B-2.

Technology has taken a quantum leap, skipping over the expected, concentrating on the hoped for. That is a very different challenge. The complexity of modern production would make it impossible to duplicate the mobilization of the forties. Therefore,

we cannot possibly afford to let our industrial base erode through neglect.

Here are the challenges I think we face together. We know that a continued defense is required. We know that such a defense will require ever more sophisticated systems. We know that such systems will require a robust industrial base to support them. And, yet, we also know that the American public is not prepared to fund production at previous levels. They have serious doubts about our ability to deliver what we promise on schedule. So, something has to change.

We must recover the public's trust in our ethics and our products. We must strike the right balance to retain the technological edge that has underwritten our enormous success. But we must do so at affordable, economically viable levels. It is a problem that calls for bold, imaginative and innovative approaches.

We in the Air Force, in industry and in organizations that support us, have a challenge. In my view, we need to develop acquisition development strategies that are flexible enough to withstand the changes in the world and the political realities that go with them. We need to reduce the incubation period from conception to development to production, while working at far less predictable schedules than in the past.

We must encourage the government to give incentives to industry so that compatible parts and interoperability are achieved. We must self-motivate, self-regulate with vigor and with vision.

Finally, we must communicate our recommendations, our conclusions, our solutions and our problems clearly and candidly.

It may be difficult given the extreme complexities of the issues we face and the challenge of communicating them well.

We can take heart in our record and in the successes that are demonstrated daily out in the Arabian desert. Air Force contributions in Operation Desert Shield represent the greatest amassing of U.S. military power since Vietnam. We can be proud of the quality of our contribution. It is a true success story in planning and execution. It is also a success story for yesterday's Air Force leaders. They correctly understood the needs and translated them into adequate numbers of C-141s, C-5s, F-15s, F-16s, A-10s, F-117s, etc. — the airpower backbone of today's defense against today's threats. Unfortunately, none of us have a crystal ball to see the advances that may transpire; the threats which may materialize or diminish before you meet next year. But I believe the Air Force and its industrial partners have a natural advantage in recognizing and in meeting that challenge.

From the very beginning, the essence of airpower has been an ability to respond to changing needs by championing innovation. We are the people who looked to the air when others were walking. We are the people who looked to space for undreamed of capabilities now considered commonplace. And it is we who have the ability to reach far, get there fast in discharging our global responsibilities.

I have no doubt that we, with your support, will meet the new challenges of this new world as successfully as we have in the past. I offer each of you and the organizations you represent, on behalf of the Air Force, our thanks. □

General Robert D. Russ

Commander, Tactical Air Command

Tactical Air Forces: Today & Tomorrow

When we talk TAC today and tomorrow, we have a good news- good news story. I think the forces today are probably the best they have ever been in the 35 years I have been in the service. I see a lot of bright things in the future as far as TAC is concerned.

I was looking over statistics about where we have come from in the last decade. I've made comparisons of how well off we are today compared to where we were in Southeast Asia and World War II. Productivity today is significantly enhanced over what it was in the 1980s. Let me give you some examples. The amount of sorties each of our teams fly per month has gone up in the last 10 years some 22 percent. Flying is not the only measure of merit. Flying good, demanding exercise missions and training better are key. In fact, the number of joint training exercises has gone up 100 percent.

The capability we have with the mix of our aircraft and aircrews has also gone up significantly. Accuracy in air-to-ground performance has gone up some 98 percent versus 1980. If you go back and make a comparison of the target that you would attack in World War II, we would have used 75 B-17s. In Southeast Asia, we would have used 12 F-4s to do the same job. Today we can use one F-15 to do the same job as 75 B-17s.

In the air-to-air role, we would have used 32 P-51s. In Southeast Asia we would have used about eight F-4s to do the same job. Today we can use two F-16s. So the capability we have is significantly improved.

The systems we have today work very well. I think that is a compliment to the partnership between military and industry in demanding high quality products and seeking the reliability and maintainability we have worked so hard to achieve in the past 8-10 years. The mission-capable rate today of our fighters is a little over 86 percent. That means 86 percent of our fighters are ready to go war anytime, anywhere in the country, 24-hours-a-day. That means that in a squadron of 24 airplanes, 21 are ready to go to war immediately, and the other three would take a few hours to ready through normal maintenance.

In World War II about half of our fighters were mission-capable. In Southeast Asia, 70 percent were mission-capable. Today, 86 percent of those fighters deployed in Southwest Asia are maintaining over a 90 percent mission-capable rate. That is a significant achievement in our fighter forces over the years. I think it speaks very well for the man and the machine.

Now, one statistic that should go down and has gone down is the cost of flying hours. The cost of flying hours today is 37 percent cheaper than it was in 1980. To give you a couple of examples: The F-15C cost 40 percent less to fly per hour than the F-4C. The F-16C cost 30 percent less than the F-16A. We have better aircraft and they're cheaper to fly.

One of the statistics that is very important in my business is the aircraft accident rate or the aircraft mishap rate. The number of accidents we've had in 1990 is about 50 percent less than it was in 1980. All of this speaks well for our force today.

If I summed it up, 97 percent of our TAC active fighter and reconnaissance units are in the highest readiness state. 98 percent of our medical units; 99 percent of our support units; 100 percent of our special operations or our special flying units; 100 percent of our

ground attack units; and over 90 percent of our Air National Guard and Reserve units are in highest readiness state. Our readiness is high and it is being aptly demonstrated in Southwest Asia. I think that is a classic example.

I told the troops, "Somebody is really giving you the test." We have advertised for years that we can deploy any squadron we have anywhere in the world within 24 hours. We got the call and I said, all right, deploy them. Our first squadron out of Langley was gone well within the 24 hours as was our AWACS. They flew 8,000 miles in 15 hours with seven in-flight refuelings. That is a long way for fighter squadrons to go. It was not the easiest thing in the world. One of the guys flying the F-15 said, "I wish I had an auto-pilot." He was flying night formations a good percentage of the time. They did it, and they did it very, very well.

I looked at the map and said, "That is a long way." What would be the distance if we went the other way. One of the guys drew a line on the map and he said, the distance from Langley to where they went is about the same distance from Chicago to Hong Kong. So you get an idea of how long the pilot is flying one of those little fighters.

They did it. The 1st TAC Fighter Wing was first in-theater. They had aircraft on alert, ready to deter within 24 hours after they left Langley. Within the first five days, we had five squadrons there, all of them up and ready to go. There is considerable capability there today. We have got F-15s, F-16s, A-10s, F-117s, F-4Gs, RF-4s, F-15Es, F-111s, EF-111s, AWACS, ground attack, and significant support.

This is the first time we have ever moved our air transportable hospitals so rapidly. We have deployed significant numbers of air transportable hospitals (ATH), and we have them at most of the bases over there. At some bases we have air transportable clinics. But, by and large, most of them are air transportable hospitals. An ATH is the equivalent of a base hospital. It can serve up to about 5,000 people a day. It has enough supplies to run 30 days. It has a 128-person staff, and they can do everything but neurosurgery. I think deploying hospitals sends a message. I think it was best said by the Surgeon General. He said that when we deploy the fighters and we deploy the hospitals along with them, everybody knows we are not going for an air show.

How are we doing? Well, I think we are doing exceptionally well with the flying, the training, and I told you already about the MC rates. Morale is very high. I know the morale is high. I got word from the 1st TAC Fighter Wing that they have pigged out on cookies. The cookie brigade has flooded them. Cookies are coming in by the hundreds of thousands. They really appreciate that support. They say the cookies are kind of tough. So when I hear them complain about cookies, I know they are in good shape.

They are also delighted with the support base — both on-base with the family support centers and in the community. There has been great support from the community.

I was talking to a reporter who had interviewed a young boy whose Dad had gone to Saudi Arabia. He asked the little boy what it was all about. The little boy said, "Well, my Daddy is watching the bad guys so people can be free." I think that kid knows a heck of a lot more than most of us. And he put it in straight-forward

language. The force over there is doing well, and I consider it the best trained force that I have seen in the history of the Tactical Air Command.

Now, what about the future? I think the future is going to be affected, at least in the near term, by two major factors: major changes that are happening in the European environment; and future contingencies. Right now it is Southwest Asia. But I think we can expect to see regional contingencies in the future. I was talking to the Russian Ambassador about eight to ten months ago. I asked him what he thought about what was happening in Europe and what was going to happen next. He looked at me and said, "I do not know, I have not read the Washington Post this morning." Things are happening faster than anyone could have expected. I think change will continue.

A few things are going to happen because of that change. We are going to have a lot of turbulence and change is going to be costly. I was in East Berlin not too long ago talking to some people and the subject of connecting the roads between East and West Berlin came up. It will cost over \$100 million just to open the streets between East and West. Germany is now talking about spending about \$10 billion to support the Soviets in leaving East Germany. When you stop and think about the number of Soviets in East Germany today -- some 360,000 -- it is going to be costly to move them. It is going to be costly to build up the infrastructure. I looked at the infrastructure in East Berlin. It is not in good shape. The West Germans are concerned, too, about the nuclear energy plants in East Germany. If they shut them down, that is another major expense.

It is very, very costly. I am just talking about Germany, but the same applies to other countries. And the turbulence. We need to remember that people in that part of the world have lived under Communist domination most of their lives. You have to be over 50 to remember World War II. Going to a marketplace economy is not an easy thing to do. We see day in and day out the problems the Soviet Union is having. It was interesting to talk about the difference between a marketplace economy and a centrally-controlled economy where labor is basically free. I was talking to a businessman from Germany who was trying to acquire a bank in East Germany. He owned a bank in West Germany. He said there were five times as many employees holding similar jobs in the East as there were in the West. If he staffs the bank in the East as he did in the West, he has to lay off four out of every five people.

There are lots of people holding jobs in that part of the world who will probably lose those jobs when the marketplace economy comes along.

As change occurs, there will be fewer demands for weapons and more weapons available on the open market as forces draw down. I read an article in the Atlantic Council Bulletin. It said the USSR continues to improve its military machine. Every six weeks, one new sub is launched and every day they produce two aircraft, six tanks and one missile. This is in a period when we are drawing down and reducing arms. Reductions so far have been in obsolete or aging weapons. This doesn't mean we are not going to get a reduction in production, or be able to phase out some of the newer systems.

It does mean a great many weapons will go to third world countries. The Soviets need cash. Foreign military sales (FMS) is a great way to get cash. So these new systems will find their way into third world countries. In fact, 23 countries today have chemical weapons programs. Ten countries have biological warfare programs. By the year 2000, 15 third world countries will have ballistic missile programs. What we see is a shift from a bipolar world to one where we have potential for various regional confrontations.

As the bipolar nature of our world changes, so will the force structure. Our budgets will continue to be cut as our forces become fewer and fewer. We are embarking on a program now that reduces the budget about two percent a year through 1995. It's on an even glide slope. Whether Congress will adhere to that glide slope or not is not known. Even if we do get to that point in 1995, we will still only be spending about four percent of our gross national product on defense. That is the lowest it has been in 50 years. I do not think we are going to be overspending on defense. We certainly are going to be cutting back.

What does this mean for our tactical forces? Three points: Our forces in the future are going to be a lot smaller. You heard the figures tossed around: about 25 percent smaller. We peaked out at 38 wings in 1988. I would estimate it will be in the high 20s somewhere by the mid-1990s. It is important that as we reduce force structure, we reduce the base structure as well. Force structure gives you deterrence. Force structure gives you war-fighting capability. Base structure gives you neither. The base structure of the United States is there because it is a place to put your stuff, but it does not add to your war fighting capability. So you cannot afford to maintain base structure at the expense of force structure. Congress has come up with a new process to take out excess bases. Whether it will work, and how it will work, I am not sure. Not all the details have been written out, but at least it is a process. I think that is good because it recognizes that we have to think base structure as well as force structure.

The second point is that with that much smaller force, we must maintain it at a high state of readiness. I think it is important to keep those forces on their toes, flying at the rate they are flying today. If we had not done that in the 1980s, we would not have been able to go to Saudi Arabia at the speed at which we did. You cannot keep a boxer from training and expect him to fight a heavyweight championship fight. He has got to be prepared. So whatever size force we decide the budget can afford, we must make sure that force is ready to go. I strongly recommend that those forces be kept at a high state of readiness so we don't get back to the hollow forces we had in the past.

The third point is that we need to modernize that force, but we must do it very wisely. We cannot say we are going to get a new one of everything in the next decade. We must pick those systems that are very important to us. We must pick those systems that give us a revolutionary rather than an evolutionary capability -- those that give us a great advantage over anything the adversary has. One of those systems is the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF). It is imperative that we get the ATF. AMRAAM is another. And Joint Stars is the third. Those systems are crucial to the future of our tactical forces. I would hope that we continue those at a prudent pace; one that gets them into our inventory in sufficient numbers to give us worldwide deployability and deterrent capability we need.

The future is uncertain at best. Who would have thought last year that we would be in Southwest Asia? We are moving from a cold war to a warm peace. Maybe that is not the right description, but we certainly are in a tough peaceful situation today. I think we are moving into an era that is characterized by regional confrontation or competition with increased risks and instability. It is an era characterized by more cooperation on a global scale. I also think it is an era characterized by airpower and one where airpower will play an absolutely critical role in any strategy this government decides to pursue.

If you ask how do we handle an uncertain, challenging world, my answer is with flexible, ready tactical forces manned by dedicated professionals.

Let me close by telling you a story. Forty-six young men and women just got promoted from buck sergeant over in Saudi Arabia.

The wing commander went out there and had a little ceremony. He said no other circumstance than the one they were in could better

capture the challenges in the future.

Thank you very much. I will be happy to answer any questions.

General Robert D. Russ - Questions & Answers

Thank you very much for those remarks, Bob.

QUESTION: While the mission-capable rate is very high, have there been any maintenance surprises or difficulties stemming from the harsh desert conditions?

GEN. RUSS: A quick answer is no. Now, that does not mean there aren't a few things that operate in difficulty. But, we operate in Las Vegas; we fly out of Tucson, Arizona, where the ramp gets to be 125 degrees; and we fly out of Luke AFB. We fly in places the aircraft are designed to fly in. There are some techniques we have learned over there, like not keeping the canopy closed because it acts as an oven. We leave it cracked a little bit. And we find we need to wash the aircraft down more often. But we have not found anything that has been a significant problem. It was reported in the paper not long ago that we were having problems with our jammers. The reporter automatically assumed it was an electronic warfare jammer. In fact, it was ground power equipment that we nicknamed the "jammer." Those run all the time until they get so hot they turn themselves off and cool off. It was a big report alleging that we were having trouble with all of our jammers. I'm looking at the jammers and the reporter's information. I'm trying to figure out what the heck is going on. So, they're looking for a story that our equipment is breaking down when it gets over in Southwest Asia. It is not. Our equipment is well maintained and working well. I do not see any problems there.

QUESTION: Realizing we are in an unclassified session, how serious is the threat posed by the captured HAWKs to our aircraft?

GEN. RUSS: We think the HAWK is a pretty good missile. We wouldn't have it in our inventory if we didn't think so. So far as not to pay attention to that wouldn't be very smart. The Iraqi Air Force is a powerful Air Force, the fourth largest in the world. They have a variety of systems, which means we have to have a variety of counters. I think if, in fact, the HAWK they have is put into operation for them, then we should run up against them. It's a formidable system, but there is nothing we don't know about it.

QUESTION: General Russ, while it may be said that there is nothing like actual flying time, with today's concern over fuel shortages and safety, shouldn't a bigger push be made for enhanced flight simulators?

GEN. RUSS: I think simulators play a big role and the more we develop them, the better they can help us. But it is just like anything else. We need to do the real thing. We need to do it at a certain rate. I can put you in a simulator, fly you all day, but you know you can crash, open the lid and step out unharmed. If I put you out there at 350 feet at night in a blinding storm and if you don't make it, you have got to punch out. There is a difference. We all know that. You can simulate all you want, but you cannot substitute simulation for full-time flying. You have to be able to go out there and do it.

The better our simulations become, the more we will use them. But there is a certain amount of flying proficiency a pilot needs. And, he needs it whether or not he has the simulation. I think

simulation adds to his capability, especially ones that zero in on specific new weapon systems. You can get the procedures, the switchologies down without wasting valuable time doing that in the air. But I do not think that you can trade one-for-one simulator time for flying time.

QUESTION: General Russ, there has been much discussion over advances in technology going beyond a human's ability to process information in our fighter aircraft. Do you see a move back toward two-seat fighter aircraft to enhance our ability to deal with a dynamic combat environment?

GEN. RUSS: I think that as we proceed with new and better systems, it is generally easier to have two seats to start. But you pay a penalty with two seats. You pay a penalty in cost. That's the biggest penalty in that you have to train another individual and you have to develop an aircraft with two seats. If you can do it in a single seat airplane, you are much better off. When we started the F-15E, we found that with all the things we wanted that F-15E to do, it was easier to accomplish with a wingman in the back. That combination was absolutely incomparable -- really great. On the other hand, that does not mean you need a back seater in an F-15 in an air-to-air war. You do not. It's automated so we can do that. So I think it depends on how well we automate our systems, how well we put them together and how well we display. The problem is that sometimes we give the pilot more than he really needs. We have three navigational systems. We have a GPS system. We have an INS system. We have a TACAN system. When push comes to shove, he only uses one. We need to make sure that rather than having three different systems -- you can have as many sensors as you want -- but have one needle that says this is the way to go home rather than three needles for the same purpose.

QUESTION: Where do we stand and how are we doing on pilot retention?

GEN. RUSS: Pilot retention has levelled off in the mid-30s, measured by the CCR rate, the continuation rate over several years. The point is you can stabilize in the Air Force at any rate you want. We have had a great many pilots get out, but at the same time, we have had a big reduction in force structure. If force structure is reduced as expected in the years to come, the pilots and the rate we have today will be sufficient to fully man the fighter force. In the near term, we may have more pilots than we have slots for them. I hope we don't bring force structure down quite that rapidly, but the problem that faced us before in going to 38 TAC fighter wings from 40 is not the same as what we'll face. It will be more difficult.

QUESTION: Related to force structure, you said there's the possibility we could be in the high 20s in terms of tactical fighter wings by the mid-1990s. How will this affect our ability to respond to possible regional contingencies?

GEN. RUSS: I would hope that as we reduce the size of the force, we reduce it in a balanced way. What do I mean by that? If you have a football team, you need some specialists, you need a kicker, you need a center, you need tackles and ends and you need a balance among the whole team. You can have all the best ends in

the world, but you won't win the Super Bowl if you don't have the rest of the team. I can have all the air-to-air in the world, but if I do not have any air-to-ground or any reconnaissance or any of these other systems, then I am not going to win anything. So when someone tells me to reduce the force -- I must reduce it in a balanced way so that I have all the parts needed to fight and win. Once you do that, the question is what can I do with that force and how many contingencies can I handle? Certainly I will be able to go to one contingency. Maybe two, depending on the size of each. Whatever the Administration and Congress come up with, that will size the total force. Yes, we will be able to go to any contingency; but whether we will be able to stay there very long or whether we can put everything we have got there, that will depend on the size of it. It has got to be a team effort, though.

QUESTION: General Russ, recent predictions on the introduction of the advanced Soviet fighters, the ASF and CAF, range within the late 1990s to soon after the ATF or sometime after the turn of the century. How central to the case for the ATF are these new Soviet fighters?

GEN. RUSS: I think they are a major player in that. Also a major player is the fact that our F-15s are getting old. I don't know many people who are driving 1969 automobiles right now. You and I are driving 1966 models, but I'm spending a heck of a lot of money on mine. I know you are, too. I would not want to enter mine in the Indianapolis 500. The point is we are going to have a lot of systems that need to be replaced. The F-15 is going to need to be replaced. If the ATF comes in the late 1990s, at least 50 percent of the F-15 force will already be over 20 years old. That gets to a point that bothers me. Not only will that bother me, but the Soviets have airplanes today comparable to the F-15s -- MiG-27s and 29s. You've seen them in airshows around the world. So they are developing airplanes today in their force that are comparable to ours. I am not comfortable waiting, but it is a matter of judgment as to when the follow-on threat is coming. I am worried about the current threat as well.

QUESTION: A question about space systems. How important are space systems to the precision targeting of tactical air? A related question, how about the trade-off between aircraft and force structure and support systems like space systems?

GEN. RUSS: There needs to be a balance. We need to put these things in perspective. We should not say we need all fighters and no tankers. We need to make sure we don't have all the communications, space and intelligence systems in the world, but no bombers or fighters. If we do, then we'll see everybody, we'll hear everybody and we'll know we're going to die, but won't be able to do anything about it. The point is, there must be a balance. When we have to reduce the budget, everybody has to do it.

QUESTION: General Russ, is the Air Force making sufficient progress in stand-off weapons in unmanned aerial vehicles? How do you view the future of these systems?

GEN. RUSS: I am not happy with the way in which we are doing it. I haven't been happy for 15 years. We have not been able to do things I think we should be able to do. The secret to building

stand-off systems, especially in the drone business, is to build them cheaply. For some reason, we cannot control ourselves. As we start to develop one, we want it to do a little bit better; we want it to have a .95 P.K. That raises the price. When it raises the price, you have to buy fewer. When you buy fewer, they become less attractive and the targets they go after have to be more expensive. For stand-off systems to be useful, they need to be simple and inexpensive. They need not have the high P.K.s that we have on a normal system. Then you can use them en masse; you can use them in a lot of different ways. Show me a drone program that is started, and I will show you one that got killed because it grew too many requirements, and got too expensive. Finally when it got over a million dollars a copy, nobody could believe it. Now it's got 100 percent P.K.; 100 percent kill on every one of them. It goes and it never comes back. So cost is a big issue. I think we need to address it. I think we are getting better on stand-off weapons. We seem to have a difficult time on starting new stand-off weapons. We do better when we build on one that we currently have.

QUESTION: As we cut back on force structure, cut back on tactical fighter wings in particular, what will become of the excess aircraft? Will they be used in FMS or will they go to the boneyard?

GEN. RUSS: I think all of the above. Certainly I think there will be some sales of our aircraft. FMS will be a good market for some of them. It will allow some third world countries to upgrade. And some will go to the boneyard. We have some there right now. We have got more going there all the time. Davis-Monthan AFB is a good place for a lot of them.

QUESTION: General Russ, speaking of Desert Shield, are you satisfied with the deployment mix you have now and if not, what else do you need, how many more aircraft, types of weapons and fighters, recce, etc.?

GEN. RUSS: I am satisfied because that is what the commander over there wanted. It is his responsibility. He is the operational commander. I have given him everything he has asked for and if he wants more, I will provide it. But, he is the one who calls it. He is the one who looks at the intelligence reports every morning. He has decided these are the things he wants and I've sent them to him. He's got them, they're there and they are ready to go. I don't mean to duck the question, but that's one of those things I don't decide.

QUESTION: General Russ, given Operation Desert Shield and the Saudi request for F-15s, is there any prospect for an extended production run of the F-15E aircraft?

GEN. RUSS: I do not know, but Congress has added \$100 million as an option for an upgraded F-15. I think there are people around the world who would like to buy F-15s. We had bought 200 F-15Es for our tactical forces. I would like some more for the force structure. And in case they break down. I would hope there would be some way to do that, but I certainly cannot justify leaving the line open for a few airplanes.

General Russ, thank you very much for the very frank and candid answers. □

Lt. Gen. Donald O. Aldridge

Vice Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

Strategic Air Command: Realities of Tomorrow

I am honored again to be included among this group of distinguished speakers. I am also pleased to have another opportunity to tell you about Strategic Air Command. While I will perhaps brag a little about the past contributions SAC has made to national security, I want to focus on what it can contribute in the future.

Last year, within the context of a rapidly changing world, I talked about maintaining deterrence. That was appropriate then and will be a heavy responsibility for the years to come. While it appears that the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union will grow into one of competition rather than the confrontation of the past -- and I hope it does -- nonetheless, the Soviet Union is the only nation with the means to destroy our society as we know it. As long as that capability exists, deterrence will be a necessity. General Thomas Power once said, "you cannot buy deterrence cheaply. Today's peace has become more expensive than yesterday's wars, but it is still infinitely less expensive than a nuclear war." It is important to remember that the Soviets have not reduced their strategic nuclear capability. Those who would make dramatic cuts in U.S. strategic forces before equitable Soviet reductions or before we conclude strategic arms control agreements which would lead to those reductions, should remember this: The Soviet strategic nuclear force is more modern and has more warheads than a year ago when this apparent dramatic change in the world environment began. Those analysts who say the threat has gone away without looking at force levels and force capabilities do their public and the nation a disservice. I hope Mister Gorbachev succeeds. But his stated intentions are only valid so long as he can maintain the leadership of the Soviet Union. Human life is tenuous. Capability is hard fact. Or, as Paul Wolfowitz said last year, "We want the reform process in the Soviet Union to succeed, but we must also be prepared for a world in which it does not." And, Larry Eagleburger was right on target when he said, "Our task, after all, is to devise policies which will serve our interests, whether Gorbachev succeeds or fails."

But, assuming this U.S.-Soviet relationship continues to improve, and assuming that the arms control negotiations between the two nations are successful, the world will still be a dangerous place to live. As we move from the relative stability of a highly disciplined bipolar world power arrangement, we can see a multipolar arrangement developing where many nations will have similar military capabilities. As the military power of the U.S. and the Soviet Union is reduced, and as the dramatic proliferation of intermediate range ballistic missile technology and cruise missile technologies within third world nations occurs, an environment of instability is likely to result. For the last two hundred years, we have known that shifting alliances among factions with relatively equal military capabilities tended to create instability and fostered conflict. That hasn't changed.

The world of the future will have a United States with fewer deployed forces on a day-to-day basis. We will have fewer base landing rights and even overflight rights will likely be more restricted than they are today. As General Dugan has said, "... More of the punch that goes with our commitments to our allies and to our cooperative security arrangements will be based on U.S. soil." However, it is clear that we will remain a global power with

interests throughout the world. We will remain the ultimate guarantor of order in many parts of the world. This country will still insist on being involved in the solution of the world's problems and conflicts, and rightfully so. However, we will have to discharge these responsibilities in different ways. One must assume the U.S. will maintain its superpower commitments and will remain a key player on the global scene to maintain influence over the key determinants of its national well-being in an uncertain world. But, we will not be willing to pay for basing large U.S. forces routinely in a particular regional theater; rather, we will demand a capability to rapidly deploy to a hotspot, put out the fire quickly with great lethality, and return home. That capability does not exist without airpower. As we structure the forces necessary to execute a global reach, global power strategy, it will be essential to retain adequate air refueling and airlift capability to allow this projection of power. While the total numbers of bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles will be reduced, sufficient bomber capability must be retained to allow an Administration the option of projecting lethal airpower over great distances with minimum reaction times. Forces with global reach -- bombers, airlift, and refueling -- are a must to extend the range of both those missions and for the deployment of tactical air forces.

The challenge then is to develop a policy compatible with the real world environment and to mold a force structure from the one existing today and from the acquisitions of the future to provide that national defense capability. I believe that global reach, global power is the right framework to guide both the policy and the force structure evolutions -- and tomorrow's Air Force will have to reflect those realities.

I believe this because the Air Force has unique capabilities which other forces do not have. The nation's need for a quick reacting power projection capability -- a power projection with great lethality -- will grow as we draw back from overseas basing and as we draw down our military force structure. Future conflicts, and especially regional conflicts like the current one in Southwest Asia, will be fought with the weapons on hand. In most cases, the ability to provide great firepower over a long range, quickly, will be the key factor in success or failure of that particular military operation. While time sensitive, lethal projection of firepower at long ranges is our forte, I would anticipate that in most cases we will act in concert with the other U.S. services and sometimes with our allies.

As we adapt the Air Force to this new environment, the most critical talent will be a vision of the future and a capacity for building. It may seem strange to require a talent for building in an environment of drastically reduced defense budgets. But if we do not approach these force structure reductions with a vision of the essential outcome, the resulting forces will be incapable of fulfilling the desired national military strategy. A clever strategy will be of little utility without having thought through how to implement it or without having provided the forces necessary to execute it. SAC forces, in total, support the strategy of global reach, global power: some in the nuclear arena, some in the conventional arena, and most in both. Everyone should understand that as strategy has evolved so has Strategic Air Command. Let there be no

doubt, SAC has both a nuclear and a conventional mission, and we plan and train for both.

As you know, intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range nuclear bombers, along with the Navy's submarine launched ballistic missiles, have proven effective in maintaining deterrence for several decades. To maintain deterrence, these forces have had to be a credible instrument of long-range power projection. ICBMs enable our nation to respond quickly and accurately to a nuclear provocation. We maintain about 99 percent of our available ICBM forces on day-to-day alert to respond within minutes when directed by the National Command Authorities.

In addition, a continuing program of operational test launches has proven that our Minuteman missiles along with our newest system, the Peacekeeper, are reliable and extremely accurate. In other words, they can do the job.

When you combine the ICBM's high alert rate with its reliability, you have a credible long-range force projection capability, assuring any potential enemy we can retaliate promptly, with power, if we have to do so.

Complementing our land-based ICBM's, our long-range bombers, the FB-111, B-52, and B-1B, give us added flexibility in responding to nuclear threats.

We maintain a large portion of our bomber fleet on day-to-day alert, and can disperse them, and the remainder of the fleet as well, to promote survivability. Additionally, the bomber alert force or the entire bomber force, if generated, can be launched under positive control to ensure its survivability.

We also need to remember that bombers carry the bulk of our retaliatory nuclear weapons, varying from stand-off systems such as air launched cruise missiles and short range attack missiles to extremely lethal, high-yield gravity bombs. Training and competition results have proven that our bomber crews can deliver these weapons accurately even after flying long distances.

When you combine survivability with the high accuracy, large numbers, and varying types of weapons our bombers can deliver, you have an awesome retaliatory nuclear force -- one that is credible to any potential enemy.

I would be remiss if I didn't acknowledge that the capability of the nuclear heavy bomber is dramatically enhanced by the employment of air refueling tactics with those tankers dedicated to the SIOP. The KC-135 has been a workhorse for SAC and the nation. The reengining program which converts them to KC-135R models is a fantastic investment for the nation with a high payoff in effectiveness. By replacing older, less efficient engines with new ones, we are getting more capability without buying more aircraft. Each modified "R" model is equivalent to one-and-a-half of the older version in fuel offload capability. We are planning to reengine the entire KC-135 fleet, including those flown by the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. I will have more to say about refueling when I discuss our missions in the conventional arena.

I won't dwell on our nuclear capability because the capability of the present force is integral to our national strategy of nuclear deterrence and you know it well. Of course, our ability to project power at the nuclear level, thus deterring nuclear war, is fundamental to our ability to respond at lower levels of conflict. That is, we have to possess the muscle to deter; but also have the flexibility to react quickly in a crisis.

By having a credible nuclear retaliatory capability, we can maintain balance with the Soviet Union while continuing to draw down our forces through arms control negotiations.

At the same time, we can focus attention on the threat posed by the emergence of irrational actors who may become emboldened by the proliferation of military weapons and the redistribution or

leveling of military and political power in the world.

In any event, U.S. forces must be capable of intervening decisively through the application of overwhelming power. SAC forces and resources are vital to that effort.

Let me talk about what our current forces are capable of doing today in the nonnuclear arena, and what we are doing to improve that capability for the future.

Long-range bombers can reach any point on the globe and can do so within hours. A couple of years ago we demonstrated that during exercise Bright Star when two flights of B-52s took off from their North Dakota bases, flew nonstop, and delivered their loads of conventional munitions on a training target in Egypt, then returned to their home bases.

The 31-hour, 15,000-mile round trip operation was a complete success and demonstrated that long-range bombers can strike rapidly in any part of the world. Believe me, that capability has even improved since then.

Today, SAC bombers can deliver a wide range and a large number of munitions very accurately against a multitude of targets.

In support of the U.S. Navy's sea control operations, B-52s perform maritime missions. In fact, SAC's support of maritime operations began as early as 1947 and continues today with aircrews trained to interdict enemy sea power, to protect shipping, and to conduct aerial minelaying operations. The B-52 has been described by one combatant commander as being of "...immense value as an in-theater force multiplier."

The B-52 is unmatched in its capability to deliver mines. The B-52's capabilities also include sea surveillance and surface ship air interdiction. Two B-52s can cover 448,000 square miles of ocean on a standard maritime patrol. That's an area the size of the South China Sea. By employing the Harpoon missile, B-52s can hold potential enemy lines at risk anywhere in the world, and do so very rapidly.

In a more traditional role, the B-52 is capable of delivering a variety of weapons against land-based targets as well. Certainly all of you are familiar with its employment in Southeast Asia. During that conflict, B-52s provided direct air support, interdiction, and strategic bombing missions. In total, our aircrews flew over 126,000 bomber sorties and dropped almost 3 million tons of munitions. Many of those missions were round-trip missions from Guam, again emphasizing the long-range capability of this venerable aircraft.

Today, our B-52s remain capable of delivering the traditional "iron bomb," but because air defense technology continues to improve, new stand-off nonnuclear munitions are being developed. The B-52s of the near future will be capable of striking targets with pinpoint accuracy while remaining beyond an enemy's defense by using these stand-off weapons.

So, despite being older than a lot of the pilots flying it, the B-52 remains a proven instrument of U.S. power projection.

Our newest and most modern bomber, the B-1B, was designed primarily for the nuclear role, and it is currently ready and capable of performing that mission if called upon.

By taking advantage of many advances in airframe, engine, and avionics technology, the B-1B is without a doubt, the most advanced long-range bomber in the world today. This aircraft is more difficult to detect by radar because it uses some elements of low observable technology resulting in a low radar cross-section.

Due to the likelihood of lower levels of conflict and the increased need for flexibility in projecting conventional power, the B-1B is currently undergoing testing which will enable it to deliver a wide range of conventional weapons, thereby increasing its flexibility and bolstering our nation's capability to project power.

The B-1B won the SAC bombing competition in only its

second year of competing, an unprecedented accomplishment. And, I can tell you from personal experience, it performs superbly.

Today, the manned bomber is the cornerstone of our long-range deterrent forces. It is the most flexible offensive weapons system we have and is becoming the weapons system of choice to maintain stability in an arms control environment.

As a result, the most important strategic modernization effort at SAC is centered on improving our manned bomber force.

By the end of next year, we will have transferred the last FB-111 to the tactical air forces and will have a remaining force of B-52G and H models as well as the B-1B.

Even if everything in the world stayed the same; even if air defense technology doesn't improve; even if emerging threats dissipate; even if the Soviets cease their modernization; even if weapons proliferation stops; our bomber forces in being today will still not be sufficient for the future. The reason is age. Even if needed capability remains the same, what we can do will decrease with time. Systems get older and thus less capable unless we modernize. Thus, it's naive to think that we could still perform today's mission with the same degree of effectiveness in the future without modernization.

And this leads me to the most exciting and controversial bomber modernization program -- the B-2. Those opposed to the program talk cost, but never ask what the cost to the nation would be by not going forward with the B-2 should that decision lead to a failure of deterrence.

I would like to quote from a speech recently made on the floor of the Senate by Senator Sam Nunn. "...Let me discuss the cost, the sticker shock problem. The average cost of the last 60 B-2s is \$450 million. That is what each of the next 60 will cost. That is about three times the cost of a jumbo jet, a 747. So when we are talking about this, I think people ought to understand that passenger aircraft we fly across the ocean cost a lot of money, too. The 747 costs \$150 million. But a 747 does not go halfway around the world and back with one refueling. It does not penetrate massive Soviet air defenses that the Soviets have spent \$400 billion on. They (the 747s) do not threaten surface Navies all over the world."

Former Chief of Staff General Larry Welch said, "The B-2's cost is not unprecedented. The percentage of the defense budget devoted to the B-1B and to the B-52 exceeded that planned for the B-2. Peak year funding for the Minuteman and the B-1B was higher than any year for the B-2. The B-2 -- despite the sticker shock -- will provide the U.S. a guaranteed capability well into the twenty-first century. It will provide not only a solid foundation for nuclear deterrence, but will also contribute to the nation's ability to project conventional power quickly, effectively, and over long distances. It will be a credible -- perhaps essential -- instrument of global reach; global power.

I recently read an article in the *Washington Times* which described this credibility.

(Quote) "The B-2 is a symbol of what U.S. security policy should be. While deterring the Soviet nuclear threat, it provides needed flexibility in responding to regional conflicts. As an airborne tool for projecting power across the globe, the B-2 has a range and stealthiness that could put U.S. firepower on the front lines ..." The article further pointed out, that with a single inflight refueling, the B-2 can strike any target on the planet with conventional or nuclear warheads.

The best and most succinct statement of need for the B-2 was expressed in a paragraph from a letter to several key Senators regarding the B-2. "While we are witnessing truly historic changes in the international environment, these changes have not obviated the need for a credible and effective nuclear deterrent. Soviet strategic modernization continues and there remains a fundamental

requirement for the B-2. The long-range penetrating bomber is the most flexible and most stabilizing element of the strategic triad and the only one that is applicable across the full spectrum of possible conflict. The B-52 is approaching the end of its useful life and the B-1B was expressly bought to bridge the gap between the B-52 and the B-2. I am convinced that the United States should proceed with the B-2." The letter was signed by the President, George Bush.

Continued modernization is vital to keeping our strategic long-range bombers credible.

But, as important as bombers are to global power, their effectiveness would be limited if it weren't for our capability to refuel them in flight. Tankers are the lifeline of global reach. Tanker aircrews are the unsung heroes of our efforts to project forces. Faced with the potential of reduced overseas bases for all U.S. forces, the concept of global reach becomes increasingly important and highlights our tankers as a critical asset in meeting our future needs. The bottom line in both nuclear and conventional war plans is that you can't do the mission if you can't get there.

Just as some of our bomber aircraft have been serving since the 1950s, our KC-135s, on average, have been flying for three decades. Even our newest tanker, the KC-10, is almost ten years old, on average. Yet, our tankers continue to be workhorses supporting worldwide deployment of personnel and equipment. The KC-135 reengining program will help to maintain that capability.

You have heard about the tanker's record in Southeast Asia in responding to emergency situations and accounting for numerous saves of valuable people and aircraft. Smaller operations such as Grenada, the raid on Libya, and Operation Just Cause also attest to the capability of the tanker.

In support of Operation Just Cause, for example, cargo aircraft transiting Panama didn't have to remain on the ground for refueling because tankers were orbiting to gas them in the air. This was vital because there was limited parking space at Howard Air Base. Our ability to put troops and equipment on the ground in a very short amount of time ensured the success of this operation. That capability will continue to be a key factor in future crises.

The current crisis in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia has opened the eyes of many to the need to have forces in being that support our nation's ability to project power. In support of Operation Desert Shield, as of a couple of days ago, tankers have accomplished more than 11,700 refuelings from 7,400-plus sorties and transferred more than 29.5 million gallons of fuel. Tankers are refueling C-141s and C-5s transporting troops and material, and are ferrying fighter aircraft to the region. In addition, tankers provide an organic capability to transport personnel and equipment -- a capability that I submit most of the general public is unaware of.

In this regard, the KC-10 is a particularly valuable asset. It is a tanker cargo aircraft. Its primary mission is to refuel fighter aircraft deploying overseas while simultaneously carrying the fighter's support personnel and equipment. The KC-10 can transport up to 75 people and approximately 170,000 pounds of cargo; has an unrefueled range of more than 11,500 miles; and is itself refuelable. To bolster its air refueling capability, we are adding multipoint refueling capability to a portion of the KC-10 fleet. That means a single KC-10 will be capable of refueling three fighter aircraft at once using the hose and drogue method.

SAC tankers support every U.S. Air Force major air command that flies air-refuelable aircraft, as well as the Navy, Marine Corps, and many of our allies. Tankers are the bread and butter of our nation's global reach capability.

Getting to the scene of the crisis is, of course, only part of the reaction equation. Accurate and timely intelligence information is critical to answering the what, where, who, and how many questions of national security. SAC operates the manned intelligence

gathering platforms: the U-2s, the TR-1s and the RC-135s -- most of which are in Southwest Asia right now. Our reconnaissance aircraft gather both strategic and tactical information that is used by the National Command Authorities, DoD, and theater commanders in planning operations during crises and war situations.

From the U-2 that took the first photographs of Soviet missiles in Cuba, to the U-2 that photographed the San Francisco Bay area to determine the extent of damage from last year's earthquake, to operation Desert Shield, SAC reconnaissance systems have been in demand because of their versatility, economy of operation, mission effectiveness, and responsiveness.

Well, I've basically "run the gamut" talking about our forces, and by now it should be obvious to you that I've been waving the SAC flag. The reason, however, may not be so obvious. I want to leave you with the message that SAC is, by design, a far-reaching command. From top to bottom, SAC forces make significant contributions to our nation's ability to project forces and power worldwide. I've highlighted the capability of our equipment -- and make no mistake -- our equipment is good. But our people are better. Any plan, policy, or strategy is critically dependent on qualified, motivated and dedicated people for success. We owe

those Air Force people a life style equivalent to the demands we place on them. We owe them a professional work place and professional living accommodations. Today, we have that. Strategic Air Command is dedicated to the perpetuation of such standards. In summary, we are a command of long-range assets with dedicated people who operate, maintain, and support them. Historically, we have been primarily associated with the nuclear deterrence mission. That is still an essential mission of Strategic Air Command in support of the national policy of deterrence. As General Colin Powell has correctly said, "It is a changing world, ... It is not yet a changed world." In that environment, there is no more important mission than deterrence.

We also have a long list of accomplishments in the non-nuclear arena, and we become more capable in that area every day. We believe that the changing world environment demands a focus on the capability to project power from the continental United States. We believe that global reach, global power is the proper strategy under which we should mold the Air Force structure of the future. The forces of Strategic Air Command possess inherently essential characteristics necessary to the employment of such a strategy.

Lt. Gen. Donald O. Aldridge - Questions & Answers

Thank you very much, Don.

QUESTION: Talking about B-52s against a conventional threat in the raids over Hanoi, B-52s in the early raids took hits from the SAMs. How confident are you that B-52s that might be called on in Desert Shield can survive against Iraqi air defenses?

GEN. ALDRIDGE: I think they probably will survive very well. I would expect them to. I have every confidence they will. Having been in the B-52 over Hanoi, I can tell you that was not very enjoyable, but I think both the tactics and weaponry are a little bit better. The way we plan to employ them today, and in coordination with the tactical forces, is a vast improvement over our thinking of earlier years. I have every confidence that General Homer and General Schwartzkoff will deploy them in a way they will be very effective.

QUESTION: General Aldridge, we have heard a great deal about the potential use of B-52s in Desert Shield. Why do we hear nothing about the B-1?

GEN. ALDRIDGE: I covered that briefly in the talk because for one thing, the B-1 is not certified as a conventional weapons carrier at this point. It is undergoing testing right now. We have done live drops out of each of the bomb bays, but we have not yet gotten certification by the AFOTEC folks to say that it is ready to go. The other thing is that it was a conscious decision that the B-1 would be primarily a nuclear bomber. There is less than a full complement of loading equipment and racks to outfit the entire B-1 fleet for the conventional role. But the main reason is that we have not finished the certification of the airplanes.

QUESTION: That is straightforward. General Aldridge, Congress has pushed for shifting Milstar away from its strategic mission and towards tactical combat support. How important is the Milstar system for SAC and with the currently reduced Soviet threat, can SAC wait for a smaller, cheaper alternative to Milstar?

GEN. ALDRIDGE: Obviously, I do not know when a smaller,

cheaper alternative to Milstar will come about. I would say that Milstar probably got in trouble because too many people tried to load too much on its back, but SAC is very supportive of a basic Milstar architecture. We are not, in today's environment, pushing for the full-up original plan that was envisioned by some. We think that we need it, but we think that what supports the tactical forces would also be satisfactory for an interim capability for SAC.

QUESTION: General Aldridge, please comment on the budget actions with regard to B-1 ECM systems. Are you satisfied with the progress currently being made?

GEN. ALDRIDGE: A flip answer would be that the progress in the budget actions are about equal with the progress in technology, but both are difficult tasks. I think we will eventually have the money to do what needs to be done, but it is a tough row to hoe. I do not really know what came out in the budget. I have not seen it. It has been changing so much that I have not seen final figures today.

QUESTION: Commenting on the KC-10 and recent operations in Desert Shield, have we used that aircraft to its full potential?

GEN. ALDRIDGE: I think so. You probably know we have a memorandum of agreement with the Military Airlift Command that some of those airplanes will be used as cargo airplanes. We moved, I believe, 10 of those airplanes over when MAC needed them. They since have sent part of them back to us, but we worked very closely with MAC to make sure they were maximizing the use of them. The KC-10s have a terrific organic capability to lift a fighter unit at the same time they lead the airplanes over there. There are a lot of demands for them. Everybody wants to refuel against a KC-10, so the challenge is to pick out the most important requirements, but I think we are doing a pretty good job of that.

QUESTION: General Aldridge, earlier we heard from General Russ about the reduced number of tactical fighter wings. How will a drawdown in force structure affect Strategic Air Command?

GEN. ALDRIDGE: Obviously we are going to get smaller like everyone in the Air Force. We would hope to be able to keep the conventionally dedicated B-52G models to participate in perhaps more frequent conventional roles than the nuclear mission. Certainly one hopes. I think that in the immediate term, the force structure has drawn down faster than the pilots. General Russ mentioned that perhaps you wind up with more pilots than you need in the interim. At the moment, our challenge is B-52 pilots because we have more of them than we have airplane seats to put them in for the immediate future.

I think we will probably see an acceleration of the G model and perhaps the ALCM G models faster than we had hoped. A lot of that is tied in with the B-2 outcome. Certainly there are those who would suggest that the ALCM B-52 should be reduced more quickly, so I think by the mid-1990s, we'll see an even smaller B-52 force than we see today.

QUESTION: A few questions in the area of ICBMs and I will paraphrase. Clearly, there is a difference in what the Air Force has asked for, what the Congress has approved, and what the Administration wants in terms of future ICBM programs. Where does the Air Force stand today and where does SAC stand on these programs?

GEN. ALDRIDGE: I prefer not to speak for the Air Force. Today I will stick to speaking for SAC. We think that mobile ICBMs contribute to stability. We think that the research and development in both of those systems should go forward, certainly Peacekeeper-Rail Garrison. However, in a reduced budget environment, one has to remember that, while putting those 500 RVs on trains increases survivability, it does not add to your war-fighting capability. You already own them in a different deployment mode. If we had to make a choice money-wise between a B-2 and doing that, obviously we would put the B-2 as the first priority. But we think ICBM modernization should be kept alive. We think it is useful, and we fully support the Administration's desire to continue the development of both the Small ICBM and Peacekeeper-Rail Garrison.

QUESTION: Switching from US mobile ICBM systems to Soviet mobiles, the Soviets are going to make the bulk of their ICBMs mobile in the future. What about the rationale for the B-2 in strategic relocatable targets, and where does that stand SAC's priorities for the B-2?

GEN. ALDRIDGE: Well, the need for the B-2 is not based on the development of a capability for strategically locatable targets. But, we think that is a useful mission, and we are working very hard on sensors to allow us to do that effectively. It is a very difficult task. I was just recently at one of our bases where they do their training and some testing on strategic relocatable targets. That is one of the most load-intensive missions I have ever seen put on an aircrew, and especially in a nuclear environment. Obviously, they need some considerable help with various kinds of sensors, not only for the targeting of them, but for keying them where to look and actually finding them.

The B-2 is needed for heavy bomber modernization. It also offers the best potential for solving the RT problem. I would not necessarily subscribe to the point that the Soviets are going to go all mobile. There is some indication that maybe that's not quite true. Nonetheless, we will continue to strive to develop the capability to attack relocatable targets. We think that when you are handed the job to attack the enemy's war making capability, you should be able to do that. But that is not just the B-2, and the B-2

is not contingent upon being able to do that.

QUESTION: Bomber force structure question. If Congress fails to fund the B-2 beyond 15 aircraft, would SAC revisit the current plans to transfer the FB-111s to TAC?

GEN. ALDRIDGE: No, I do not think we would revisit that. I have no idea what we would look at in that regard. That obviously would be a plan that would be developed with the Air Staff and with the OSD staff, and the Administration. But I doubt that. We are too far along with that program. I do not see any chance of reversing that. General Russ might. But, I do not see any reason we would do that.

QUESTION: All right. You stated how much SAC forces have learned about weapons systems during various exercises and competitions. Will SAC continue with these competitions in light of reduced funding and our current deployments in Operation Desert Shield?

GEN. ALDRIDGE: We have canceled them. The load comp and bomb comp for this year are canceled. The missile comp for next spring is canceled. We are going to revisit that as time goes on and it will all depend. We get a lot of good pay-back from those, but they may become too expensive in a different environment. We are looking at the possibility of holding them bi-annually instead of every year. We're looking at ways to cut back on the cost. But in reality, you get a very high pay-back for the money invested.

QUESTION: A couple of questions on the tanker fleet. To reengine and modernize the KC-135 tanker force will require time and money. What about the schedule? Do you have the assets to support Desert Shield and also to stand down some KC-135s in order to modernize? Will this be an industry program or will it stay an ALC depot?

GEN. ALDRIDGE: I think it will probably stay the way it has been for the last several years. It is a program that comes in nice, neat packages so when Congress needs something to even the totals at the bottom of the page, the program gets molded to fit what is available. I think we will continue with that. We have sufficient assets to keep the program going at a greater number than we are funded for. Initially in Desert Shield deployment, the KC-10s and the KC-135-Rs and E-models were used in the bridge across the Atlantic and then in the Pacific because of their greater capability. Then we started backfilling with A models where we do not need such long off-loads and such greater range. So we maximize the use of all of them. We can continue the program for as many as Congress will fund. It just keeps getting stretched out.

QUESTION: General Aldridge, what improvements do you foresee, and are you satisfied with your C3I capabilities in the Strategic Air Command?

GEN. ALDRIDGE: Of course one is never satisfied, but I think that it is making reasonable progress. Over the last 10 years we have made a lot of progress in that area. I think one has to be satisfied that we are on track to provide, in a fairly sensible and rational way, the capability that we need.

QUESTION: General Aldridge, does SAC have any indications that the Soviets are building counters to the B-2?

GEN. ALDRIDGE: I doubt that I could go into that in any great depth in an unclassified forum, but the short answer is no. There is no indication that I know of that the Soviets will have the capabilities to counter the B-2 in the foreseeable future.

Thanks very much, Don. □

General H.T. Johnson

Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command and Military Airlift Command

Support America Can Always Count On

On the first day of October, America and the United States Air Force lost a great citizen and one of our greatest military leaders.

I know that everyone here feels the loss of General LeMay. He was one of America's strongest and most successful advocates of airpower and a legendary combat leader.

Just two weeks ago at the Air Force Village in San Antonio, I had the pleasure of speaking to an entire audience filled with the airpower legends.

The resident list at Air Force Village is a who's who of American airpower, including combat veterans from World War I, World War II and Korea; participants in the Palesti raids and the Hump operations; survivors of Pearl Harbor and Bataan; and three members of the Doolittle raid.

The Doolittle raid was an incredible feat of daring and skill. It was perhaps America's first demonstration of global reach through airpower. Global reach was certainly of great importance to America's security interest in the 1940's and even more so today.

During last spring's congressional testimony, I focused my comments on the critical importance of maintaining a strong and responsive capability for force projection. I stated that a military of reduced size and reduced forward deployment would become even more dependent on this capability if it were to remain a credible deterrent and fighting force.

I am not sure how effective I was with my arguments, but there is no question that the recent events in the Persian Gulf have demonstrated very clearly that America's security interests are critically dependent on America's capabilities for global reach.

Without the global reach of America's armed forces, it would not be a matter of Saddam Hussein holding a few thousand hostages. Our entire nation and our friends and allies around the world would be held hostage to Saddam Hussein.

We are the only nation in the world with the global reach to respond to this crisis, and it is an element of national power we must not lose.

During the past year, America's capability for global reach has been tested during two difficult and demanding operations.

Last December, our airlift forces allowed President Bush to respond to a rapidly deteriorating situation in Panama. In less than 36 hours, we airlifted 9,500 soldiers to Panama, including the largest night, combat air drop since the D-Day invasion. The success of this highly complex military operation allowed the Panamanian people to restore democracy in their country.

I know all of you, like all Americans, were very proud of the men and women who participated in Operation Just Cause.

In Military Airlift Command, we did not have one delayed departure on the initial assault other than for inclement weather. Despite the major improvements made in air operations during the past 40 years, we still haven't learned how to prevent freezing rain in North and South Carolina.

We also had difficulty with dense fog in northern California; however, all of the airplanes made it off on schedule. The fog was so thick that the buses going from Fort Ord to Travis Air Force Base got lost. They couldn't read the signs on the freeway. When

they finally got to Travis, we had to have pickup trucks lead the C-141s to the departure end of the runway. Visibility was less than 500 feet, but our crews made it off safely and on time.

The flying skills and valor of our crews were also tested as they approached the drop zones. Several were hit by ground fire. One had an engine shot out, but they all pressed on and put all paratroopers on target.

I could tell Just Cause stories for the rest of the morning, but let me sum them up by saying that our men and women performed under difficult and dangerous circumstances with bravery and dedication — the same characteristics they are showing today in the Arabian Peninsula.

In Operation Desert Shield, our air and transportation assets are playing a key role in protecting our national security interests and the sovereignty of our friends in Southwest Asia.

From a transportation perspective, reporters frequently ask me to compare Desert Shield with Just Cause. This is a difficult task. The nature of threats, types of terrain, distances involved, and concept of operations are completely different. I also point out that Just Cause was a combat operation from the very first minute we landed in country, and it is now over. We know how Just Cause ended.

On the other hand, Desert Shield began and continues to be a deterrent effort. It is our desire to resolve the conflict without resort to hostilities.

I am proud to report that America's deterrent efforts, made possible through our global reach, have been an overwhelming success. I say America's efforts, because it is truly a joint and total force effort. America's uniformed forces, active-duty, Guard, Reserve; our Merchant Marine; our airline, trucking and rail industries; our ports, and our transportation unions have all leaned forward as a team.

In many respects, particularly from a transportation perspective, Desert Shield is a worst case scenario. Our warning time was extremely limited, we had insufficient forces in place, and we had to move most forces a great distance.

As with any fast breaking deployment, our response was with airpower. Elements of the 82d Airborne and the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing were enroute to the region within hours of the decision to send troops. Since those initial flights, we have built an air bridge that outpaces any in history.

We have melded an airlift force of active-duty, Reserve, Guard, and civilian personnel, airplanes, and equipment capable of achieving the unprecedented.

At the height of our initial surge, more than 100 strategic airlifters were landing in the desert each day.

Since August 7, we have generated more than 4,000 missions, carried more than 170,000 passengers and delivered more than 300 million pounds of cargo.

Three hundred million pounds is difficult to comprehend. Let me explain it this way. Not far from Scott AFB, Chrysler Plant # 1 assembles Dodge Daytonas. Three hundred million pounds of Dodge Daytonas, lined up bumper to bumper, would stretch from

here to Las Vegas. Two passengers in each car would equal 170,000.

Another way to describe this incredible airlift is a ton-mile comparison with the Berlin Airlift. (A ton-mile is one ton moved one mile.) By the sixth week of operation Desert Shield, our airlifters surpassed the Berlin Airlift in terms of ton miles delivered. That's six weeks compared to sixty-five weeks. By the end of October we will have doubled that figure.

Desert Shield has certainly tested our people, our total force concept, our command and control capability and our airplanes and support organizations.

During the first 45 days of Desert Shield, our C-5 and C-141 fleets exceeded normal operational use rates by more than 300 percent. The actual rates were close to, and on some days, exceeded planned wartime activity rates.

The support from our logistics people has been nothing short of phenomenal. Our mission capable rate for C-5s during this surge period was greater than 85 percent; for C-141s greater than 94 percent; and for C-130s operating in-theater, greater than 95 percent.

Thanks to our magnificent "loggies," our fleet of airlifters have met the test.

However, we all know that people can only do so much. They cannot change the fact that our C-141s are rapidly approaching the end of their service life. They have served magnificently, but the end of a generation is now in sight. We look forward to a new generation of airlifters to take us into the next century.

The C-17 is that airplane. It's an airplane America must have. It's an airplane that General Schwartzkopf would have liked to have in early August.

The C-17 would certainly have made a major difference in our support of Desert Shield. With the C-17, we could have increased our airlift through-put by 35 percent. This would equate to 20 additional tactical fighter squadrons or two additional medium ready brigades.

That is a lot of firepower — perhaps the difference between victory and defeat.

Airlift has certainly played an important role in Desert Shield, but we all know that Desert Shield is much more than just an airlift operation. Virtually all of our Air Force capabilities are being tested — fighters, tankers, reconnaissance and AWACS — a powerful deterrent force that made the difference during those early days in August.

Along with our naval assets, which were already in the Persian Gulf region, the rapid deployment of our tactical forces made it possible to draw a line in the desert sand.

Because of our capability to move such a powerful force to the Arabian Peninsula in such a timely manner, we have, at least for the time being, deterred further aggression. It is difficult to predict his actions, but Saddam Hussein must know that he would pay a terrible price for further aggression.

From the perspective of global reach, Desert Shield has been a great success. The credit goes to two groups — first to those who are responsible for providing America the military force we now have, and the young men and women out there who are making it all work.

I have recently returned from visits to our staging bases in Europe and numerous operating locations in the Persian Gulf. Our people are putting in long, hard days. They are, in many cases, working in austere field conditions. Most of them are a little homesick and a little tired of MREs.

Despite this, I didn't meet anyone who was not proud of the role they were playing in this operation. I didn't meet anyone who did not understand the importance of what they are doing, and I

didn't meet anyone who was not thankful for the overwhelming support they are receiving from the American public.

That support is readily visible to our people on the Arabian Peninsula. Virtually every facility I walked through had banners and drawings sent from schools all across this nation. Everyday our public affairs offices receive calls from people who want to send everything from Girl Scout cookies to 150,000 country and western tapes donated by the music industry in Nashville, to books donated by the American soldier's best and most enduring friend, Bob Hope.

Perhaps the spirit of support here at home is only surpassed by the spirit of our troops. At one of our staging bases in Europe, we are using a large hangar to accommodate our passengers while their planes are being refueled. Many of our dependents are helping to operate this facility and also helping us feed the troops. In one corner of the hangar, we have set up a BX — the last chance BX before the desert.

I wondered what I would buy before heading off to the desert. So I asked the BX manager what were the hottest selling items in his mini-BX.

He told me that the number three selling item was toothpaste. The number two selling item was flowers for loved ones at home. But the number one item was Old Glory, the American flag.

Seeing the great dedication, professionalism and sacrifice of our people in the desert, here at home, and at scores of locations around the world, it makes me proud to wear this uniform.

This pride I feel in our Air Force and in our great people is, however, colored with my concern about the limited vision of a few Americans.

Throughout most of the past year, these few have called for massive cuts in military personnel. They want to cut quickly, in a manner that will force out large numbers of our young people prior to retirement with little or no advance warning.

Then, just before Christmas last year, these same people who were about to be forced out were sent off to Panama to fight.

These are not draftees, but volunteers, many who signed on for a career. As our people now endure the hardships of the desert and face the very real threat of Saddam Hussein's forces, some in Washington continue to talk of massive rollbacks and hasty cuts.

We are asking a great deal from our men and women in uniform. It upsets me when I read in the press about how these individuals want to treat our people.

This nation must not forget the commitments that were made when we decided to have an all-volunteer force.

One of the most important missions that the Air Force Association has is to ensure that the American public honors the commitments it made to our men and women in uniform. It is a mission that requires our maximum efforts.

The mission that requires the maximum efforts of the men and women in Military Airlift Command in the decade of the 1990s will be to ensure that this Command continues to provide America with the support it can always count on.

To meet this goal, we have initiated many new programs: Action Eagle, Sharp Eagle, Fit Eagle. We have placed great emphasis on moving responsibility, accountability and authority down the chain of command.

All of these programs are designed to help us move toward our goal of quality.

I strongly believe that America's security interests in the 1990s will become more dependent upon MAC's ability to provide our armed forces with global reach. It is, therefore, essential to America's security that the men and women of MAC provide our customers with the best support possible.

Much of what we are doing is not new. This emphasis on

quality is not the latest management gimmick or fly-by-night theory. It is an effort to put into action the management philosophies and ideas we have all studied for years. We want to create a structure and a mind-set that will facilitate moving these theories from the classroom to the flightlines, the aerial ports, the chow halls, and the hospitals.

MAC is a support organization, and proud of it. We all understand our important role in protecting America's security. We want to provide our customers with quality support.

MAC's customers are widening. They include a theater commander who wants to move 10,000 soldiers across an ocean; a mechanic on the flightline who needs a spare part from supply; and the wife of an Airman First Class who needs a hospital appointment. All of these individuals are MAC's customers and all of them deserve quality support. Since we are a service organization, a focus on quality is even more critical. In most cases, we have only one chance to succeed. We can't keep our customers happy with a good warranty or replacement program.

If given the task to move 5,000 soldiers within 48 hours, we will only get one chance. We must do it right the first time. Our success or failure is not a matter of profit or loss. It is a matter of national security.

The better that MAC supports our customers, the better MAC will support America. That's why we exist — to provide the support America can always count on.

I'm pleased we've helped draw the line in the sand for Saddam Hussein. If we had not drawn that line, or helped to draw it, the sand that came from the Saudi desert would have been perhaps owned by Iraq. This Saudi sand is important to us because it's a strategic location in our world.

There is no one else in the world who could have drawn the line. We did that. Our President got the support of the world.

I'd like to close with something I've used before, but it's very meaningful today. It comes from an earlier President, but certainly President Bush would be proud of it also.

President John Kennedy was to use some closing words in a speech he would have delivered at the trade mart on Nov. 22, 1963. These words were not written by a speechwriter. They were penciled in at the bottom of his prepared text. He wrote, "If we are strong, our strength will speak for itself. If we are weak, no words will help."

We've relearned that. By being strong, we have deterred and I'm sure we will continue to deter.

I thank you very much.

General H.T. Johnson - Questions & Answers

The first question, H.T.

QUESTION: How about the dramatic rise in aviation fuel prices. What will this do, and what impact will it have on your O and M budget for next year.

GEN. JOHNSON: Certainly the fuel prices make a big difference. Most of our flying is done under the industrial fund. Those costs are passed on to our customers, and, of course, the fuel accounts make up a lot of the difference. We are a little concerned about the effects on the commercial airliners. We have long term contracts. Someone was wise enough to lock them in for two years. I suspect we will have to go back and relook those at a little higher rate because of the fuel prices. But we are fortunate -- and unfortunate -- in the Military Airlift Command because we have an industrial fund. We are able to pass on some costs, but then we do not have a lot of flexibility in other areas.

QUESTION: The second question is one that was asked earlier of General Russ and General Aldridge. Pilot retention. What experience are you having in the Military Airlift Command in 1990?

GEN. JOHNSON: This quarter we are doing very well. They put out an order called stop-loss which said, in essence, that anybody who has people recalled from the Reserve forces cannot let out comparable people. We have given some waivers, but I suspect that Desert Shield will have a very positive impact on our pilot retention. It is still too early to tell. It is still a big concern to us. We work it very hard.

QUESTION: Comments as the Administration and the Defense Department consider the possibility of another deployment in excess of 100,000 to the Persian Gulf. What is our capability to respond to that, and can we surge again in such a short period of time?

GEN. JOHNSON: Yes. We are prepared to surge tonight. I would have to call on the civil carriers perhaps more. I would have to call on some of the sister services and sister MAJCOMs. But,

yes, we can surge and take care of that. I worry a bit if we decide to come home the day before Christmas. A young lady I talked to this afternoon who planned to go home for Christmas might not understand if we took her airplane.

QUESTION: We spent significant funding on automated planning and tracking systems, computer systems in the past years. How well have these support systems performed under the Desert Shield deployment conditions?

GEN. JOHNSON: Getting better every day. Of the various computer systems we developed, a lot of them were developed for deliberate planning. I recall we had a big command post exercise in October called Proud Eagle. As we went through the time phased deployment, list deployment, we tried to alter it. If you go through this model with the computers, you literally have to take a pause, let the computers re-flow it, and go again. General Schwartzkopf did not understand that. He changed his priorities almost every day in the early days and we responded. Sure, we had airplanes at the wrong place, had some too early and so forth, but we were able to respond using ingenuity. Since then, we have updated those systems. We are using them every day and they are getting better. I had a message a couple of days ago from someone willing to help who said, let's not waste time correcting the command and control systems until we finish. Then we will write them up in lessons learned. Those of you who know me can imagine my response. I wrote, "Bull." We are fixing those as we go. We are not waiting to do lessons learned. I told him to call them lessons fixed. If they were not fixed, come see me.

QUESTION: Two or three questions, General Johnson, on sealift. You referred to that in your remarks, but I would just ask you to discuss your perspective on where we stand with fast sealift and what you think we need for the future?

GEN. JOHNSON: Our sealift worked. I was quoted as saying it worked as I expected. It had some problems. We expected those. The fast sealift, the infamous eight ships, worked very well. One of

them had some difficulty, but overall, it was about 87 percent successful. We brought ships out of the James River, about 40 of them. It took a little longer. Once we got them activated, they ran very well. We got ships from the American fleet, but we also got ships from the foreign fleet. I believe at one point we had 37 ships, maybe higher, with foreign flags.

We were very careful. We always went through the hierarchy to ask for US flags first. Once we turned on the sealift, it worked very well. We discovered that almost the only ship of value was a roll-on, roll-off, or the infamous roll-roll ships. Once we started them, we were offloading, as I mentioned earlier, about six a day. The Saudis in their build-up days, had built up very fine ports and airports. We had no problems in handling those.

I made a mistake early on. I thought we would work sealift just like airlift and we'd tell people who want to ship things to ship them to two ports, Oakland and Norfolk. I was out of touch and I should not have been. We worked with the sealift companies to use containerization, intermodalism. If you have something you want shipped, you call us and tell us where it is. A company will put a container there. You stuff it, then they will take it to port, put it on the ship, and it shows up in the Arabian Peninsula. It has worked very, very well. We are very good at that. Our ro-ro (roll-on/roll-off) business is not very good day-to-day, so we did not have a lot of those on the US flagship.

As we go forward, we will want to look at buying more fast sealifts, but not quite as fast as the ones we have -- 25 knots versus 33. It makes quite a difference on the power plant. We will want to put a little more pre-positioning. I did not talk about it, but we had two prepositioning programs. One is for the Marines. There are three squadrons, Diego Garcia, Guam and off the East Coast. We deployed the two from Diego and from Guam. These will support a Marine brigade, they call it a Marine Expeditionary Brigade, but it takes an awful lot of airlift -- 250 C-141 loads to close on those four ships because they carry people -- 16,000 as I recall -- and they also carry a lot of equipment that is not on board the ships.

The other type ship is afloat preposition. They have commodities on board. A couple of them have petroleum. We did not use those. A lot of them have bombs, medical support equipment. They closed very quickly from Diego, seven days. Those fast sealift ships go port-to-port in 14 days. So sealift worked well.

Can we improve it? Yes. I think the Army will get some afloat prepositioning. I think we will get more of the fast sealift ships. I think we will look at our reserve fleet and see which ones we need and also the readiness level we would like to keep.

QUESTION: A question on the C-17 program, H.T. There have been reports that the C-17 has had some delays and some other problems. What can you tell us about the progress on the program?

GEN. JOHNSON: The C-17 is on the revised schedule. There was some difficulty. About a year ago it was essentially re-baselined date-wise. The Douglas company is ahead of those dates and doing very well. You can go down the road here, as I did today, and see an airplane that looks like an airplane, stands on its

own feet and day-by-day is getting closer to flying. It should fly at the latest next June. Interestingly, they put the airplane together in the most modern, big airplane factory in the world. When they pressurized it, on the eighth cycle, it went to 2.5 times the pressure level that we expect with it, so the aircraft was not a leaker. You always have a few things you need to adjust. It is coming along very well, and will be a tremendous asset not only in the Military Airlift Command but for our customers around the world.

QUESTION: A question for the future regarding an advanced theater transport aircraft. What plans do you see there, and is joint development with the Europeans a feasible alternative for such an aircraft?

GEN. JOHNSON: In our country, we have a hard time in developing new airplanes, especially two in the same area at the same time. All airlifters would like to have a brand new theater airlifter. There have been some programs working with European allies. I suspect that we will continue to buy the C-130. Lockheed is engineering a new model, the J model, that will change the power plant a little bit, the propellers, the gear, the cockpit and a few other items. I believe we will buy some of those and modernize our airlift fleet. As I speak, we have six squadrons deployed to Southwest Asia. Two of them are Guard, plus another Guard and one Reserve, and that means a total of four squadron equivalents because the Guard and Reserve have eight aircraft in the squadron and we require 16. They are serving with great distinction and I believe the C-130 will be around for a long time to come.

QUESTION: An organizational question. Are you satisfied with the organizational lines now between MAC and Special Operations Command?

GEN. JOHNSON: Yes. We are in the airlift business. We have a close relationship with General Steiner. We support him. The Air Force Special Ops Command is a major air command. They own the helicopters, the HCs, MCs and AC-130s. We help train them; we support them. They could not get along without us. We provide logistics support. They use our command and control and we have a very healthy relationship with the special ops community as we must have. You could never say that so many airlift airplanes are special ops and the rest are something else. We cannot divide the fleet up among our various users.

QUESTION: One final question. A lot has been written about MAC EW requirements. What are MAC's plans to equip its aircraft with EW warning equipment?

GEN. JOHNSON: They now are primarily in the special ops command. We will modify a few of our planes. We have some that are specially configured for special ops. We will modify those with electronic warfare gear. We hopefully will have a program where we will put in group A wiring and will have group B equipment in the aircraft when we need it. We do not plan to go alone into an electronic environment. We have the capability to go around it. Occasionally we will have to go in, and then we will put the gear on that we are developing. We have some aircraft today that have been modified. Not near enough, but we continue to work at it. □

General Merrill McPeak

Chief of Staff-Designate, USAF

The U.S. as an Aerospace Force

It's great to spend some time with this knowledgeable, dedicated group of aerospace leaders. For many years, the Air Force Association has provided strong support to the Air Force and to the nation's understanding of air and space needs. We need you now more than ever.

I'm sure you're all familiar with the Washington budget process, if we can call it that. This year has proved to be one of the most difficult and discouraging in recent memory. I don't believe it will get easier anytime soon. But I didn't come here to spread the Washington blues. I came to talk about the Air Force and some important issues I see ahead of us. Before looking at the future, let me talk briefly about today's Air Force.

First of all, a blinding glimpse of the obvious: We have a lot going for us in the Air Force. We've got smart people -- dedicated people -- good people. We have great people in the Air Force. Our readiness is sky high. Our equipment is the world's best. Our sustainability is good. Our operating tempo is right. Our training is realistic. We understand our tactics and doctrine. We have great leadership at the sharp end. We work well with sister services and allies. I don't say this in a boastful sense, but this is the wrong time for anyone to mess with the United States. Your Air Force is ready for combat.

I believe Operation Desert Shield is proving just how capable and ready our forces are -- active, Reserve and Guard. Within five days of getting Secretary Cheney's order to go, we had five full fighter squadrons and a contingent of AWACS aircraft in place, ready to defend Saudi Arabia. Our airlift forces have been involved in the most massive airlift operation since the Berlin Airlift. As of last Friday, we had flown almost 4,000 airlift missions, moving 145,000 tons of cargo and 160,000 passengers over the 7,500 or so miles required to get equipment and personnel into position. Our tankers have flown over 34,000 hours and offloaded well in excess of 29 million gallons of fuel. Throughout the force, morale is great.

And, although the changing international security situation and the budget cuts are causing adjustments, our modernization programs are on track -- so far. We have focused our efforts on one large weapon system per major program area: the B-2 for strategic bomber modernization; the C-17 for airlift; and the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) for air superiority. But these, in combination with other important modernization programs -- Advanced Cruise Missile, AMRAAM, ICBM modernization, Titan IV, Joint Stars, KC-135 reengining -- ensure that the Air Force will continue to be a well-balanced, powerful combat force into the future. The Air Force is doing a lot right today.

Now, what about the future? I'd like to lay out for you my thoughts on three themes that I feel will help characterize the years just ahead of us: integrity, openness, restructuring. Let me discuss each of these in some detail.

First, integrity. Let's face it, many in America are skeptical about the sincerity, honesty and candor of public officials. Since the Air Force is, of course, a public institution, some of this has rubbed off on us. Our image has been hurt. We must correct this misperception. The public, the Congress, industry, and the press must believe in our integrity. No matter how bad the problem, no

matter how difficult the circumstances, the Air Force as an institution does not, will not, and cannot accept anything less than absolute, rock solid, uncompromising integrity.

Integrity is so important that we can't stand even the appearance of its absence. Let me give you a few examples of what I mean. The first involves the use of the F-117 in Panama. The mission for the night of 20 December 1989 was to put ordnance close enough to two barracks to stun and disorient, but not kill the Panamanian troops sleeping within. The aim points were in open fields about 50 meters from the two barracks buildings.

Now, for starters, open fields are maybe not the most precise aim points. In addition, target area winds caused the pilots to switch targets just prior to mission launch. To further confuse the problem, the F-117s ran into unexpected weather conditions in the target area. Low cloud cover. So, the pilots ended up dropping on aimpoints that were just slightly different than planned. Call it the fog of war, or Murphy's Law. Anyway, one pilot hit less than 100 meters from the intended target; the other was over 100 meters away.

Now, I've dropped a few bombs. And I've had days where I'd have been proud of such scores. But today we've come to expect better results. The real problem was that the initial reporting to the general public mentioned only that, one, the bombs went precisely where they were aimed (which was true) and, two, the purpose -- to stun and disorient the Panamanian troops -- was achieved (which was also true). But there was more to the story, and it trickled out over time, with the result that it looked to some like the Air Force had slanted the initial reports for its own purposes. A subsequent investigation cleared the Air Force of wrongdoing, but the damage had been done.

The procurement of the B-1B is another example of where appearances hurt the Air Force. As many of you recall, the B-1A was canceled in April 1977. Following the change in administrations, the B-1B program was initiated in September 1981, with a funding ceiling and a requirement to field the aircraft in only five years -- a difficult task. But the Air Force delivered 100 aircraft under the cost cap and ahead of schedule. I recently flew the B-1B. It's very impressive -- even to a fighter pilot. It's the most effective bomber in the world today. It was and is a true success story. But, not the whole story.

The electronic countermeasures (ECM) issue has cast a shadow on our good work. We made a bad mistake in assuming the ALQ-161 was far enough along to keep pace with the highly concurrent development and production of the aircraft. We knew that the ECM mission was essential and we thought -- and said -- we had it in hand. But we did not grasp the magnitude of the problem until we were fielding the aircraft without a robust, adaptable ECM system.

In retrospect, we should have recognized the ECM problem sooner, and admitted it sooner. We could have done better. We learned many lessons. But, as before, the ECM story was taken out of context and used to create the perception that the Air Force had lied about the B-1B -- again, the appearance of a lack of integrity.

The final example I would point to is the view held by some that we tell only part of the story when we announce a base closure.

For instance, in December 1988, the Department of Defense announced the closure of Norton Air Force Base, here in southern California. In that announcement, we indicated we intended to leave the Ballistic Missile Office in place and relocate the two airlift wings to March Air Force Base.

In the months following this announcement, a lot happened in the world. East/West tensions were reduced. Dollars got scarcer. And, the Defense Management Review (DMR) was initiated to improve efficiency in the Department. These three events forced a scrub of our entire force structure. This, in turn, led to major adjustments, including the deactivation -- instead of relocation -- of Norton's two airlift wings and an initiative to move the Ballistic Missile Office from Norton to Space Systems Division in Los Angeles. Announcements to this effect were made last January.

We didn't anticipate these further changes before the original Norton closure announcement was made. No one can be faulted for not foreseeing the changes that have taken place in the world since December 1988. As in the other examples, the Air Force had no intent to deceive or keep appropriate information from the public. But, because so much is at stake for the people whose lives will be changed; and because we switched signals so soon after the original announcement; it was almost inevitable that there would be a serious backlash, including attacks on our integrity.

Now, I'm convinced we do not have an integrity problem. But these, and other examples you can think of, combine to give the appearance of an integrity problem and it just will not do.

How do we correct it? First, we are lucky to have the right guy, Secretary Don Rice, in charge. His complete integrity is well known, recognized, and unquestioned. He gives us the best possible leadership as we seek to burnish our image. Just having him as Secretary will help. As for the Air Force's top uniformed leadership, let me say this: We will make mistakes. We won't make many because we know our business. But we'll make some mistakes. They will be honest mistakes. We will never cut corners.

That leads me to the second subject that I see as a guiding theme for the Air Force of the future -- openness, openness with the Congress, with the press, with the public, and with our own people.

Mike Dugan was on the right track. I'm sure you're familiar with his initiatives to open up the process. He issued the much discussed "laminated card" to reporters with names and phone numbers of key staff officers. He informed the internal Air Force of important issues through weekly messages. He talked frequently with members of Congress and the press. He sent an open letter to all Air Force generals describing his belief in openness and the need for increased internal and external dialogue. His approach was correct and we should continue what he began.

Healthy dialogue is important to any organization. The Air Force has the channels for open communication -- public affairs offices, base newspapers, commander's calls, meetings, conferences, many others. We must use all these tools. We have an important story to tell and we need to tell it.

By the way, a healthy dialogue includes listening to opposing

views inside the organization. Openness is a two-way, and often a rough and tumble process. I want to be told when I'm wrong. I hope that won't happen too often. But, I've noticed that the only people who will tell me I'm wrong are the ones who actually respect me. And I'm more interested in the substance than the appearance of respect.

We must instill this kind of respect -- this kind of openness -- at all levels of command. Air Force people are willing and ready to practice openness -- we just need to empower them. For me, it's straightforward -- the right way of doing business. Openness will have its costs. On the other hand, it ought to be relatively painless, but it ought to be easy to do.

And that brings me to the last theme I see in the future of the Air Force -- restructuring. As Gorbachev has found, restructuring will not be as easy as openness. It doesn't need to be more difficult, but, as we all understand from our own experience, anytime you attempt to reorganize, the affected area immediately develops antibodies. But, make no mistake, international events and internal pressures will reshape the military services. The Air Force must adapt or go the way of the dinosaurs.

It is almost certain that we will be a smaller Air Force in the years ahead. But our purpose, our goal, our mission, will not change. The only reason any of us are in this bluesuit is to produce combat capability to defend the nation. We must now undertake to review the way we do business at every level -- from the squadron to the Air Staff. Our goal is to ensure we are adapting, evolving, continuing to be relevant; that we have it right -- that we are well organized, with the measure of merit being combat capability, today and tomorrow.

I hope to apply several operating principles as we restructure. First, we should try to eliminate layers to streamline and flatten our organization. Second, we should use a total quality approach, aiming to eliminate low-value added activities. Finally, whenever possible we must seek actively to combine authority and responsibility so that we have true accountability for performance at each level.

The Air Staff won't be exempt from a relook. And, quite frankly, I think some reduction is feasible. Today, we are projecting an Air Force that is over 20 percent smaller than it was in the mid-1980s. In addition, we are reducing our management structure at the Major Commands by over 30 percent. It only seems logical that the Air Staff should undergo a similar reduction. So, in my view, we should aim to cut the Air Staff by up to 30 percent. That will require that we focus on the important, which is not a bad idea on its own merits anyway.

So, these are the concepts I see helping form the Air Force of the immediate future -- integrity, openness, restructuring. We have a lot to do. But we are up to the challenge.

The Air Force has a proud heritage. Our dedication, our capability to defend this nation remain strong. When we're needed, the Air Force will be there and we'll be in great shape. I know the AFA will be right there at our side.

Thank you.

General Merrill A. McPeak - Questions & Answers

QUESTION: Thank you very much, General McPeak, for your very frank and open remarks. We appreciate your being here today. That speech is one that will get us all off to a good start. Now, with the drawdown in force structure, do you

foresee different sorts of units such as composite wings made up of various types of aircraft in the Air Force's future?

GEN. MCPEAK: Sounds like a planted question. I just wrote an article titled "For the Composite Wing." It will be published

soon. It sums up my views on that question. I think wings ought to be organized around the required mission. Some wings can be monolithic, 72 PAA F-15s, if their mission is to go elsewhere in the world and reinforce.

For instance, I've got a standard wing in Okinawa with 72 PAA F-15s. That's a package we usually think of when we think TAC fighter wing equivalents. The wing really isn't there to do anything in Okinawa. If we have to defend Okinawa, we can provide air defense with fewer than 72 F-15s. The wing's mission is to go somewhere else in the theater and, in combination with other assets already there or flying in from CONUS, put together a package of air/space capabilities.

My view is that if that's the wartime mission, then that's the way we ought to organize it and train in peacetime. So the composite wing makes a lot of sense to me, especially in forward-deployed locations. It has a lot of advantages. If we have to do something in Saudi Arabia today, it won't be with a 72-PAA wing of F-16s. It will take some attackers, some defenders, some stand-off jammers, some Weasels, some tankers, some of this and some of that. We are now in the process of practicing in Saudi Arabia the kind of composite force tactics we may need to use if it ever comes to hot shooting in that part of the world.

I believe that for the forward-based forces at least, they should be organized in peacetime the way we intend to fight them so they can train and work together. Over the years, the reason we haven't done it that way is our fear about cost. It is expensive, especially if you have to create the intermediate-level maintenance organization at each base where you locate a composite wing. We are starting to see our R and M efforts pay off in much better in-commission rates, much lower break rates, and a much reduced requirement for eye-level maintenance at each base.

Accordingly, in concept at least, we can begin to see the possibility of two-level maintenance. When you get to that point, then the composite wing becomes a lot more possible as the economics become a lot more credible. Now, you still might want to have some wings, especially CONUS wings with the principal mission of overseas reinforcement, to be organized in a monolithic form because of the economies of scale.

I think, in the end, you'll need a balance with some composite wings forward-deployed and some monolithic wings stationed more to the rear. Our mindset is such that we always think about the wing in monolithic terms. In my view, we should begin to think more about a mix of monolithic and composite wing structures.

QUESTION: General McPeak, the media reported yesterday that during your confirmation hearing, you stated that Joint Stars may not be required for the follow-on forces attack and other military missions. In the sense that the Air Force can do interdiction with or without J-Stars, can you please elaborate?

GEN. MCPEAK: Well, I did not say that. I have no idea what the source of that is. It is obvious that we are going to do interdiction. I was quoted as saying we will do interdiction with or without Joint Stars, and that is true, we will. We have in the past. The focus of Joint Stars is to make interdiction more effective. The fact is in the past we have done interdiction that was not particularly effective. Sometimes it has been very effective; sometimes it has been much less effective. But the interdiction we are doing now is the classic type one thinks of in severing lines of communications, dropping bridges, trying to create choke points, etc. In other words, our target then is the road. The road is the enemy as the Ho Chi Minh Trail was the enemy in Laos for instance.

That has proven to be of limited effectiveness. As we move forward to the point of contact, enemy forces will find ways around the dropped bridge or the hole in the road. It's not that dropping

bridges and trying to create choke points are not a good idea. They certainly are. But in severing lines of communication, what we're trying to do is back up traffic so we can attack enemy forces. In other words, the real target is not the road, it's the truck.

What Joint Stars gives us is a much better possibility of going after the truck directly because now we are beginning to track moving targets and know where they are. Bob Russ has often said that Joint Stars will be the AWACS of the interdiction mission. That's exactly right. We can do air defense without AWACS. But we are much less effective without AWACS because we have to go out there to try to find the target. We waste a lot of time. So we can do interdiction without Joint Stars, but we'll waste a lot of effort. Joint Stars will make it a much more effective interdiction package.

Finally, I think one of the great virtues of Joint Stars is that both the ground commander and the air commander will have the same picture of what is going on in the battle situation. The Air Force wants to be part of the combined arms team. That means we have to work well with commanders on the ground. It's a lot easier to work well with the ground commanders when you both share a common understanding of what is going on in the battlefield. Joint Stars will produce a common understanding and, as a consequence, ought to improve cooperation, making us full members of combined arms team.

QUESTION: Thank you, Tony. Regarding your comments about openness, does openness include better industry-military cooperation?

GEN. MCPEAK: I sure hope so, yes.

QUESTION: How do we treat industry as full partners in this process?

GEN. MCPEAK: I think a lot of progress can be made in this area. Now, you are talking to a fighter pilot and not someone with a robust understanding of the acquisition business. There are many in this audience who will immediately begin to discount what I say because they know a lot more about it than I do. Bob Russ being one of them. But I have the impression that we need to work in a much more congenial, convivial atmosphere with industry. We need to hire more engineers and fewer lawyers. (Applause)

We sometimes treat each other as if we were the real enemy and that is not true. We are in this thing together. Our end objective is to produce the best, most cost-effective defense for this nation, and we ought to act that way.

QUESTION: There are a number of questions on some acquisition subjects so let me just ask you, even though the defense bill is not finalized yet, how do you see the B-2 program, the C-17 program and the ICBM modernization programs faring?

GEN. MCPEAK: I am going to apologize in advance for the filibuster that is about to occur. The B-2 is our highest priority program. We do not have a program that is more important to us. As I go around Washington, I get the feeling it's an endangered species. There is just not as much support for it as we need to have. I will go to work, assuming I am confirmed as Chief, on trying to solve that problem. But it will be a man-sized job to take it on.

It's very important that people understand the facts behind the case for the B-2. There's an awful lot of misunderstanding on Capitol Hill and elsewhere about the program. It's our number one program because there is no mission that is more important to us than the strategic mission. For 35 years, our national security strategy has been based on the concept of a Triad approach to deterrence. That has always represented over-insurance. It has always been true that one leg of the Triad could inflict such massive damage on a potential opponent that one leg would be enough to effectively deter any rational individual.

Nevertheless, we chose a Triad approach because we wanted to be conservative on the problem. The potential consequence of being wrong is so grave that we had to over-insure. When I go around Washington, I don't hear anyone saying now's the time to end the Triad and go to some other approach. That is what we ought to be talking about. Is the principle of over-insurance still a good one? What I find talked about is price. Here we have a case of people knowing the price of something and perhaps not the value of it. We have got to talk about value in the B-2 program. The centerpiece of that value is that the B-2 continues the Triad approach to deterrence.

There is another aspect that is poorly understood. The bomber leg of the Triad is the stabilizing leg. I think the theory here is well understood by all of you. But to summarize it briefly, stability, like deterrence itself, is a question of psychology. What is happening in the mind of the opponent under attack? If one is being attacked by fast flyers, that is, ballistic missiles, there is a tremendous time compression that occurs. You know the threat is only minutes and seconds away. There isn't much time to consider what you're going to do next. One is forced into a "use it or lose it" psychology.

Accordingly, fast flyers are seen as destabilizing. The B-2 attack which develops over a period of hours, allows for time to consult, to activate the hotline to Washington, to ask if it's an accident or a deliberate attack. As a consequence, the slow flyers are seen as giving decision-making time and, as such, are stabilizing in a crisis situation.

For this reason in our START talks with the Soviets, both sides have agreed to incentivize each other to continue in the manned bomber business. As you know, the counting rules are arranged so that the B-1 will count as one weapon system and one warhead even though it contains many more than that. So it is clear to us and to the Soviets that this is a deterring part of the Triad approach and a stabilizing part of the Triad itself.

There are many other pieces to this puzzle. I don't want to stall out on just the B-2, but I think we are making a big mistake if we don't continue that program to completion. It represents a major turning point for this country in terms of its national security policy and we must make the right decision.

The C-17. I had a chance to look at the C-17 yesterday. It's a very impressive program and also a high priority. What we see in Saudi Arabia today is a wonderful demonstration of what airlift can do for us. I don't think it's being overly boastful to say that we are probably the only nation in the world that could have done what we just did. Nobody else could pull that off. The reason is the capabilities in the Military Airlift Command, but they need to be modernized and the C-17 is our modernization program to do it. Quite frankly, the C-5 and C-141 -- especially the C-141 -- have performed magnificently. They have turned in very high readiness rates throughout this exercise, but the C-141 is beginning to show its age.

If we want the continued capability for crisis response anywhere in the world, we must have something like the C-17. It is a critical element of our program.

Now, ICBM modernization. That is something I am an expert in from so many years in the missile business (laughter). I will offer you again a layman's understanding of what is going on. I think it's important that we continue a very effective research and development program in the ICBM modernization area. We must prove that we are capable of fielding the MX in a Rail Garrison mode; a mobility mode. The Soviets have, as you know, already fielded mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles. Part of what we are trying to do in our international negotiations to reduce strategic arms is to move away from this concept, especially MIRVed

mobile ballistic missiles.

It's important that we demonstrate to ourselves and to the Soviets that we can do it. If this mode of deployment continues in the world, in other words if we do not negotiate it away, then we must be able to rapidly field that offsetting capability.

As you know, we were originally scheduled to field Peacekeeper in a Rail Garrison mode in the relatively near term, I believe calendar year 1992. We will not make calendar 1992 deployment, but we ought to continue a complete and comprehensive R & D program so that we could change our mind and go ahead and deploy quickly in the future if that becomes necessary.

In the case of the small missile, we have a little more R & D to do. With MX Rail Garrison, we have the missile and the railroad trains so it's a relatively easy problem. We do not have the small missile. We do not have the hard-mobile launcher. So that development program is going to take a little longer. I think it was to achieve IOC around 1997. So it's not imperative that we decide now. We should continue the research program and the development work so we can continue to understand the problem. We can make a deployment decision closer to the mid-1990s when we'll have a better understanding of our position in these START talks.

QUESTION: Another series of questions on events in the Pacific. As you depart that area of responsibility, there is instability in the Philippines, planned force drawdowns in the Pacific and Europe, US withdrawal from Guam. What is your view of the status of our forces and the stability question and the general state of affairs in the Pacific?

GEN. MCPHAK: I would like an easier question, if you've got one (laughter). First, the Pacific is not NATO. It is not a place where we have one security alliance which binds the countries together into a common structure and a common dedication to alliance defense. Rather, it is a series of bilateral relationships with each country. So you cannot generalize about the situation in the Pacific. You have to say, here is the situation in Korea, here is the situation in Japan, here is the situation in the Philippines, etc.

Regarding Korea, I think there's no doubt that we are going to have a changing relationship with the South Koreans. The Air Force now has about 12,000 people in Korea. We are going to move that down to around 10,000. That is about a 15 percent drop in our Air Force troop strength. We now operate out of five bases. We are going to consolidate on two. We are moving in the direction of a smaller, less comprehensive force. I don't think we are making any deep cuts in our combat capability in Korea. These are cuts on the margin, but they are nevertheless indicative of the trend. I think we'll see that continue as the ROK armed forces continue to improve their own self-defense capabilities and, hopefully, the North and South Koreans continue a dialogue. We've seen one halting step in that direction already. Hopefully that will continue and we can look forward to something more than an armistice. We are still at war in Korea after 35 years or so. There has never been a peace treaty signed. Hopefully we can move in the direction of true peace there, and perhaps even integration of the peninsula over time.

In Japan, I think we will probably stay there for a while. We have not made significant reductions in our Air Force troop strength there. We, and the Japanese, see our presence as mutually beneficial. They pay for a considerable fraction of the costs of our operating forces and, as a consequence, I see our presence in Japan as relatively stable into the immediate future.

In the Philippines, it all depends on how the on-going negotiations come out. I think there is a very great possibility that we will have to change the nature of our operation at Clark Air Base. We are, in any case, going to change it. I have got about 9,000 people stationed at Clark right now. We have on-base

accommodations for about 6,000, about half married and half unaccompanied. So we can put about 3,000 people in married quarters and 3,000 people in dormitories. I am committed to moving our numbers down to those we can keep on base by next summer. That means we are going to go from 9,000 to 6,000 almost without regard to what happens in the negotiations. We are responsible for the safety of these young men and women who are entrusted to us by the American people. So we are going to tighten our belt at Clark and operate with fewer people.

What will it mean? Longer hours. Six-day weeks and so forth. We are going to underman because we are not going to change the mission at Clark unilaterally. We are going to cut the number of people there so we can get them all on base and take care of them.

I think the mission may change as a consequence of these negotiations. The Philippine people, as represented by their negotiators at least, seem to think they need a larger scale change in the nature of the arrangement. I would emphasize that Clark is already a Philippine air base. It flies the Philippine flag. We have a Philippine two-star, the commander of the Philippine Air Force, who has the job of commander of Clark Air Base as a second title. He is represented on a daily basis by a brigadier general who works and lives at Clark. So this is a Philippine base just like RAF Bentwaters is an RAF base. The sovereignty question, in my view, has been pretty well settled. But, for the Philippine people, it may be necessary to go somewhat farther in the direction of making it clear to everyone that this base belongs to the Philippine people, and not to the United States.

If so, they may impose or we may agree to certain restrictions to scale back our activities or change our deployment there in some respect. If that is the outcome, then so be it. We will have to do

that. But, I believe it will be a mistake for us. It will be inimical to our national interests. It will not serve the Philippine people either. But that may be the dynamic we are stuck with, and if so, we will move and resume operations at some other location.

We are increasing our presence in one respect. We are negotiating with the Singapore government to start a small rotational deployment into Singapore. On balance, if you look across at the tactical fighter force structure in the Pacific, we probably are not going to reduce it much because Alaska has now become part of PACAF. We see Alaska as a growth opportunity. If you want to buy stock, when Alaska's sales start, it's going to go up as far as we are concerned. As we move forces back from the Philippines and elsewhere, Alaska is the logical place to bed some of that down. I do not see us falling much below the four tactical fighter wings where we are now.

QUESTION: Thank you very much, Tony. Last question for General McPeak, an easy one. What job do you consider more exciting, your future job as USAF Chief of Staff or flying with the Thunderbirds as a Captain when the wings of your jet broke off?

GEN. MCPEAK: I prefer flying as a Captain to any job, especially this one that I may be headed for, if I'm confirmed. In fact, I was scheduled to follow Bob Russ's act at Langley, and I was delighted to do that. He has got F-15s parked right out by the office door there. I thought that would be a nice way to end up a career but I was not given a lot of choice in this whole business, so I will go where I am asked to go.

Well, we have the right man for the job, and we thank you very much for being here, General McPeak. It has been a pleasure to have you. □

Panel from Rand Corporation

The next topic should be very interesting. The dynamics of developments in the Soviet Union are very difficult to chronicle. It is still the only other nation in the superpower relationship that exists on this globe. We have a group here today to discuss what is going on over there, and they will accept your questions. In my previous incarnation, I headed an organization called the AFAG which is the Air Force Advisory Group or Project Air Force. I worked with George Donahue and Don Palmer and others who are with us today. Before I travelled to the Soviet Union two years ago, I sought out their advice. These are the people you come to understand the latest.

When we have reached a point where the foreign minister, Mr. Shevardnadze, is being called a Communist in derogatory terms, you know things are happening rapidly over there. Even Tom Clancy couldn't write a script for the next year or two. So if anyone is going to put it straight for us, it will be this panel from Rand. I know you will find them interesting. Let me just introduce their leader, David Ochmanek. Over to you, David.

MR. OCHMANEK: Thank you. My colleagues and I probably represent the third generation of American foreign policy and strategy students who have been preoccupied with the Soviet Union, and with ways to contain Soviet power and expansionism. Given that long history of preoccupation with the Soviet Union and the central focus the Soviets have played in our national security policy and planning, it's not surprising that fundamental changes within the Soviet Union and with respect to its external policies are having very powerful reverberations in our own defense planning, our budgets, our programs and even raising questions about the proper role in the world for the United States in the future.

With this as a background, General Hatch asked us if we would convene a panel of students of the Soviet Union to place some of this in perspective. Today I have asked Eugene Rumer to talk about developments in Soviet internal political realms. Bob Nurick will follow with some comments on Soviet civil-military relations, and then John VanOudenaren will conclude with some comments about changes in recent Soviet foreign policy. I have asked each of my colleagues to limit their remarks to about 10 minutes each so that we will have plenty of time for your questions and answers. Gene?

Soviet Internal Political Developments:

DR. RUMER: Thank you, David. I think 10 minutes is definitely not enough, but as I would like to try to prove to you today, no time would be enough because chaos cannot be described in adequate detail. I recently came back from a two-week trip to the Soviet Union. Since my return about 10 days ago, I have been trying to organize my impressions to put some order or perspective on the information I gained during that trip.

Increasingly, I realize that it is an impossible task because you cannot organize chaos. And you cannot describe the domestic political situation in the Soviet Union today in terms other than chaos. In a nutshell, the old political order has collapsed, but a new political system has not yet emerged in its place. Presently, there are two political groups in the Soviet Union that have found themselves in a dual role of being both the ruling government and the opposition. At the old union level or the federal level, the Gorbachev government still remains at least nominally in control and dominates the old union legislature or the Supreme Soviet.

Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, and the democratic coalition he leads, are in the minority in the national legislature. They act as the opposition to Gorbachev. The spearhead of that opposition is the so-called interregional group of deputies in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Now, at the republican level, most notably in the largest Russian republic, the forces aligned with the old union governments are, in

turn, in opposition. It is the Yeltsin people and their counterparts in other constituent Soviet republics who are in control; and Gorbachev and his team are in opposition at the lower republican level. In effect, the old union government headed by Gorbachev no longer controls the country. For that matter, it is difficult to point to any single government that is in control of a republic or any administrative unit of the Soviet Union which it should be governing and having jurisdiction over.

Fractionation of political power in the Soviet Union has made the country virtually unmanageable and ungovernable. Political power is diffused among many layers of government -- from the old union to the republican, to the autonomous regions within individual Soviet republics, and even to municipal levels and smaller administrative units within reasonably sized cities such as Moscow and Leningrad. Few if any of these governments have the actual enforcement ability to follow up on the numerous laws that they have passed. I think their power is best expressed in the ability to undermine laws and decrees issued by higher level governments rather than enforce the laws they've passed in their jurisdiction. It is, in a sense, a power of defiance or, if you want to take it to the next level, sabotage.

The roots of this phenomenon can be traced, in my view, to the declaration of sovereignty by the Yeltsin government within the Russian republic earlier this year. By this declaration, the government of the Russian republic asserted the supremacy of its laws in its territory over the laws passed by the old union parliament. A series of similar declarations were passed subsequently by, I believe, 13 out of 15 constituent Soviet republics and that was not the end of it. Many lower level administrative units, autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts which are smaller level administrative units, began to assert their sovereignty over their own territory, proclaiming the supremacy of their laws over the laws of constituent republics of which they are part. This process continues on and on to even the most ridiculous levels.

I think the analogy that comes to mind is the nuclear-free zone resolutions passed by some New England towns which threaten to penalize those who explode nuclear weapons within the city limits by \$500 or \$1,000 fines. (laughter). In the case of the Soviet Union, in the absence of a really functioning constitution or clearly defined federal treaty, they are in a situation where all traditional instruments of power have been rendered useless. This proliferation of legislative activity leads to chaos. Even the Yeltsin government, which was the trendsetter with its own first sovereignty declaration, has begun to experience many of the challenges that it initially put up to the Gorbachev government.

I do not know how many people were aware of where it would lead, but just to give you some examples. The Karelia autonomous republic, which is part of the Russian federation, refused to supply newsprint to the Russian federation because it felt it was getting a

bad economic deal in not getting enough needed supplies from the rest of the Russian republic. When I arrived in Moscow a few weeks ago, the newly-opened Pizza Hut restaurant had to close after about a week to ten days, and it remained closed for some 10 days to two weeks. The reason was a fight between the Moscow city council and a lower level municipal body over jurisdiction over the Pizza Hut. There was a very practical reason behind this. They were fighting for control of hard currency producing-income that was to be generated. It was a very heated political struggle which, I think, turned off many people interested in investing in the Soviet Union.

I really hesitate to predict where and how far this can go. All traditional instruments of power have been rendered essentially irrelevant and ineffective and, so far, no government in the Soviet Union has come up with anything to replace them. By traditional instruments, I mean the three institutions that have long dominated the thinking of students of the Soviet Union: the Communist Party, the military and the KGB. The Communist Party and the Apparatus of the Communist Party, which constituted the real government that ran the Soviet Union, has been destroyed. It is no longer a coherent organization with a single center of power to which its branches respond or from which they take orders.

In many regions, local party officials still retain considerable power, but their power and the authority to use it comes not from their status as party officials. Rather, they have been able to get themselves elected -- I do not know how, by hook or by crook -- to local legislatures. Thus they remain, at least nominally, in control of the territories they used to control as former party apparatchiks. They are very much subject to local conditions. They do not, in any real sense, respond to the center or take any instructions from Gorbachev or the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Now, the second instrument, the military, is suffering from a profound institutional split. The split runs along the lines of junior officers versus senior officers; the rank and file versus the high command. I think Bob Nurick will address this issue in the next presentation.

To sum up my assessment of the military, I think it is no longer an effective political player in the domestic context. The KGB has suffered the least in the turmoil of the last five years, but that's not to say it hasn't suffered at all. Increasingly, it is coming under attack from the liberal media and from left wing political organizations and parties. It cannot function on its own as an instrument to enforce law and order by the central government simply because, in my view, it does not have sufficient physical assets to bring the country under control.

The new institutions which have emerged in place of the three traditional instruments of power I just described, are inherently incapable of enforcing law and order. It is not their function. Their main function so far has been to undermine the power and authority of the central government.

Now, how long can this go on? I hesitate to make a prediction. I would offer two possibilities to conclude this very sketchy overview. One possibility is a continual slide into more chaos which could continue for months or years. It depends on the degree of tolerance of the Russian and Soviet people. This gradual decline may, in my view, continue for years. The other possibility is an iron hand type regime. This has been advocated by many already -- not the conservatives, but many liberals -- people on the progressive end of the Soviet political spectrum, including many progressive journalists and political analysts. It's the idea of a government of national reconciliation being formed by the more progressive elements in the political spectrum, people associated with Yeltsin, or perhaps Yeltsin himself and his allies at the republican level, who will take control of the country; declare a national emergency;

suspend the functioning of local legislatures; impose a state of emergency; and begin to implement economic reform. Again, the chances of this happening at the present time are very difficult to assess.

Changes in Soviet Civil-Military Relations:

MR. NURICK: Thank you. For most of the Gorbachev period, the Soviet military establishment has been very much an institution under seige. It has been subjected to harsh criticism of its internal practices. It has been buffeted by broader social forces, especially nationalist ferment and upheaval. It has been required to absorb significant cuts in its budget and its force structure. And it has seen many of its traditional prerogatives, preferences and bureaucratic clout eroding over time.

One of the things that has been striking for observers witnessing all of this is how quiescent senior officers have been through much of this period in the face of these trends. Of course, they have spoken out about social and national issues affecting the military's interests, and they certainly have continued to address issues of defense policy as they have always done. But what they have not generally done for most of this period is to attack directly and publicly Gorbachev's basic program. The criticisms they did utter about it were usually muted and hedged by expressions of underlying support for perestroika and for the new thinking.

But since roughly the beginning of this year, a number of prominent members of the high command seem to have come out of their shell and have started to speak out on basic issues of policy in ways which, in my view, they had not really done before. In some cases they did so in a manner which seemed to suggest a direct challenge to some of Gorbachev's foreign and domestic policy lines.

What I want to do, then, is address very briefly three basic questions. First, what is behind this new outspokenness? Second, what is it that senior officers are complaining about and why? And third, what does this imply for military cohesion, for the prospects for the military's political role in the future and, more broadly, the prospects for civil-military relations?

Two major sets of developments appear to have spurred this new willingness by some senior officers to go public with their unhappiness and frustration. The first is the intensification of nationalist upheavals, particularly in Azerbaijan, Lithuania and elsewhere in the Baltic states, and the consequent demands on the Army's internal policing function. Indeed, since a bloody suppression of some demonstrations in May of 1989 in Georgia, senior officers had expressed misgivings about being called on for this internal policing role. They recognized that policing activities had exacerbated the Army's own internal ethnic problems, making the Army the focus of considerable public anger and resentment.

Finally, this role had also given rise, among other factors, to some quite troubling nationalist demands for changes in staffing policy within the military. In particular, calls for an end to so-called extra-territorial staffing, a practice where conscripts serve away from their own republics in multinational units; and demands for the establishment of territorial militia or other similar national units, placed under the political control of republic authorities. These demands, which grew in 1989 and 1990, were very troubling to the high command.

One result of all this was a major debate within the military press about whether, and under what circumstances, it was appropriate for the Army to take on this internal policing role. In general, I think the unhappiness with it was quite widespread.

In any case, these events and their repercussions over time reinforced an evident bitterness on the part of Defense Minister

Yazof, Chief of Staff Moiseiev and other senior officers that the Army was being made a scapegoat for social conditions and problems whose ultimate responsibility lay with the political leadership.

The second key development sparking this outspokenness was not hard to guess. It was the unravelling of Communist Party control and the fading Soviet presence in Eastern Europe. These events have intensified earlier internal debates about the implications of Gorbachev's foreign policy priorities for the Soviet Union's security posture. And for military planners, they have posed some very stark issues. Now, a number of senior military spokesmen have maintained that they were fully involved in, and presumably prepared for, the decision-making processes which led to the shift toward the so-called defensive force structure and operational doctrine which produced the decisions to undertake unilateral reductions in Eastern Europe and to let the East Europeans go their own way.

Personally, I am a bit skeptical about these protestations. The military, in my view, shows every sign of scrambling to catch up with directives which have come down from above. One thing is clear: They have not been prepared for the imminent unravelling of the Warsaw Pact, nor the prospect of losing this longstanding buffer and their forward presence in Eastern Europe which has occurred so quickly. Now, the high command must plan against a very real contingency that defense of the homeland will have to be insured perhaps entirely from Soviet territory. This is an issue with which they are struggling. This has created a transformation in their security situation which has been another important source of frustration and unhappiness.

In the last year or so, they have made their unhappiness increasingly known and have started to respond to these attacks. A number of prominent senior officers have been involved, including Yazof, Boris Dromov and many others. The principal themes in the military press that emerged in the last eight to ten months have included: The failure of domestic economic reform to rejuvenate the economy as a whole or reduce the gap in defense technology with the West; further unilateral cuts in defense spending and force structure would be dangerous; Eastern Europe represents a strategic setback of major proportions which requires a reevaluation of defense policy.

A basic message is that the threat from the West, though perhaps abated for now, does continue to exist; that together with the events in Eastern Europe, and the upheavals at home, these factors mean that the demands on the military are, in fact, rising and not diminishing.

This kind of critique which has emerged in the military press, suggests they are voicing concerns not merely about individual policy questions of interest to the military. This is something they have always done. Rather, they are drawing more or less explicit links between their institutional concerns and broader issues of foreign and domestic policy.

What does all this suggest about the military's political role? One speculation, and a source of considerable rumors in Moscow, is that they might attempt a coup. These rumors first surfaced last spring and intensified early this fall in the context of some very peculiar troop movements, including some airborne regiments in the Moscow area in early September. My own instincts are that a coup of this sort is unlikely, at least in the Banana Republic sense of something done at the military's own initiative. There is no tradition or precedent for it in the way the military has behaved historically in the Soviet Union. Also the senior officer corps seems highly committed to the notion of party control and is very uneasy at the prospect that the party presence in the military might be attenuated.

More important, though, is the fact that the officer corps itself seems increasingly polarized. It's split along generational lines where, on the one hand, we see senior officers expressing very conservative positions of the sort I have referred to, but numerous younger officers, especially in the Congress, striking much more sharply reformist positions.

What this has some bearing on is a more potentially important though less dramatic issue. It is not whether the military might stage a coup, but how they might act in the context of a serious political struggle within the elite as a whole. Now, arguably, the struggle already exists and has for some time. But the terms of it have changed considerably. The political equation has shifted since early summer when a major defeat was suffered by some of the conservatives at the party congress. The main challenge to Gorbachev at the moment is not so much from the right as from the republics. In other words, it is not so much a right-left issue which the military could conceivably attach itself to, but a center of periphery issue at a time when central authority, as Eugene has said, is eroding in general.

In this very chaotic and fractionated political situation where lines of division run in many different directions, not just along a left-right axis; and where coherent central authority of any sort seems to be difficult to exercise, my own view is that it's unlikely a military establishment which, itself, is so deeply divided would be able to reverse these trends or significantly affect the course of political developments in the short term, at least not as an independent political actor. If a real conservative challenge to Gorbachev should coalesce, and I do not see any signs of it at the moment, bringing a lot of people with it, and if important calls should be made for the reestablishment of an iron hand, then the military's influence could grow once again. Thank you.

Changes in Soviet Foreign Policy:

DR. VAN OUDENAREN: Let me start out by saying that I agree with just about everything that has been said by my two colleagues about the internal situation in the Soviet Union and about the state of civil-military relations. These developments naturally have a great effect on Soviet foreign policy. Because of the mess it is in internally, the Soviet Union is internationally operating from a great position of weakness -- economic, political, and to some extent, military. The Soviet Union still is a great military power, with manpower and hardware, etc., but its ability to get involved in any military contingency would be severely constrained by its internal difficulties.

I would add, however, that the Soviet Union still does pursue a very active foreign policy. This foreign policy, at least at the rhetorical level, at the level of signing treaties, casting votes in the UN and so forth, is very much under the control of Gorbachev and his top advisors, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, etc. As you know, Gorbachev met with President Bush to discuss the Gulf crisis in September. He will be in France and Spain in the next few days where he is going to sign important treaties. He is going to Germany on November 9 where another important treaty will be signed and, of course, he will be at the Paris Summit later in November where he will sign several important agreements about the future of Europe. So we have this strange situation where the guy does not really control his own country, but he is very active on the international scene, does have a foreign policy and, in fact, is trying to use foreign policy to some extent to bolster his position at home. However, it is sort of wearing thin a bit at home.

Now, given that he does control Soviet foreign policy, what is the content of this policy? Well, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze would claim that Soviet foreign policy today is based on what they

call the new political thinking which they introduced in 1985-1986, shortly after they took power. They come very close to implying that everything that has happened since 1985 and 1986, including German reunification and the loss of Eastern Europe, etc. sort of flows from the new political thinking and they more or less foresaw these developments or even planned them.

Of course, this is total nonsense. When Gorbachev took power in 1985-1986, he had no intention whatsoever of losing Eastern Europe, of allowing Germany to be reunited as recently as the first half of 1989 or even into the fall of 1989. You can document quite easily that Gorbachev expected a reformed Communism to emerge in Eastern Europe. He expected the GDR to survive and Germany to remain divided.

But for reasons having very much to do with the internal weaknesses of the Soviet Union as well as developments in Eastern Europe and Germany themselves, the Soviets completely lost control of the process. They now face a totally new situation where their main military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, has become virtually a dead letter. Their main economic organization, the COMECON, has become pretty much of a dead letter. Trade is breaking down in the area, and they face this new reunited Germany. They saw little choice but to go along with the trend toward unification. They could not stop it although they made a half-hearted attempt early this year, late last year.

So they face a fundamentally new situation. They use slogans like new political thinking to imply that they have controlled this all along. They knew where they were going, but in fact, they did not. They are having to fashion a new policy.

What are the elements of this new policy? I think it is largely ad hoc. They are looking for help wherever they can get it, but there is a certain pattern emerging. I will say a few things about some of the highlights of Soviet foreign policy as it is emerging in the post-Cold War world.

It is clear they are banking very heavily on their West European connections, and in particular, their connection with the new united Germany. This emphasis on relations with Western Europe and with Germany is motivated both by fear and by hope and expectation. I think the Soviets' great fear is their total exclusion from Europe. The east-west divide that used to run through the center of Germany and at the western border of Hungary and Czechoslovakia could simply be pushed to the western border of the USSR. This would be economically difficult for the Soviet Union. It would mean they would be excluded from 1992 and one Europe, and the growing integration of Eastern Europe into Western Europe. It would be difficult psychologically for the Soviet elite. The Russian elite, going back to the Czarist days, has always identified itself as European. To have the door slammed on them, saying you're not part of Europe, I think that would be difficult for them.

It would also complicate the security situation of the Soviet Union. Perhaps most important, it would hasten the break-up of the Soviet Union. If you move this east-west divide to the western border of the USSR, the first thing that is going to happen, in fact, it's already happening, is the republics on the western periphery of the Baltics -- Byelorussia, the Ukraine -- are going to be trying to find ways to get on the western side of that line rather than be stuck on the eastern side of it. This is really going to hasten the break-up of the USSR, leading to further isolation of the Russians.

The Soviets have a keen desire to remain in Europe. This, in part, explains their enthusiasm for the CSE process and for the creation of new institutions. We will see this on November 19 and 20 in Paris when the agreements are signed. I have not seen the text of those agreements. I think they are still under negotiation, but you are going to see the creation of risk reduction centers and CSE

secretariats and various permanent institutions. The West has decided to go along with all of these, but these ideas were very much coming out of the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze began pushing them last year, in part because the Soviet Union is looking for mechanisms to anchor itself in Europe to assert its position as a European power.

If exclusion from Europe is the great fear that the Soviets have, the great hope is that Europe -- European money, European capital, European expertise -- in some way will help to rescue the Soviet Union economically. The Soviets are banking very heavily on German investment and ties with other European countries to help their economic situation. The Germans have put forward a lot of money already to help the Soviet Union as part of the deal leading to reunification and the removal of all Soviet troops from Eastern Germany. I think there is a good chance the Soviets are going to be disappointed that the Germans or other Europeans are not going to provide an external solution to the problem of Soviet economic disaster. The difficulty is just too great. These are essentially profit-making companies which are not going to give charity to the Soviet Union for no particular reason.

Now, looking outside of Europe, I see the Soviets doing a few things. The first and most important thing is they want to get rid of costly engagements: Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola and so on. They simply cannot afford to keep these entities afloat. They are trying to look for graceful ways out. They do not want to look as if they are selling out. But they have made it clear that they cannot underwrite a third world empire. Another thing they are trying to do is get economic benefits from countries they used to not deal with. South Korea is a case in point. The Soviets, particularly out in the far eastern region, have great hopes for ties with South Korea. The Soviets are also dealing with Israel for economic reasons and with South Africa. In the old days, they would not have dealt with these countries for political reasons. Now, if they can cut a good deal, they will do it because they need the cash to put it bluntly.

Another characteristic of Soviet policy is that they -- Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, in particular -- are very keen on being perceived as a good citizen in the world. It is part of this not wanting to be excluded and, of course, we get a certain pay-off from this in the Gulf crisis. There are temptations, there are internal debates, and the Soviet military is not fully on board. They want to lean, I think, more toward Iraq or at least not be seen as wholeheartedly supporting the international effort against Iraq. But for the civilian leadership, Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, etc., the overwhelming concern is to be perceived as a good citizen and being supportive of the international effort.

I do not think Gorbachev and Shevardnadze are eager to see a war in the Gulf region. I think this would, in some sense, underline the absurdity of Gorbachev's rhetoric about new thinking and a non-violent world. It would also underline the impotence of the Soviet Union in this new world. It would show that the United States and its allies are, in effect, preeminent, doing what they want in the Soviet Union's own backyard. Even though the Soviets are not supportive of the Iraqis, it would be a humiliating thing for the Soviet Union.

I think we are seeing the Soviet Union trying to integrate itself into the outside world, trying to be a good citizen to get economic benefits, but doing so very much from a position of internal weakness. Unless they can get the internal weakness under control, all the diplomatic, political and public relations skills that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze have is not going to do them any good. The basis of their power is crumbling around them, even as they go on these international trips and sign agreements and so on.

The Rand Corporation - Questions & Answers

MR. OCHMANEK: Thank you, John. I would like to open up the questions by addressing the first one to each of my colleagues. In 25 words or less, do you foresee the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a national entity and if so, what are the implications of that for world security? Eugene?

DR. RUMER: Why don't you start as chairman?

MR. OCHMANEK: No, I have chosen an easier one for myself later on.

DR. RUMER: In a word, yes. I have 24 left. I think the Soviet Union has already ceased to function as a coherent country. As I just said, I think the central government no longer functions. Nobody has the ability to enforce the laws that they have on the books, whether it is at the lower echelons or the higher echelons.

As to the actual physical break-up of the Soviet Union, I think it is a very difficult task to predict whether and when it will happen. I think it is more predictable in the case of the Baltic republics, perhaps in the case of Azerbaijan.

I think that many other republics will have second thoughts about completely pulling out of the Soviet Union, simply because, at least for the time being, they stand to gain something out of being part of the union. So to give you a non-answer, maybe.

As to the implications for the outside world, I think many of them are very obvious. With the crisis in the Gulf, we all of a sudden realize that eight or some million Azeris are living in Soviet Azerbaijan with 10 or 15 million more Azeris, their counterparts, living in Iran. As Turkic speaking people, they all might have the same national aspirations. All of a sudden, people at Rand began to wonder what is going to happen in Iran, for example, if Azerbaijan were to disintegrate, adding another unpredictable variable to the Persian Gulf crisis.

It is simply impossible to predict what might happen. I think we all can only fear the consequences, but to predict the actual course of events at this point is impossible.

MR. NURICK: My short answer to the first part of the question would be yes. Five or ten years from now, I don't think the Soviet Union will look like it does today. Part of its territory will be missing, certainly the Baltics are the first to come to mind, but perhaps, some others along the western edge as well. Also the relationship among the republics and the relationship between the republics and the center of whatever remains of the Soviet Union will also be, I think, strikingly different. That is the most likely outcome in my view.

As to what this means, the long term implications of course depend on what is left; what the shape of this new Soviet Union or whatever replaces it will be. I cannot predict that. Frankly, I have not thought it through and I'm not going to try to hazard blind comments about it. There is a near term question which is not so much what the end state of this replacement will look like, but how it gets there. That is, whether the process is violent or not; whether it happens quickly or over time; whether it brings in outside actors and invites intervention and so on. Those issues may loom as policy issues for Western officials sooner rather than later. There is where I would focus my analytical attention now.

MR. OCHMANEK: Bob Nurick gets to answer the winner of the most popular question contest which is, given the political chaos in the country and the potential breakdown of civil-military relations, what are the implications for control of the military and, in particular, are we seeing signs for change in the way the Soviets are going about keeping the rein on their nuclear weapons, if you can shed some light on that at this level of classification.

MR. NURICK: Let me address political control of the military first. That is an issue very much on the agenda right now. There are strong pressures coming from reformists, braced to some extent by Gorbachev, to de-politicize the military. What that means is getting some of the party organs out of the military structure. This has been resisted by many senior officers. So far the result is a compromise; that is, a series of decrees and resolutions stemming from this past summer, which have changed the nature of some of the main organs within the military, but still allow the Communist party to retain a presence there. So they have not been completely de-politicized and the issue, I think, is going to continue.

As I mentioned before, the question of how political control is exercised is related to the broader question of whether it is going to be exercised at all. My own sense is that the very strong instinct, even of conservative military officers, has been to be much more comfortable with a political presence and specifically a party presence within the military structure than without it. This is one of the reasons they have opposed these more reformist proposals for de-politicization. I am not worried so much, at least in the short term, about political control of the military as such. The big question, of course, is whether the political control itself is coherent. That is another matter. But so long as it is, it seems to me that issue is one I'm relatively relaxed about.

On the nuclear weapons question, I should say at the outset that I do not have any special information that would not be available to any of you in the audience when I answer this question. I am, in some respects, somewhat more relaxed, at least for the moment, about that issue than many of my colleagues. This is, in part, based on past precedent. The Soviet military has been very, very cautious and conservative. I see no signs that they are relaxing that. There are threats; there are things to worry about. They recognize them and I think have taken some action.

The real issue is not so much with the longer range systems which are harder to protect, but some of the warheads that are dispersed in the field. Some believe they might be vulnerable to nationalist or other extremist groups. Again, it is not something I would relax about entirely, but at the moment, so long as the military itself is coherent, I am quite persuaded that they will continue to be very careful and take the measures they need to. If the military itself collapses under much more extreme circumstances, then that is a different matter.

MR. OCHMANEK: Thank you, Bob. John, I am combining a couple of interesting questions here on the changing role of the Soviet military in Soviet foreign policy and security policy. In particular, do you see enduring signs that the Soviets will rely less on their military as a tool of diplomacy; and do you see signs that public opinion is becoming a serious factor in the way the Soviets use and think about their military?

DR. VAN OUDENAREN: Yes, the military is becoming less of a factor in Soviet foreign policy. The military instrument is becoming less important. What is interesting about that, though, is when Gorbachev and Shevardnadze began talking about de-militarizing Soviet foreign policy in 1985, 1986, 1987, there was some resistance on the military side to that. They obviously did not like to hear that what was going on in Afghanistan was an ignoble action; that their budgets could be cut because the military instrument was not important and so on. They certainly did not like pulling out of Eastern Europe under the theory that there was going to be a brave new European security order in which military power

was not going to matter anymore.

But the military bowed to reality and did what the political leaders told them to. They got out of Afghanistan, pulled out of Eastern Europe and so on. What is interesting now, though, is when Shevardnadze a couple of weeks ago raised the idea, just in a passing context, of the Soviet Union committing forces to a UN command either in the Gulf context or in some other context around the world, people more on the conservative side said, now wait a minute, you told us we were getting out of that business and we believed you. Just because you are involved in a new game right now of building up the UN and talking about reviving the UN military command, don't expect us to play along. So, yes, the military is becoming less important.

Yes, public opinion and parliamentary opinion are becoming more of a factor in stopping military involvement, but it is not fully a process that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze control. Just to repeat, they were the ones who wanted to get the military out of international affairs. It is conceivable they might want to get it back in for certain purposes. It may be that people in the military or their allies in parliament will say sorry, we are not doing that for you anymore.

MR. OCHMANEK: I have a number of questions on prospects for the Soviet economy and Soviet arms production capabilities. I am going to have to pass on those. We do not have an economist along with us today. There is one interesting question that Eugene might have a view on, which is of more than purely academic interest to him since he is going to be spending most of the next winter and spring in the Soviet Union working on a project for me. That is, do you see the prospect for widespread famine inside the Soviet Union, based on your impressions of what you have seen in the stores and on the shelves?

DR. RUMER: The short answer is, I am, afraid yes. If you go into the stores in Moscow, there is simply no food to be bought in government-run stores. There is plenty of food to be had at extremely high prices in private markets, very high quality food, but most people simply cannot afford it.

When I was in Moscow in late September, it was the end of their harvesting season for potatoes. It had rained for about six weeks by that time and, according to official statistics, in the Moscow region only three percent of the potato harvest had been picked. Many politicians and city officials were asking people to go out in the fields and pick their own potatoes, stockpiling as much as they could to get through as much of the coming winter as possible. The problem, of course, is that it is difficult to store potatoes in one- or two-room apartments already cramped with large families and their belongings. So many enterprises were setting up storage facilities for their employees.

I spent 2.5 weeks there. It was my second visit in the last 12 months. I simply do not understand how Soviet people get by. A lot of people must spend all their time in lines trying to get food. I think for many it is, literally, a question of where the next meal is coming from that dominates their agenda.

As to longer term prospects for widespread famine, I do not know what to say. All signs point in that direction at the present time. So far they have been able to avoid one. With luck or through miracles or grain deliveries from the West or with the help of a relatively mild winter, they might get through. Also, what affects people in Moscow in the worst possible way is that the city produces very little in terms of actual physical goods. It has very little to send to other regions of the country. Also, the central supply distribution system has broken down so a lot of grain- and other food-producing regions are simply hoarding the products that they have. So the food situation in many parts of the Soviet Union may be better than it is in Moscow. It used to be that Moscow was

the best place to be in terms of food. Now it is probably the worst. So I would expect famine in Moscow unless the city fathers work out a deal with other regions. The situation is better in the Ukraine and other parts of the country.

MR. OCHMANEK: A question for Bob. This is on the prospects for an all-volunteer military. If you could say a few words on the status of that and whether you think, in fact, that is a realistic option for the Soviets to follow.

MR. NURICK: Well, again, this has been another major bone of contention in the internal Soviet debate about military reform. Right now, the situation is more or less as follows. Over the past two years, calls for a professional, all-volunteer Army have come from both the liberal reformers who are interested in an all-volunteer Army largely to reduce the size of the Army; from some military reformers who see this as part of a more general strategy to achieve a smaller but much better skilled and technically proficient military force; and from some in the republics who are simply interested in reducing the military's burden on their citizens. As a rule, particularly in the early days, it was resisted by senior officers in the high command, in part on economic grounds that it would cost too much, in part because of longstanding attachments to the political functions that a multi-national armed force would reputably serve. Senior officers' views have moderated considerably over the past year. Their instincts seem to be doubtful of the idea. Very few even conservative officers are expressing vehement objection to the notion of an all-volunteer army in principle. What they are saying now is they are not ready for it yet.

Very recently one officer, General Lushev who is still, at least formally Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact, published a very interesting piece in the party theoretical journal. He essentially embraced a number of the military reforms, including a greater reliance on contract staffing and volunteer forces that had been put forward by much more reform-minded junior officers in the past.

In part, the issue has been cast in terms which are slightly unreal. That is, either all conscript or all volunteer. The outcome is going to be some mixture of the two, and the question is the balance. Right now in some services, there is already considerable reliance on what are essentially professional soldiers. In the Navy, there are going to be more experiments with additional contract arrangements starting this fall. They are supposed to spread to other parts of the services. My guess is that we will see a slow evolution towards a mixed force, but one which relies much more heavily on long term volunteer contract arrangements.

MR. OCHMANEK: Someone in the audience has done us the favor of cutting right to the quick. I would like to attempt to answer the question and then ask my colleagues to comment on my answer. The question is, does the Soviet Union still represent a realistic military threat to the United States, with realistic underscored. If I could reword the question slightly, I would say, does the Soviet Union still represent a serious threat to the United States, one worthy of playing a role in our force planning and strategy planning?

My answer to that question is an unambiguous yes. There is a tremendous amount of uncertainty with respect to the future political make-up and policies of the Soviet Union. Let us not kid ourselves that we have any better capability to project the future of the Soviet Union now than we did two or three years ago when we all thought the Soviets were going to continue to be a nasty, anti-Western, militarized, expansionist country. We simply do not know what kinds of international objectives a Soviet Union or its successor state or states might have, two or three or five or ten years from now.

Moreover, it seems quite likely that the Soviet Union or its

successor state or states will continue to possess sizeable forces, both nuclear and conventional; that a Russia stripped away of all of its empire internally, will remain the largest military power in Europe.

Finally, political stability has always depended upon an underlying set of military stabilities and balances. I would like to see us get away from debates about the plausibility of a Soviet attack on Europe and focus on the existence of military capabilities and on the uncertainty of the future course of the Soviet Union. We must recognize that until there has been deep and lasting reform in Soviet political and economic institutions, there is still a threat that is very much worthy of our attention.

Gentlemen, do you have any comments on that?

DR. VAN OUDENAREN: I would pretty much agree with that. The Soviet Union, Russia, whatever it ends up being, will present a potential threat to the US that we have to hedge against with our own forces. The only thing I would add is that given the political changes that have happened in Europe and the continued evolution of Japan and China, etc., I would think that if the Soviet Union or Russia does get on its feet again in presenting more of a credible military threat to countries along its periphery, I would hope that, in addition to involvement through its alliances, the Europeans, Japanese and Chinese would also respond. In a sense, we are back in a pre-World War II world in which the Soviet Union or Russia does present a potential threat to everybody around it. But those entities around it, a united Germany, a truly independent Poland, etc. are, at least in theory, in a better position to respond to that threat than they have been in the last few decades when they were divided and had the Soviet forces breathing down their necks right in the center of Europe.

MR. OCHMANEK: Any other reactions?

MR. NURICK: A very quick addition. I, too, would say the short answer is yes. The issue to me is what kind of threat and, therefore, what is the new task for our defense planning? I am focusing here on conventional forces. The nature of the threat, in my view, at least for the next five, ten years is completely transformed. Certainly from the Soviet planner's point of view, as I mentioned before, the loss of Eastern Europe and its infrastructure has meant that a lot of assumptions and basic planning scenarios which we have always been worried about in the West simply are either irrelevant or transformed. The issue now is not whether the Soviet Union could tomorrow amass 100 divisions and march across the inter-German border, because to do that, they would first have to reenter Eastern Europe.

The problem we are going to face, it seems to me, is a matter of defense planning. How do you deter the things that would have to happen for a Soviet conventional threat of the old style to re-emerge? How do you deter reentry into Eastern Europe? That, in turn, raises questions about what kinds of guarantees or security arrangements you make with the East Europeans who clearly want them? The pressure on the West and the US to give them some kind of understanding seems to be increasing at a time when we also want to reassure the Soviet Union that, for the sake of other

political objectives in Europe, we are not going to exploit them, exploit their weakness to the point that they might lash out again.

So that is the new issue, both for defense planning and as a critical problem for diplomacy as well.

DR. RUMER: I very much agree with what was just said by my colleagues. I would like to add one more thing in terms of immediate, perhaps not a physical threat to the United States from the Soviet Union, but a threat to U.S. interests. This immediate threat comes from the very process of transformation of the Soviet Union. In reply to the first question about the break-up of the Soviet Union, there may be new contingencies, new missions which at the present are simply unpredictable. The U.S. may have to be involved and that, in many respects, complicates the planning process. We cannot think of this as happening five or ten years from now. It is something that could occur suddenly at any time over the next five or ten years, but it is a real possibility that may emerge just as suddenly as the situation in the Persian Gulf emerged.

MR. OCHMANEK: Thank you, Gene, I think those were all useful clarifications of what I said. I would add one more thing. In my view, some of the basic elements of our post-war security posture -- the presence of US troops in Europe, the existence of a peacetime alliance between ourselves and the European allies -- some of these things that were created in the 1950s are quite unique in American history and may well be irreplaceable. I may be accused of old thinking. I have been by some of the people sitting here. But I would hate to see us dismantle any of those prematurely. It might be very difficult to recreate them short of war should we finally need to.

I think we have time for one more question. That is, I will direct it to Bob. The question, how influential is the civilian defense community in the Soviet Union and are they playing a major role in the revision of strategy? Is there a Rand in Moscow and are they doing any better than we are at affecting policy?

MR. NURICK: There is not a Rand in the sense of one organization with a large body of analysts who beaver away at these issues. What has happened is there has been a proliferation of civilian analysts who have gotten into the knickers of the military in areas the military kept pretty much as its own domain. As best we can tell, they have broken down some of the old barriers. They have been able to free up information. They have been used as an alternative source of advice and ideas, but it is important not to overstate the case. They, themselves, will express frustration, certainly privately and occasionally publicly, at the difficulties they are still encountering in getting information out of the military. In many cases, they still have to rely on Western sources. This is, again, a sign that the military is not, in many cases, making life easier for them. They are not playing along.

So it is a political struggle. They are, I think, more important. They are having more influence. But they are not yet at the point where we could say that civilian debate and civilian expertise play the same role yet in the Soviet Union that they do in the United States. □

Lt. Gen. Jimmie V. Adams

Commander in Chief-Designate, Pacific Air Forces

Air Force Operations in Desert Shield

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Before I begin my remarks this morning, I would like to thank Mr. Ollie Crawford, the AFA President, and all the members of the Air Force Association, for your tremendous contributions through the years — thanks for the contributions to our country, and especially for your support for the Air Force. For a service that is short on tradition, AFA support of the Air Force has become an institution. In the words of a popular song, your support — ranging from education, to communication, to charitable activities — has always been "the wind beneath our wings." Few better examples exist than this symposium — a wonderful opportunity to renew acquaintances, exchange views, and press for a better Air Force for today and tomorrow. It's also a classy affair including the grand ball tonight.

And, as I look ahead to the future, I believe your support will become even more important to preserve a capable, flexible, modern Air Force ... a force that will be more and more important as we deal with an uncertain future.

As I prepare to move to the Pacific next week, I've spent some time thinking about the last 18 months I've served as the Deputy Chief of Staff/Plans and Operations. I can't imagine any of my predecessors having a more exciting tour. Tiananmen Square, the Berlin Wall, a unified Germany, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the beginning of a market economy for the Soviet Union, Just Cause, and now Desert Shield.

I don't know how many of you have had the opportunity to listen to Dr. Don Rice, the Secretary of the Air Force, as he explains his vision of the future Air Force summarized in the key phrase, "Global Reach—Global Power." This month's *Air Force Magazine* also devotes considerable coverage to Global Reach—Global Power. In his talks and writings, Dr. Rice accurately, succinctly, and eloquently describes our efforts to define our future and the role we'll play in a rapidly changing world. Earlier this year, the Air Force Secretary looked into his crystal ball — which proved to be remarkably accurate — and characterized the uncertain future and the role of the Air Force this way:

"A prominent characteristic of the world of the 1990s and beyond may well be instability. ... The likelihood that the U.S. military will be called upon at some time and place to defend U.S. interests in a lethal environment is high — but now, more than ever, the time and place are difficult to predict. Given the unpredictability of the future, our force planning must call for an increased emphasis on force projection capabilities — a shift toward even more flexible, rapidly responding, precise, lethal forces with global reach. The Air Force's focus will be on emphasizing those inherent characteristics of airpower — speed, range, flexibility, precision, and lethality — which best support U.S. national security in the uncertain world of the 1990s and beyond."

Those words were prophetic. As we're pulled on the one hand by a changing world, and on the other by a constricting budget, a fundamental question emerges. We are forced to ask ourselves, "What role will the Air Force play in a new world order?" The answer is increasingly clear; a role that's the essence of air-power: The ability to react fast, far, and overwhelmingly which is the role envisioned by "Global Reach—Global Power."

When Dr. Rice's White Paper on "Global Reach—Global

Power" was distributed in June of this year, few people realized how quickly the Air Force would be called upon to demonstrate the philosophy stated in the paper. In the rush to welcome the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, some forgot that those changes do not promise a tranquil world ... nor an end to threats to American interests around the world. Saddam Hussein serves as a reminder that the disappearance of the Iron Curtain makes this a momentous era; but not a stable one. Our operations in Desert Shield are providing the proof of the vision embodied in Global Reach—Global Power. Let's turn to the five basic objectives that frame the Air Force plan to achieve and maintain global reach.

Those five objectives are:

- Sustaining deterrence
- Providing versatile combat forces
- Supplying rapid global mobility
- Controlling the high ground
- Building American influence

The first objective, the need to sustain deterrence with nuclear forces, remains intact. As we attempt to conclude an equitable and verifiable strategic treaty with the Soviets, we will continue to have a need for a modernized strategic force. But I want to focus on Southwest Asia today, so I leave strategic forces for another speech.

The second objective of the Global Reach vision is also a fundamental part of our planning — providing a versatile combat force for theater operations and power projection. In June, the Secretary described the ability to concentrate force in a responsive manner over great distances — to change the military and/or political conditions necessitating the response — as a key attribute of the Air Force. And in August, we proved the wisdom of those words.

F-15s from the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing at Langley, supported by SAC tankers, MAC airlift, and AWACS, landed at bases in Southwest Asia within 24 hours of the President's decision to deploy forces to protect Saudi Arabia. The 1st Tac Fighter Wing commander [Colonel John (Boomer) McBroom] said after arrival, "Airpower stopped Saddam Hussein in his tracks." He may have overstated the effect, but I do believe the fact that the United States was able to respond quickly was a very important consideration for Hussein.

The third objective of Global Reach—Global Power is also being demonstrated in Desert Shield — maintaining the capability to supply rapid global mobility with tankers and airlift.

It's a long way to the Persian Gulf — 7,000 miles from East Coast bases and 10,000 from the West Coast. MAC has been doing a superb job in carrying out an immense task — transporting people, material, and systems to the Gulf. Some historical comparisons can give you some idea of the magnitude of the effort.

MAC aircrews have flown more than 60 million miles and carried more than 300 million pounds of cargo to date. We surpassed the ton-miles carried throughout the 450-day Berlin Airlift in the first 25 days of Desert Shield. We moved more forces and equipment in the first three weeks of Desert Shield than we moved in the first three months of the Korean War. And in the first month, airlift carried almost twice the troops and cargo as in the

peak month of Vietnam.

To make the comparison in another way, TRANSCOM has moved the equivalent of the city of San Bernardino, California, with all its people, cars, trucks, household goods, hospitals, stores with stock, phone system, and water supply from here to Saudi Arabia twice! Well over five billion pounds of material and the people to use it have been moved over seven-to-ten thousand miles, or more, on land, sea, and through the air; and more is going. That's global reach, and it means global power.

The fourth objective of Global Reach — controlling the high ground with space and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) — is also readily evident in Desert Shield. To give you some idea of the size of the effort, we have as many telephone lines and operators in-theater as they have in Riverside. And our controllers handle more air traffic than Los Angeles International — and we go around the clock! Our command and control is good now and improving daily. It will be critical to the success of combat operations. In the air, our AWACS are integrated with the Saudis' and we are tied in with the other services and our allies. We are also supporting all the services and our allies with space systems, providing real-time weather imagery, communications, and navigational data. We're operating in Desert Shield in all the arenas — land, sea, air, space. The capabilities we built in the 1980s are allowing us to respond in the 1990s.

We're increasing U.S. influence by strengthening our allies and our relationships — the fifth, and final, objective of "Global Reach—Global Power." The United States is helping, in concert with our allies, to shape the post-Cold War world — protecting freedom, supporting our allies, and, at the same time, making decisions regarding our views of our role as a global nation in a changing world. Nowhere is that cooperation more apparent than with the multinational effort supporting Desert Shield. Today more than 25 nations are allied in their efforts to prevent further Iraqi aggression.

That's the Big Picture. Now I would like to talk about some of the details, people, and issues of the operation and share with you some of the impressions I got during the very quick four days I spent in the region a month ago.

Our Air Force people in the Gulf are doing a superb job along side of their Army, Marine, Navy, and Coast Guard counterparts, and the servicemen and women of our allies and friends. And when I say Air Force people, I'm talking about the total force — the contributions of the Guard and Reserve forces cannot be overlooked and have been instrumental in our success. Guard and Reserve people volunteered from the first in Operation Desert Shield. At the peak, we had 10,000 Reservists who volunteered their services and about 5,000 volunteers are still participating, in addition to the 4,500 Reservists who have been called to active-duty. We are truly the total force concept in action in Southwest Asia.

Just like the other service men and women, our Air Force people are hot, and thankful for the recent break in the weather in the Saudi desert where the average daytime highs have dropped from August's peak of 115°-plus to highs of "only" 95° to 100°F. They're dusty with the talcum-like grit of the Saudi desert. We're taking special measures to keep it out of airplanes and components. They're living in tents, wearing the desert camouflage BDUs they call "chocolate chips." They're drinking non-alcoholic beer, which loses the small appeal it has when it's "chilled" to 120°. And they're fiercely proud of their country, their Air Force, and themselves.

And they are adapting very well to the harsh desert environment. We've dealt with windshields being eroded by the Saudi sand. We've dealt with desert conditions before. We know how to operate in that environment. We know how to fly and fight in that

environment. We have deployed a tremendous armada to the Arabian peninsula — hundreds of airplanes and thousands of people. Twenty-plus tent cities [110 ten-person tents per tent city] — and I do mean cities — with housing, hospitals (500-plus beds), cooking facilities, mess halls, and power and water supplies — have sprung up, seemingly overnight. True, the housing is made of canvas and so are the hospitals, but the capabilities are awesome.

While the force size and composition are similar to that used in Vietnam, the combat capability has dramatically improved. These improvements are a direct result of wise investments our country made in the 1980s. Let me remind you of some of them.

We spent almost a billion dollars on prepositioning equipment in Southwest Asia and that has proved to be a wise investment. Fuel, ammunition, medical supplies, and general support cargo were all on their way to the Gulf in a matter of a few days; and got there much sooner than would have been possible if they would have come from the States. And the prepositioning saved precious airlift and sealift. Much of this would not have been hauled by airlift. But if we had had to do it, it would have taken 10,000 C-141s to have the equipment we had prepositioned over there.

And for the mobility forces, airlift has grown appreciably and greatly increased its flexibility with the buy of an additional 50 C-5s and 48 KC-10s, and the stretch of the C-141s. The KC-10 also adds to our reach when used as a tanker and the reengining of the KC-135 increases its off-load capability by 50 percent.

These improvements have been critical to getting our forces to the Gulf — each F-4G from George refueled an average of 19 times on the way to the Arabian Peninsula; F-15s from Langley tanked an average of seven times. To date, Air Force tankers have flown nearly 32,000 hours, conducted nearly 10,000 refuelings, and off-loaded more than 168 million pounds of fuel or about 26 million gallons, enough to run all the cars in Redlands, California, for a year.

Tankers are not only important for deployment of our forces but also for adding range and loiter time for employment. This is especially important on the Arabian Peninsula where distances between the bases are significant — Riyadh to Kuwait City is 280 nautical miles and any map will show that the distance from Oman to Baghdad is 835 nautical miles.

The Air Force fighter modernization program has provided a very reliable, accurate, lethal force. In-commission rates are running near 90 percent on all the aircraft we have there. We are benefiting from a sizable investment in reliability. It is also a payoff for the investment we made in parts in the mid-1980s. We have been underfunded in parts over the past four years. What we have to do is go back and rebuild that capability. The weapons delivery accuracy for the F-16 is approximately three times better than the F-4 it replaced and our inventory of precision-guided weapons — electro-optical, infrared, and laser-guided — has grown significantly.

Perhaps the most dramatic improvement in the past ten years has been in the capability to conduct combat operations at night. F-15Es, F-111Fs with Pave Tack pods and F-117s add a new dimension to the CINC's options for conduct of the battle. The night is no longer safe for Iraqi forces.

While these technological advances add greatly to the Air Force's global power, the key ingredient is our people. The all-volunteer force has been a great success story for the Air Force. Our troops are bright (75% are recruited from the top 50 percentile by mental category), well-educated (99% high school, 66% have college credits, over 50% of the officers have advanced degrees), dedicated and well trained.

Let me spend a few minutes on training. In the late '70s, our fighter pilots were flying 12 hours per month. Today, they get

nearly 20 hours per month. Not only has there been a near 100-plus percent increase in flying hours, the quality of that training has increased as well. Previously the focus was on event-oriented training, for example, going to the range and dropping bombs. Today the focus has shifted to more realistic training much like that expected in combat — composite forces, large scale exercises, and deployments to potential wartime beddown bases.

This shift in training focus costs money, but the payoff today was well worth the investment.

I would like to get to your questions, so let me close by saying this: Global reach and global power is more than just a vision. Hussein's threat to world order reminds us that we must maintain the capability to "reach out and touch somebody" anywhere and anytime the National Command Authorities direct.

Our action in the Gulf is not about religion, greed, or cultural differences, as some would have us believe. As President Bush said in August,

"... Our action in the Gulf is about fighting aggression — and preserving the sovereignty of nations. It is about keeping our word

and standing by old friends. And it is about our own national security interests and ensuring the peace and stability of the world."

Desert Shield is not a struggle between "haves" and "have nots" in the traditional sense of that phrase.

Iraq was already the owner of the second largest oil reserves in the world — second only to Saudi Arabia. But in the final analysis, Desert Shield is a conflict between the "haves" and "have nots." Saddam and the Iraqi forces "have" Kuwait and Kuwaiti people "have not."

We have amassed the most capable Air Force ever on the Arabian Peninsula. The investments in training, spares, parts, and people have paid off. Clearly, we can have a smaller force than previously required for the Central European scenario, but it must be ready. We've seen from the limited warning time we had in the Gulf, just as in Panama, that we have no time to train or rearm after a crisis begins. We need to be careful to preserve our options, to make sure that we're ready for the next Hussein, just as we are ready for the one we face today.

Thank you.

Lt Gen Jimmie V. Adams - Questions & Answers

QUESTION: The first question for General Adams. Is progress being made in rationalizing the military command structure among the multinational forces in the Persian Gulf?

GEN. ADAMS: I speak only as an observer because that is the CINC's business as he puts it together. From my experience over there about a month ago, I was very pleased to see the way the air forces had been integrated. I can only talk about that because it is the only area in which I have any expertise. I really did not discuss it with the ground forces. General Horner is the Central Command, Air Force commander. He is, in fact, designated as the JFACC, the Joint Forces Air Component Commander. He is responsible for establishing the daily flying schedule over the Arabian Peninsula that includes our sister services as well as our allies. They are singing off the same sheet of music so operations day-to-day are well integrated. He is the guy who is orchestrating with the assistance of each of the services and nations represented, and within his headquarters and within the planning cell that does the day-to-day flying operation. He has representation from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps for their flying operations as well as the Saudis and all of those other allies.

The number of allies were about half of what they are today when I was there. But I am confident that he has continued with that arrangement. I think that part of it is very well pulled together, and the command and control from the air standpoint is working very well. I gave a presentation to the Joint Warfare Course that two-stars attend down at Maxwell along with my operations deputy counterparts from the other services. We all viewed it as a textbook operation the way this command and control has been put together for control of the air and the use of the Joint Forces Air Component Command. We suggested they use it in their course.

QUESTION: General Adams, your office in the Pentagon has responsibility for integrating space capabilities with our operational forces. How is this progressing and what examples of space support systems can you discuss in Desert Shield operations?

GEN. ADAMS: Let me talk first about the organization. As some of you may know, about two years ago a blue ribbon panel on

space was set up to work what was viewed at the time as a problem to normalize space operations within the Air Force. The goal was to treat space capabilities as we treat strategic capabilities and mobility capabilities and tactical capabilities and, in fact, the source of the capability becomes somewhat transparent to the user. There have been some growing pains in space. This is partly due to the mystique, and partly because many space programs grew up in a classified manner, so operational commanders were not always familiar with the capability.

So we reviewed very carefully things we might do to make the commanders more familiar with those capabilities, while spreading those space experts around the Air Force so they were more conversant with the rest of Air Force operational needs and capabilities. We looked for areas for cooperation, where we could exploit the unique and important contribution space makes. This has been an ongoing process. I have a space general on my staff, but he is not my space expert in terms of being in charge of a space organization. He is, in fact, there to become very knowledgeable in total Air Force operations so he will be more useful to the space business. He also can advise me informally as needed. He is not the conduit for the total space dialogue outside or inside the building, but he is a helper. We have placed space personnel at all major air commands to serve as a point of contact with that staff and as an advisor to the commander on ways space programs can better be utilized.

In Desert Shield, we have a huge concentration of communications capability that we have derived from space systems, from real-time weather capability, from intelligence collection capabilities, from GPS. One of the best sellers is a commercially available GPS receiver the troops are using in the field and on ships for a very precise location. I think you will see a great contribution from what we call the high ground for Desert Shield. I am encouraged about what is happening in Desert Shield and the awareness of all the operational commanders for that capability. It is a highly leveraged program in terms of providing us increased capability.

QUESTION: General Adams, would you discuss any planning decisions, planning arrangements that have been made

on the possible rotation schedules for deployed forces in the Persian Gulf?

GEN. ADAMS: Not all of those have come together. The major air commands have been asked to come in with their recommendations on how to handle the rotation policy. The CINC will be, and should be, in charge of how that rotation policy is implemented. Our goal is to maintain the level of combat capability in theater that the CINC, General Schwartzkopf, requires to do whatever job he feels he has to do or he has been directed by the National Command Authority to do. I think, in general, the numbers will be somewhere between six months and a year, but I would not be too precise until everybody has had a chance to vote.

There are some unique capabilities over there where we do not have a lot of other units or individuals who could replace them. We have to deal with how we will work that problem. In other cases, we certainly have fighter squadrons capable of replacing those in the Gulf and we will work that. There is some thought that a major factor will be the living conditions. In more harsh, austere living conditions, you may want to rotate units more quickly than those in less austere conditions. Another factor is operations tempo in which the individual or unit participates.

We do not have it nailed down, but we need to soon. If it is going to be as short as six months, then in order to phase that rotation so that not everyone is moving at the same time, we need to get on with these things. We hope to hear very soon on that.

There is another factor in how we do this rotation policy. I talked to you about the Guard and Reserve call-up. You know the President has authority for 200,000 to be called up for 90 days with a renewal for an additional 90 days. We have not yet received authority for the renewal. The planning factor is based either on Reservists being on active duty for 90 days or, alternatively, being on active duty for 180 days. As we use 10,000 Reservists or more, then whether we have them for 90 days or 180 days will be an important factor. We are still looking at that.

QUESTION: The next question is a combination of a couple, but they refer to the subject of logistics and sustainability in Desert Shield and the spare parts. How is that part of our operation standing up?

GEN. ADAMS: As I indicated earlier, we had pre-positioned a good amount of material over there, so the CINC, I believe, is comfortable with the munitions available to him. We are comfortable that we have sufficient spare parts today to conduct the level of operations tempo that he would desire. I do not mean indefinitely, but he has in place enough to do the job early with sufficient sustainment capability through airlift and sealift to continue for the long haul. We did a surge operation in the beginning and those units deployed with spare parts and the capability to operate for a given period. Then we went into a sustainment mode and we are in that sustainment mode now.

We are establishing our intermediate maintenance capabilities where that is essential to longer term operations. There are places within the theater and places outside the theater where we have

established airlift channels to maintain those forces for the long haul. We are prepared to do that. We are prepared to do whatever contingency the CINC calls for with the forces there today.

QUESTION: You mentioned the difficult weather and the grit and the sand. How are we forecasting those sand storms over there, and how do they affect our operations?

GEN. ADAMS: Well, I think we can forecast generally what the wind is going to be. Let me say first that because the sand is so fine, there is a lot of haze in the air. You think about a desert environment where you can see forever, but in fact, with a little wind you get a lot of haze and that haze will go to 10,000 feet. There are a lot of suspended, very fine particles from the dust in the air regularly. Wind storms will add to that. It will obscure targets for us should the targets be in the middle of that storm. If they are, then it is not so easy for their ground troops to operate in that kind of environment.

I do not know that it is a great hinderance, but certainly it is one of the things we will have to worry about. The weather people have worked hard to ensure that we can have as much understanding of where sand storms are and what they are and the effect they have on the individual target acquisition by the pilot, and our electro-optical and infrared systems as well.

QUESTION: A question with regard to the Joint Chiefs. Can you describe the process of planning between the Chiefs and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the relationship with the war-fighting CINC?

GEN. ADAMS: I do not have any blazing insight other than the process is working as the process has been designed. Let me see if I can address in general terms how that process has worked in Desert Shield.

Obviously, the CINC continues to have the responsibility to conduct in-theater the operation he is directed to conduct. He has the latitude to do it in the manner he thinks is most appropriate. That is not done without consultation, obviously. Periodically, he has consulted with the Chairman in his rightful role as the senior military officer in the chain, as well as with the Secretary of Defense. In many of those consultations, the Chiefs have been present. Remembering that the services' role is to organize, train and equip, our job is to assist in any manner that the CINC requires. But the real job of planning or conducting any operation in-theater rests with that CINC. In my view, Desert Shield is going directly by the letter of the law.

QUESTION: Thank you very much, General Adams. We have one last question, an easy one. What will you be doing to fix all the problems General McPeak is leaving behind in the Pacific?

GEN. ADAMS: As heady as those problems are, I have thoroughly enjoyed wrestling with the problems in Washington, but I look forward very much to taking on those new challenges.

We thank you very much. Well-deserved in your new assignment. (Applause)

(Whereupon the meeting was adjourned.) □

Air Force Association

The Air Force Association (AFA) is an independent veterans' organization whose objective is to promote greater understanding of aerospace and national defense issues. Among the ways AFA disseminates information are publication of AIR FORCE Magazine, sponsorship of a series of national symposia, and through educational outreach programs of its affiliate, the Aerospace Education Foundation. AFA is a grass-roots organization. Total membership is over 200,000 of whom more than 31,000 are Life Members. There are 320 AFA chapters in the United States and 28 overseas. The Association has 266 Industrial Associates, and its chapters have established ties locally with more than 2,100 businesses in the Community Partner program. The Air Force Association was incorporated in the District of Columbia on February 6, 1946.



The Aerospace Education Foundation

On May 1, 1956, the Air Force Association established the Aerospace Education Foundation (AEF). The Foundation was established as a nonprofit organization in order to formulate and administer AFA's educational outreach programs. AEF is supported through tax-deductible contributions. Over the past thirty-four years, the Foundation has made progress in educating AFA's members and the public about the critical role aerospace development plays in the modern world. By doing so, the Foundation promotes a greater understanding of technological advancements and aerospace education. AEF's programs also encourage higher education in the technological career fields. The Foundation sponsors symposia, roundtables, workshops, contests, and many other programs in order to highlight the full range of educational interests of the Association, and to help meet the growing need for scientific and technological expertise.



Aerospace Education Foundation
1501 Lee Highway
Arlington, Virginia 22209-1198

The Aerospace Education Foundation, the non-profit affiliate of the Air Force Association, was established in 1956 to formulate and administer the Association's educational outreach programs. Supported through tax-deductible contributions (all donations to AEF are used solely for programs and scholarships) the Foundation sponsors scholarships, technical studies, symposia, educator workshops and contests designed to promote aerospace education and help meet the need for scientific and technological expertise. The Aerospace Education Foundation is a tax-exempt 501 (c)(3) corporation. Tax identification #52-6043929

PARTE DE INFORMACION N°

PARA CONOCIMIENTO DE: De Acuerdo al Distribuidor.

AREA DE ICIA. RELACIONADA: Componente Militar. País: CANADA.

ASUNTO: El futuro de la Fuerza Aérea Canadiense.

I - INFORMACION

1. Con este título, la "Asociación de Defensa de CANADA" publicó un libro reuniendo en él, los conceptos vertidos en la conferencia que en ese Instituto fuera expuesto por personalidades civiles y militares de CANADA.
2. El prólogo fue presentado por el Brigadier General William J. YOST, Director de Operaciones del Instituto.
3. Expresó que CANADA estaba pasando momentos favorables, consecuentes del apoyo dado a la política de la OTAN y NORAD, liderando la política de "cielos abiertos".
4. Por el contrario, la disminución de los presupuestos del Estado incidió en mayor medida en los gastos de defensa que se sintieron afectados en un 30 % y pese a que el gobierno intenta explicar la importancia que tiene su responsabilidad de garantizar la seguridad de sus ciudadanos y la soberanía sobre todo el territorio nacional, continúa efectuando cortes al presupuesto de defensa al punto que próximamente será imposible entrenar y operar las fuerzas de "propósito general", que integran la OTAN y a los observadores de las NACIONES UNIDAS.
5. Mientras tanto, las estructuras de las fuerzas canadienses están siendo revisadas por el Cuartel General Nacional de la Defensa, pero los veedores estarían esperando conocer el nuevo presupuesto de la defensa, antes de continuar su labor.
6. El General AJGD de CHASTELAIN, Jefe del Estado Mayor de la Defensa, presentó los COMENTARIOS PRELIMINARES. En ellos analizó tres situaciones que ejercen un considerable impacto en el futuro desarrollo de las Fuerzas Canadienses.

Factores Relevantes Positivos

- Transporte:

- Gran cantidad de puertos en ambos océanos.

- Aceptable sistema carretero.

- Eficiente transporte aéreo.

Comunicaciones:

- Desarrollo interno y coherente del sistema telefónico.

- Conciencia de las autoridades en la necesidad de mantener instalaciones modernas, dado las dimensiones del país.

- Aceptables conexiones telegráficas nacionales e internacionales.

Factores Relevantes Negativos

- Transporte:

- Obsoleta red ferroviaria

- Alto costo requerido para el mantenimiento del material ferroviario.

7. Estos son: la situación estratégica entre la OTAN y el PACTO DE VARSOVIA; la situación financiera en general, dentro de la cual los presupuestos de la defensa son los más afectados y finalmente el incremento de problemas internos tales como los surgidos en el área de los derechos humanos, conservación de energía y las diferencias que existen en una población con dos lenguas diferentes.

8. El Primer Capítulo expresa lo expuesto por el Teniente General FR SUTHERLAND - Comandante Aéreo.

9. Gráficamente demostró que el año pasado (1989), la Fuerza Aérea había volado 282.000 horas, en roles asignados y misiones que contribuyeron a asegurar la soberanía de CANADA. Algunas de estas misiones, que costaron la vida de 14 tripulantes, fueron las siguientes:


- Sistema Norte de Vigilancia.
- Misiones anti-droga.
- Interceptación de aviones soviéticos.
- Búsqueda y Salvamento.
- Ayuda a la población.
- Apoyo a las NACIONES UNIDAS.
- Ayuda al Departamento Pesquero.
- Polución marítima por efecto del petróleo.
- Servicios a investigaciones atmosféricas.

10. Con relación al futuro de la fuerza, estima que tendrá que superar un triple desafío:

- Desarrollar una visión clara y precisa.
- Determinar cómo realizar esa visión.
- Continuar con las tareas correspondientes teniendo en cuenta las limitaciones fiscales.

11. Finalmente expresó que la visión de la Fuerza a la que aspira no es efímera ni etérea, sino real y pragmática. Los elementos fundamentales de esa visión son:

- Racionalización de la Flota Aérea.
- Flexibilidad.



Su sistema de comunicaciones permite las conexiones nacionales e internacionales, mediante redes de microondas, telefónicas, radiotelefónicas y televisión del Estado y privadas.

MEXICO cuenta con una extensa red telefónica que lo ubica entre los países con mayor número de teléfonos del mundo.

Desde 1968 funciona una estación terrena para comunicaciones vía satélite; actualmente se encuentra en estudio la construcción de otra antena parabólica de 32 mts. de diámetro.

Su red de Telex abarca, mediante 61 centrales, las principales ciudades del país.

Cuenta con 6 canales de televisión con cobertura nacional, de las cuales 2 son estatales.

Desarrollo intenso del Sistema Nacional de Telecomunicaciones coherente con las necesidades del país y conciencia de las autoridades gubernamentales en la necesidad de mantener constantemente modernizado el Sistema.

Se aprecia que la vecindad de EE.UU., juega un rol importante en el asesoramiento y mantenimiento de estos medios de comunicación.

- Mantenimiento de la experiencia.
- Complementación con la industria básica de la defensa.
- Integridad de la Fuerza Aérea.

12. Ellos, lograrán asegurar los siguientes criterios:

- Concordancia de dicha misión con la política de gobierno.
- Deberá ser factible.
- Deberá ser realista.
- Deberá ser comprensibles.
- Deberá ser aceptable dentro y fuera de la Fuerza.

13. El Segundo Capítulo, resume las expresiones del Brigadier General JEJ BOYLE, Comandante de la 1a. División Aérea. Fueron suyas las siguientes expresiones:

14. Los cambios impuestos por el Sr. GORBACHOV fueron transferidos, en cierta manera, también a la ideología y al poder real de la NATO. A su vez la contribución de la Fuerza Aérea canadiense se debió adaptar a las nuevas exigencias de la OTAN y fue así que debió poner a su disposición las tres siguientes Fuerzas:

- a) Fuerzas Nucleares Estratégicas.
- b) Fuerzas Nucleares de Intermedia y Corto Alcance.
- c) Fuerzas Convencionales Terrestres, Aéreas y Marítimas, las que actuando enlazadas constituyen la fuerza de disuasión de la OTAN.

15. CANADA contribuye con la 1a. División Aérea, con asiento en ALEMANIA OCCIDENTAL, compuesta por la 3a. Ala de Combate (en LAHR) y la 4a. Ala de Combate (en BADEN-SOELLINGEN), todas equipadas con CF-18 HORNET.

16. En el pasado la OTAN se basó en una tecnología más avanzada para compensar la superioridad numérica del PACTO DE VARSOVIA. Sin embargo, esta tecnología fue prontamente alcanzada en los últimos años con la presentación de los bombarderos tácticos FULCRUM y FLANKER. Esta nueva generación de bombarderos posee una extraordinaria capacidad para "ver y disparar" y emplea la moderna versión de armas aire-aire, tales como los misiles ARCHER y ALAMO.

VI.2.3- Sistema de Microondas.

La red federal de microondas abarca 2.700 canales telefónicos y una señal de televisión con 3 a 4 canales de sonido de alta fidelidad. Tiene una longitud simple de 14,056 Km. y su capacidad es de 16,3 millones de kilómetros -circuitos de telefonía; 47 mil Km. canal para la televisión y 27,1 mil Km. canal de reserva.

A través de esta red, desde septiembre del 76 a la fecha, el servicio de conducción de señales de imagen y sonido transmitió 633 horas a la semana dentro del país y para el servicio ocasional realizó 780 enlaces nacionales, 675 internacionales y 31 locales (dentro de un radio de 25 Km).

17. El reemplazo de los aviones MIG 21 FISHBED, MIG 25 FOXBAT y SU 22 FITTER por FULCRUM, FLANKER y FROGOT ha permitido incrementar en un 20 % la capacidad estimada del PACTO DE VARSOVIA. Además este ha desarrollado una mayor capacidad para la guerra química y nuclear.

18. Como contrapartida y contribución a la OTAN, la 1er. CAD (Canadian Air División) se ha responsabilizado de las siguientes tareas:

- . Procurar, junto con sus aliados de la OTAN, imponer una dente ante una posible agresión del PACTO DE VARSOVIA.
- . En caso de hostilidades, efectuar operaciones de ataque en el Frente Europeo Central.

19. Debido a la dualidad de la capacidad del CF-18 a la 1er. CAD, se le podrían encomendar las siguientes misiones:

- Defensa Aérea.
- Interdicción Aérea.
- Apoyo a las misiones ofensivas.

20. La posibilidad de poder efectuar estas operaciones depende de dos elementos: Defensa Activa y Defensa Pasiva.

- DEFENSA ACTIVA: Compuesta por fuerzas de defensa de instalaciones y fuerza de defensa antiaérea, cuya tarea consiste en proveer seguridad dentro del perímetro del Aereopuerto.
- DEFENSA PASIVA: El más significativo aporte de CANADA a la OTAN es el CF-18, avión monoposto, bimotor, comandos electrónicos, exponente de la más avanzada tecnología moderna, de uso múltiple, con gran capacidad operativa en misiones aire-aire, como así también aire-tierra, y con capacidad de carga de una serie de armas variadas.

La configuración standard para operaciones aire-aire está compuesta de dos misiles SIDEWINDER ubicados en las puntas de las alas; dos misiles SPARROW ubicados en la estación principal y la posibilidad de dos misiles adicionales ubicados en los pilones exteriores; 570 disparos de munición de 20 mm. de uso múltiple y hasta tres tanques de combustibles.

También es impresionante la carga aire-tierra; puede llevar hasta 10 bombas en racimo o 10 bombas de uso general, o hasta

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VI.2.1. Alfabriscos.

- Telecomunicaciones rurales

El objetivo de la comisión de telecomunicaciones rurales es llevar los servicios de telefonía a zonas marginales del país. Para ello ha puesto en operación 1328 km. de líneas telefónicas, que llevarán un beneficio a más de 350 mil habitantes rurales. Además han iniciado nuevas obras para continuar comunicándose con otras localidades.

Merced al avance de la tecnología, en breve se usarán generadores de energía eléctrica alimentados por luz solar, para poner en funcionamiento servicios de telefonía rural en las regiones más apartadas del país. Este sistema, sumado a los que se hallan en desarrollo, permitirán, en los próximos seis años comunicar a 10.000 poblaciones más.

La Compañía Mexicana de Teléfonos, que tiene la concesión respectiva del sistema desde 1878, es la que se encargará del servicio en su faz integral.

- Teléfonos

En la actualidad, el país cuenta con 3 millones de teléfonos en funcionamiento, ubicándose entre los países con más densidad telefónica del mundo.

Todo lo atinente a la planificación, construcción y mantenimiento del sistema telefónico mexicano, está a cargo de Teléfonos de México, de carácter estatal.

ocho cápsulas de cohetes (cada una conteniendo cohetes 19 CRV-7). A pesar de este formidable equipamiento para aire-tierra, para su propia protección, también puede cargar cohetes SIDEWINDER y SPARROW.

21. El Tercer Capítulo se refiere a lo expuesto por el General J.L. PIOTROWSKI, Comandante de la NORAD, referentes a los compromisos y futuro de la NORAD, siendo algunos de sus conceptos los siguientes:

22. El futuro de NORAD, de una u otra forma, se encuentra en manos de tres naciones: los ESTADOS UNIDOS, CANADA y la UNION SOVIETICA. Países estos tan diferentes en cuanto a su política interna y exterior. Asimismo, se siente afectado por el despliegue que efectuó la URSS de sus cohetes balísticos SS-24, SS-25 y bombarderos BLACKJAC.

23. Si bien el futuro de NORAD dependerá de las acciones y reacciones de estos tres países, podría predecirse que no solamente se mantendrá vigente, sino que crecerá porque los factores que la originaron se mantienen actualizados, estos son:

- Proteger la soberanía de ambos países (EEUU - CANADA).
- Advertir y asesorar a los conductores de sus FFAA.
- La necesidad de trabajar en conjunto.

24. El Capítulo Cuarto es expuesto por el Doctor M. F. YALDEN, titulado: LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS: LA DISPUTA POR EL LIDERAZGO.

25. Este pone de manifiesto la importancia que los derechos humanos han adquirido en las Fuerzas Armadas Canadienses.

26. El Capítulo Quinto al Doctor J.S. FINAN, del Departamento Nacional de la Defensa. Se refiere a la desconformidad de los pilotos de la Fuerza Aérea Canadiense. El estudio demostró que las causas principales fueron:

- Salarios bajos.
- Insuficientes horas de vuelo.
- Demanda de pilotos de las empresas comerciales.

La red ferroviaria tiene un trazado casi exclusivo- mente longitudinal en dirección N-S. Sólo existen dos rutas transversales entre el PACÍFICO y el GOLFO: la primera entre MATAMOROS y los puertos de TAMPICO y VERACRUZ; la segunda, de SALINA CRUZ a COATEPECALCOS. Para esta disposición N-S existió un factor físico muy influyente: la disposición del relieve, que dificultaba el enlace entre los dos océanos; además, en el período de las grandes construcciones ferroviarias, a finales del siglo pasado, las perspectivas de carga entre las zonas costeras, de escasos y mal desarrollados recursos naturales, eran muy limitadas. El predominio longitudinal se completa con un núcleo radial, determinando por el medio físico y la evolución histórica, que culmina en el Distrito Federal y la Ciudad de México. Aquí terminan tres grandes troncos: que nacen en la frontera de E.U. y que continúan otros tantos ferrocarriles americanos:

1) Línea MEXICALI-HUATSIMILTO-MAZATLÁN-GUADALAJARA-GUAY-
REHARO-MÉXICO;

2) CIUDAD JUÁREZ-CHIHUAHUA-TORREÓN-AGUASCALIENTES-GUAY-
REHARO-MÉXICO;

3) TAMPICO-NONTERREY-SAN LUIS POTOSÍ-QUERÉJARO-MÉXICO.

En la capital comienzan los ferrocarriles a VERACRUZ por XALAPA y PUEBLA y los trazados de ACAPULCO, OAXACA y TUXTEPEC. El único ferrocarril independiente es el yucateco, con centro en KEBIDA y ramales a CAMPESHE, PETO y VALLADOLID, y los escasos ramales existentes hasta la fecha: MAZATLÁN-TORREÓN-NONTERREY-MATAMOROS; TAMPICO-SAN LUIS POTOSÍ-AGUASCALIENTES Y SALINA CRUZ-COATEPECALCOS. Finalmente hay que señalar los ramales que unen esta última línea con SUCHIATE, GUAY-
MALA y los ferrocarriles yucatecos.

Los ferrocarriles sufren en la actualidad la competencia del transporte por carretera, cada vez más difundido.

- Consideraciones sobre comportamiento.

28. Estas motivaron que en el año 1989, 201 pilotos abandonaran la Fuerza Aérea.

29. Las condiciones en que se encontraban las FFAA fueron un factor fundamental para superar estos inconvenientes y ellas dependían de factores ~~significantes~~ internos. Entre los primeros, conflictos como AFGANISTAN, MALVINAS y en ESTADOS UNIDOS, la Iniciativa de Defensa Estratégica, fueron relevantes del desarrollo militar en determinados sectores; pero el advenimiento de una nueva era de pacificación afectaron ese prestigio aumentando la desconformidad.

30. Entre los factores domésticos (o internos) se puede decir que la incorporación de una nueva aeronave (CF-18) ha sido un elemento relevante de la moral, al igual que la presentación del nuevo LIBRO BLANCO DE LA DEFENSA.

31. El Doctor FINAN culminó con las siguientes conclusiones:

- La Fuerza Aérea, como organización mixta, se ha visto afectada por cambios sociales domésticos y reducción de amenazas, las que conjuntamente, en principio, han fortalecido la autoridad del modo operativo utilitario de los pilotos de la Fuerza Aérea.
- En resumen, para sus pilotos, es posible que la Fuerza Aérea pase a ser una organización más subordinada (diferente a una organización fundamental). La autoridad calculativa sobre el tipo moral de compromiso puede llegar a ser la norma. El porcentaje de desconformidad de los pilotos reflejará estas diferencias.

32. El capítulo Sexto titulado COMPROMISOS DE LA FUERZA AEREA EN EL FUTURO. Se refiere a lo expuesto por el Brigadier General W.R.DOBSON, Director General de las Fuerzas de Desarrollo.

33. Describe los múltiples factores de carácter general o nacional que influirán en el destino y futuro de la Fuerza y obtiene la conclusión de que CANADA tendrá que estudiar muy bien la fuerza que necesita para asegurar su seguridad y soberanía. Para ello tendrá que tener muy en cuenta la ~~expansión~~ expansión demográfica, el consumo de las reservas energéticas; los adelantos tecnológicos y otros factores que influirán en el mundo del futuro.

Además, el ferrocarril transistmico de LIMA-PUERTO MORENO, que se General, tanto en el movimiento de pasajeros como de carga.

La actual carretera transistmica, permite disponer de una capacidad suficientemente amplia para soportar el tránsito de vehículos actual, así como también el que existe en los próximos 20 años.

La modernización del tramo COAZACOVILLOS-MINATITLÁN y la construcción del camino a la ciudad de ACAYUCAN, permitirá satisfacer los índices de crecimiento económico y demográfico manifestados en la región.

El ferrocarril para satisfacer nuevas exigencias, deberá finalizar las obras previstas. Así, tendrá una capacidad de 17 trenes por día, destinados al puente terrestre.

La capacidad de movimiento en las terminales marítimas se proyecta para 360 contenedores de 40 pies en 18 horas, donde la estada de un barco será de 36 horas.

En la operación conjunta del transporte carretero y ferrocarril, de acuerdo con las actuales condiciones el ferrocarril moverá 108 contenedores (30% de las 360 unidades estimadas), el resto se manejará por autotransporte.

34. Capítulo Séptimo EL DESAFÍO PARA HACER MAS RELEVANTE EL CONCEPTO DE L/ DEFENSA, EN CANADA. Tema expuesto por el Ministro de Defensa Nacional, honorable W. Mc NIGHT.

35. En un mundo donde la paz parece ser rota en cada momento, la visión canadiense de la defensa es poco relevante. Es que los canadienses no han participado en acciones militares desde la guerra de COREA y la visión de conflictos es lejana y difusa.

36. En CANADA, lo mismo que en algunos otros países la Defensa depende de la voluntad nacional y a menos que el hombre se interese por las fuerzas armadas y tenga convicción de que estas son necesarias y cumplen una función vital en la sociedad, los costos para la defensa seguirán siendo discutidos.

37. Para lograr la modernización y crecimiento de las fuerzas es necesario contar con la voluntad popular, caso contrario será muy difícil convencer a la población de la necesidad de aumentar los aportes para la Defensa.

38. Capítulo Octavo 1989 EN PERSPECTIVA - por el General AJGD de CHASTELAIN.

39. Repitió las situaciones que afectan a las Fuerzas Armadas Canadienses en su actual programa de planificación.

40. Luego, analizando el futuro de las Fuerzas Armadas Canadienses enumeró su rol para el futuro:

- Primero, proveer seguridad nacional, en forma unilateral y en los principios de la alianza; Segundo, participar y fomentar la paz, y participar para que el mundo continúe siendo un mundo de paz; y Tercero, disminuir la amenaza de guerra mediante el control de armas y actividades de desarme.
- Que este hecho, como así también la incertidumbre e inestabilidad en varias áreas del mundo y nuestra política de defensa basada en los principios de la alianza, serán motivos para que CANADA mantenga el equilibrio de sus Fuerzas Armadas, con un propósito general y altamente desplegable.
- Que no se puede seguir con la idea que la protección de la pesca es un hecho que nos aparta de nuestro rol principal: la vida marina es oro. También, el impacto de nuestras ope-

La política económica se orientó a resolver el problema de desempleo con inflación. Las acciones de la política se dirigieron a restaurar la confianza de ahorristas e inversionistas, estimular la recuperación del sistema financiero, aumentar los ingresos fiscales y procurar la realización de los programas de gasto público indispensables para mantener la capacidad de expansión de la economía.

El primer conjunto de acciones se dirigió a la restauración de la confianza, como por ejemplo del signo monetario nacional.

Las políticas de tasas de interés y prácticas cambiarias se dirigieron a fortalecer el proceso de recuperación, del sistema financiero.

En el área del gasto e inversión pública destaca la acción de Petróleos Mexicanos, tanto por su producción para la exportación como la ampliación de sus reservas.

Esto contribuyó a la recuperación de la confianza en las posibilidades del crecimiento rápido del país en el futuro.

raciones militares y el entrenamiento en el ambiente apropiado, harán que las inspecciones se efectúen de manera más minuciosa.

- Que si las Fuerzas Armadas se mantienen con vida, será por su alianza con el comercio, la industria y la cultura de las agencias reguladoras.

II - DISTRIBUIDOR.

SECRETO

5.4.2. Salarios

Entre DIC 1976 y el mismo mes del año anterior, el salario mínimo real creció un 18%. La recuperación de los salarios fue atribuible en parte a las medidas gubernamentales adoptadas para reducir el precio de los productos básicos de consumo y en parte a los incrementos de los salarios nominales acordados en 1976. Estos fueron de 22% al principio de año y de 23% en octubre.

En 1977, el incremento del salario mínimo real fue del 10%, y el previsto para 1978 es del 15%.

Si analizamos estos aumentos con el alza de precios vemos que el poder adquisitivo va perdiendo posiciones, lo cual acarreará serias consecuencias para la población mexicana.

